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ABSTRACT
SOVIET AND MARXIST THEORIES OF ACCUMULATION
by
Nicholas N. Kozlov
University of New Hampshire, May, 1988
The theoretical conceptions of capitalist economy held
by socialists are surprisingly neglected in efforts to ex
plain socialist political practice. Most explanations of
politics, including those offered by Marxists themselves,
emphasize personal, ideological, etc., factors. By providing
a 'theoretical economic history' of the mainstream Marxist
labor movement in the years roughly 1860-1930, this study
contributes to an inductive justification for the claim that
the theory of capitalism implicitly or explicitly held by
Marxist politicians is a considerably more important deter
minant of their political conclusions than is generally
admitted.
After a relatively concise treatment of the First and
pre-war Second Internationals,

in which the general methodo

logical approach will be revealed and some more or less
minor errors of interpretation by various analysts will be
corrected, attention will shift to the Third International
in the years prior to the advent of fascism in Germany. The
usefulness of theoretical economic history will be most
forcefully evident here, as it will be demonstrated that the
iii

politics of the Third International, contrary to most ac
counts, are not primarily rooted in factional struggles
within the Russian party, the general economic/political
problems of socialist construction in Soviet Russia, Sta
l i n ’s personality, e t c . Rather, it will be shown that the
key transformations of the Third International's political
orientation derived from the prevailing theory of capital
ism in communist circles.

iv

INTRODUCTION
The elaboration of an adequate economic theory of cap
italism has been a central feature of the Marxist project
(the work of Karl Marx and his followers) ever since Marx
himself together with Frederick Engels decided "to settle
1
accounts" with their philosophically grounded outlook.
From
the outset, the concern with economic theory has involved
more than the mere satisfaction of intellectual curiosity
about the nature and dynamics of capitalist economy. In good
measure, Marxists have traditionally desired a scientific
theory of capitalism as the pragmatic prerequisite for elab
orating a concrete strategy and tactics for the advance to
socialism, i^.e., to root their conception of this advance in
something other than the propagandistic notion of socialism
as an ethical ideal. This has been true of Marxists with
2
quite diverse orientations. As such, most Marxists would
probably not object to assigning an important role to the
development of economic theory as an explanation of the
progress of Marxist political practice.
This study will be a 'theoretical economic history' of
the mainstream Marxist labor movement in the years roughly
1860-1930, i

, encompassing the First and (pre-war) Second

socialist Internationals and the Third International (or
Communist International or Comintern) in the period up to
the advent of fascism in Germany. The terra 'theoretical
economic history* designates a method in which the principal

objects of analysis are the competing theoretical concep
tions of capitalist economy holding sway over political
agents. The critical analysis of these theoretical concep
tions then becomes the primary instrument for the organiza
tion and comprehension of historical events as such, includ
ing the ’choices’ made by individuals. The general useful
ness or sensibility of this approach will not be defended a
priori--superb accounts of realist methodology are elsewhere
3
available.
Rather, this study seeks to provide some induc
tive support for the writing of theoretical economic history
(at least for the specific example under consideration) by
demonstrating how this approach can clarify and rectify
ambiguities and errors produced by the ’standard'
4
histories.
The principal claim advanced herein is that the theo
retical conception of the capitalist economy held by social
ists at any particular moment is a considerably more signif
icant determinant of their political conclusions than is
generally admitted, and that therefore these theoretical
conceptions should be accorded prominent status in any ef
fort to explain socialist political thinking. The usefulness
of this approach will become most forcefully apparent in the
contrast between the First and Second Internationals on the
one hand, and the Third International on the other.
*

*

*

Among the political issues confronted by the First and
Second Internationals was the problem of working class in

2

ternationalism,

.e^ , the problem of whether and to what

extent workers in different countries would be able to
overcome nationalist strivings and stand in solidarity as a
class against the bourgeoisie. The outbreak of World War I
put an end to any illusions that proletarian international
ism was a given, as masses of workers, without apparent
reluctance, went forth to slaughter one another in the name
of the fatherland.
Let the notion of proletarian internationalism at this
point refer to the more or less well-defined claim that to
be a proletarian (propertyless wage-worker) implies some
form of solidarity or commonality of interests with other
workers that transcends national boundaries. Such a notion
of working class internationalism can plainly be seen to
antedate (and of course overstep the bounds of) the emer
gence of a specifically Marxist section of the working class
5
movement.
Nonetheless, it does not seem unreasonable to
venture that the most unambiguous claims about the basis for
proletarian internationalism

stem from the thinking of Karl

Marx and Frederick Engels. Since the time of the writing of
the Manifesto of the Communist Party, the slogan "The work
ing men have no country" has come to be either vilified or
6
revered, depending on political perspective.
Even a cursory survey of the literature in the Marxist
tradition, however, shows that it would be difficult to
ascribe a specific content to the term 'internationalism',
since its practical meaning has ranged from the very strong
claim that proletarians cannot be persuaded to participate

in imperialist wars to the much weaker notion that workers
in one capitalist nation do not materially benefit (suffer)
from the greater (lesser) exploitation of workers in another
7
capitalist nation or colony.
The first two chapters of this study will serve to show
that (by and large) the political leadership of the Second
International failed to appreciate a crucial feature of
M a r x ’s theory of capitalism, viz., that any effort to

for

mulate a general (in the sense of universal and non
contradictory) material-economic basis either for the neces
sity of proletarian internationalism or its necesary ab
sence, even in the weaker sense of the term, is misplaced.
An understanding of the prospects for working class interna
tionalism must be the result of analysis rather than an
assumption, or a concept present throughout the analysis in
an untransformed ste.te from start to finish, or a ’fact'
given by history. Consequently, internationalism should be
viewed as a political program to be realized, rather than an
objective economically determined ’condition’ in which the
proletariat either does or does not find itself. The corol
lary suggests that historically observable lapses in inter
national working class solidarity are not to be explained
solely by reference to the political and ideological levels
of the social structure. Rather, uneven and contradictory
determinations affecting working class relations can, and
indeed must, also be conceived at the economic level itself.
This is most emphatically not a denial of the significance

4

of politics and ideology for a complete analysis. The point
is that uneven and contradictory tendencies should be ex
pected to operate not only between levels, but within levels
as well.
The bulk of this study will be devoted to the Third
International, insofar as this will be where the approach
adopted herein yields the most striking and controversial
results. The great historical advance of the Third Interna
tional consisted in the practical recovery of the insight
(into the contradictory and complex economic determinations
of politics) only gradually arrived at by Marx over the
course of his theoretical and political activity. IVith the
founding of the Comintern in 1919, there was a radical
displacement of the conditions in which the internationalism
controversy had up until then developed. The strict organi
zational imperatives of the Third International (more on
these later) purposely rendered membership by uncommitted
internationalists for all intents and purposes impossible.
But recognition of the non-deterministic nature of politics
masked a significant shortcoming. Political disagreements
within the Comintern,

and disputes between the Comintern and

reformist working class organizations, were implicitly ex
plained by or ascribed to ideological factors. In other
words, the theory-dependence of political conclusions was
not clearly and unambiguously recognized.'
This practical failure has, not surprisingly, been
reproduced in the historical accounts of the Third Interna
tional. Many if not most Marxist and mainstream explanations

of the crucial 'left turn'

(supposedly around mid-1928) in

the political orientation of the Comintern maintain that the
left turn in Soviet d omestic policies v/as merely transmitted
to the Comintern's international policy and/or that the left
turn stemmed from the triumph of Joseph V. Stalin's faction
in the struggle within the Russian Communist Party (bolshe8
vik), the RCP(b).
The third chapter of this study will
rectify such conceptions by showing that the origins of the
left turn considerably predate Stalin's ascent to power and
surprisingly must be ascribed to the theory of 'capitalist
stabilization' associated with Nikolai I. Bukharin. The few
Marxist writers who appear to take seriously economic theory
as a significant explanation of political conclusions will
be subjected to critical scrutiny, from which it will be
seen that their references to the importance of economic
theory in Comintern thinking either miss the mark or are
more gestural than analytical.

f3

Notes to Introduction
1 . This break with a philosophical
took place, by Marx's own account,
of The German Ideology. Karl Marx,
Critique of Political Economy (New
lishers, 197Q), 22.

conception of history
in 1845 with the writing
A Contribution to the
York: International Pub

2. See for example the Manifesto of the Connunist Party,
written jointly by Marx and Engels, the entire third section
of which is a critique of non-scientific socialist thinking.
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works vol. 6 (New
York: International Publishers, 1976), 507-517. See also
Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (New
York: International Publishers, 1975); Lucio Colletti,
"Marxism: Science or Revolution?" in his From Rousseau to
Lenin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Roy Medvedev,
Leninism and Western Socialism (London: Verso, 1981).
3. A readable survey is in A.F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing
Called Science? (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of
Queensland Press, 1979), chapters 10-12. Also David-Hillel
Ruben, Marxism and Materialism: A Study in the Marxist
Theory of Knowledge (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1979);
Gregor McLennan, Marxism and the Methodologies of History
(London: Verso, 1981).
4. Rather than providing a general survey of the literature
at this time, each chapter will discuss those writings
specific to the subject matter of the chapter.
5. For a brief survey of pre-Marxian socialism, consult the
early chapters of G.D.H. Cole, A History of Socialist
Thought vol. 1 (London: MacMillan^ 19677. Note that many
staunchly conservative— and in truth nationalist— North
American trade unions continue to carry the word ’interna
tional* in their titles.
6. Marx and Engels, Collected Works vol. 6, 502.
7. The ’strong* claim was prevalent in the pre-1914 Second
International, a federation of Marxist and progressive po
litical parties and trade unions founded in 1889. The 'weak*
claim forms the basis of *modern’ internationalist thinking,
well represented by the work of Charles Bettelheim. See his
debate with Arghiri Emmanuel in the appendixes to the lat
t e r ’s Unequal Exchange (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1972). See also Arghiri Emmanuel, "The Delusions of Interna
tionalism," Monthly Review 22, 2 (June 1970); Michael
Kidron, Capitalism and Theory (London: Pluto Press, 1974)
claims a privileged, even exclusive, role for the Western
working class in the socialist revolution.
8. Consider for example Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political
Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 403.
7

CHAPTER I
KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS
A. Descriptive Assessments of the Accumulation Process and
Capitalist Development
The founders of scientific socialism, Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels, were of course supremely concerned to
analyze the conditions of the working class movement, na
tionally as well as internationally. At first sight, it
1
might appear that both Marx and Engels considered that the
process of capital accumulation would simply negate all
national differences in the forces and relations of produc
tion and in the objective conditions of existence of the
working classes.
It is easy to identify numerous instances where Marx
and Engels emphasized the homogenizing effects of the de
velopment and expansion of the capitalist mode of produc2
tion.
In the late 1840s Marx observed the progressive
aspects of free trade (as against protectionism),

Insofar as
3
its generalization would speed the social revolution;
like

wise, Engels wrote of the "levelled social development" in
the bourgeois countries and the implications of this for the
4
international character of the coming revolution.
In The German Ideology, written jointly in 1846, Marx
and Engels conceived the process of development in highly
general terms. The concept of a mode of production as an
historically delimited and specific category is entirely

3

absent.

Instead, a series of chapters subsumes analyses of

feudal society, the manufactory period and industrial capi
talism proper under a (rather Smithian) discussion of devel
opment per se as the progressive extension of the division
of labor. Thus the guild system emerges as a deepening of
the town-country contradiction (itself a product of "the
transition from barbarism to civilization"), manufacture is
an example of the "further division of labor," and indus
trial capitalism represents the "most extensive division of
5
labor."
The 'final phase’ of the divsion of labor, industrial
capitalism, compelled each nation "that wished to retain its
historical role" to adopt large scale machine production. A
world market arose, increasing the interdependence of na
tions. The transformation of capital into industrial capital
facilitated rapid circulation and centralization. Finally,
industrial capitalism
made natural science subservient to capital and took from
the division of labor the last semblance of its natural
character.... It completed the victory of the town over
the country.[6]
Under these conditions the revolution would be
carried through by the class which no longer counts as a
class in society... and is in itself the expression of the
dissolution of all classes, nationalities, e t c ., within
present society.[7]
While the bourgeoisies of the respective industrial coun
tries were pitted against each other in struggle,

"large

scale industry created a class which in all nations has the
8

same interest and for which nationality is already dead..."
Engels delivered a speech in 1847 (at a commemoration
9

of the Polish uprising of 1830) which stressed how the
development of the capitalist node of production had fos
tered the "elimination of opposed interests which previously
divided the different sections of workers." Owing to the
application of machinery to production,

"the condition of

the workers of all countries is the s a m e t h e i r
9
are the same."

interests

The perception that capitalist development engendered a
levelling tendency seemed to apply more or less equally to
conditions within a single capitalist country, between capi
talist countries, and even between capitalist countries and
their non-capitalist colonies,

the effect of coloni

alism, in Marx's and Engels' views, was to tear asunder
traditional societies and implant a West European type of
capitalist development. Thus in the Manifesto of the Com
munist Party they wrote:
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revo
lutionary part. The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the
upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal,
idyllic relations....
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolu
tionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the
relations of production, and with them the whole rela
tions of society....
The need of a constantly expanding market for its
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of
the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere,
establish connections everywhere.
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy
artillery with which [the bourgeoisie] batters down all
Chinese walls.... It compels all nations, on pain of
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production....
In one word, it creates a world after its own image. [10]
In the same work, Marx and Engels indicated the expected
effects of the extension of the capitalist mode of

10

production:
[W]ith the development of industry... [t]he various
interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the
proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as
machinery obliterates all distinctions of l a b o r ....[11]
National differences and antagonisms between people are
more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the
bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market,
to uniformity in the mode of production and in the condi
tions of life corresponding thereto.[12]
At the same time as the Manifesto was being written
(winter of 1847-1843), Marx produced a working paper on
"Wages," which remained unpublished until 1924. In a section
devoted to the effects of the development of the productive
forces on wages, Marx noted the relatively worsening posi
tion of the working class compared with the bourgeoisie, the
increasingly "one-sided” character of work and the growing
tendency to reduce all labor to simple labor, and the ever
greater dependence of the workers’ condition on the state of
13
the world market.
In another section, entitled the "Pos
itive Aspect of Wage Labor," Marx wrote:
If one says 'positive aspect of wage labor' one says
'positive aspect of capital', of large scale industry, of
free competition, of the world market, and I do not need
to explain to you in detail how without these production
relations neither the means of production— the material
means for the emancipation of the proletariat and the
foundation of a new society— would have been created, nor
would the proletariat itself have taken to the unifica
tion and development through which it is really capable
of revolutionizing the old society and itself. Equaliza
tion of wages.[14]
*
A few years later, in a New York Daily Tribune article
about British colonial rule in India, Marx argued that
"England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one
destructive, the other regenerating— the annihilation of old
Asiatic society and the laying of the material foundations
11

15

of Western society in Asia."

In the introduction of a

colonial railroad network, Marx saw the embryo of an inevi
table process of development:
You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense
country without introducing all those industrial proces
ses necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of
railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the
application of machinery to those branches of industry
not immediately connected with railways. The railwaysystem will therefore become, in India, truly the fore
runner of modern industry.[16]
This was not an incidental point. Marx specifically referred
to this article in a letter to Engels, and noted that its
significance consisted precisely in the description of the
revolutionizing character of the British colonial
17
penetration.
In another (but contemporaneous) article on the same
subject, Marx layed stress on the effects of the development
of the capitalist mode of production in India's transforma
tion; special emphasis was accorded not to the role of
military conquest and plunder, but to the specifically 'eco
nomic' consequences of capitalist commodity production. Thus
India's primitive indigenous
forms of social
organism have been to the greater part
dissolved, and are disappearing, not so much through the
brutal Interference of the British tax-gatherer and the
British soldier, as to the working of English steam and
English free trade.... English interference having placed
the spinner in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or
sweeping away both Hindoo spinner and weaver, dissolved
these small semi-barbarian, semi-civilized communities by
blowing up their economic basis, and thus produced the
greatest, and to speak the truth, the only social
revolution ever heard of in Asia.[18]

12

B.

The Theoretical Arguments

The salience of these merely descriptive assessments of
capitalist penetration into underdeveloped or non-capitalist
areas would of course be inadequate without grasping the
theoretical connections, mentioned earlier, between an un
derstanding of the development of the capitalist mode of
production and the tendencies intrinsic to the process of
capital accumulation. Marx worked through the bulk of the
theoretical arguments which later appeared as Capital during
19
the years (approximately) 1856-1866.
The homogenizing ef
fects of capitalist development, characterized until then in
a descriptive and/or highly general fashion, came to be
linked with a theory of the capitalist mode of production.
In Part Two of Capital vol.

1, having established the

general formula for capital (M-C-M1) and shown that "its
20
determining purpose is . ..exchange-value,"
Marx arrives at
21
the concept of capital as value which valorizes itself.
On
this theoretical basis, both the mainspring and the neces
sary outcome of capitalist production become apparent, viz.,
the incessant drive to produce the maximum amount of surplus
22
value possible.
But this is only the beginning. While the production of
surplus value indeed emerges as the driving motive whenever
exchange-value has become the "determining purpose," it is
still the case that
this Inherent tendency of capitalist production does not
become adequately realized— it does not become indispen
sable, and that also means technologically indispensable--untll the specific mode of capitalist production
and hence the real subsumption of labor under capital has
13

23
become a reality.
The truly revolutionary role of bourgeois society only
becomes manifest with the transition from the production of
absolute to relative surplus value,

the transition from

the formal to the real subsumption of labor to capital. The
transformation (revolutionizing) of the "actual mode of
labor" and the onset of "a complete (and constantly re24
peated) revolution...in the mode of production"
is not an
accomplished fact until the pre-eminence of relative surplus
value and the real subsumption of labor assert themselves,
in other words, until the development of modern machine
industry and the rational application of science to indus25
try.
In short, capitalist production per se is not revolu
tionary, just as the proletariat is not inherently imbued
with a revolutionary consciousness. Rather, both are revolu
tionised by the very development of the bourgeois mode of
production.
In the rather long chapter on machinery, Marx details
the interconnections between these developments and the
Introduction of machinery to various branches of production
(especially the production of machines by means of ma26
27
chines),
the prolongation of the working day,
and the
intensification of labor (especially when the lengthening of
the working day comes to be restricted by labor legisla28
29
tion).
Capital, "by Its nature a leveller,"
moves into
those spheres of industry where labor is only formally
subsumed:
Thus spinning machines led to power-looms In weaving;

machinery in cotton spinning to machinery in the woollen,
linen and silk etc. industries. The increased use of
machinery in the mines, cotton mills e t c . made the intro
duction of large-scale production in machine tools inevi
table. [30]
Formally,

the process must follow the same general
31
pattern, whether in England or in India.
In the preface to
the first edition of Capital (1867) Marx wrote: "The country
that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less
32
developed, the image of its own future."
On the basis of
capitalist production,

the means of production and produc

tive forces of labor are thus continually revolutionized,
33
creating the "material basis" of the future society.
At
the same time, the destruction of pre-capitalist forms, and
the subjugation of all spheres of production, "generalizes
34
the direct struggle against" capital.
Hence in the chapter
on "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation" Marx
concludes that alongside the centralization of capital,
the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world
market, and, with this, the growth of the international
character of the capitalist regime... there grows also the
revolt of the working class, a class constantly increas
ing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the
very mechanism of the capitalist process of produc
tion .[35]
Consequently, the extension and development of capi
talist relations of production engender the material condi
tions which create a commonality of interests among the
proletariat, nationally as well as internationally. Insofar
as capital "by its nature" tends to annul divergency in
levels of development of the productive forces through the
constant revolutionizing of technique and the assimilation
of backward sectors,

it follows that proletarians everywhere

must be increasingly subject to similar (i,.e.> maximum)
conditions of exploitation.
*

*

But the discussion has now

*
reached a crucial juncture.

The equalizing and homogenizing aspect of capitalist devel
opment assumes a highly visible position in the theoretical
work of Marx and Engels, a visibility which is reinforced by
the descriptive accounts already discussed (particularly the
works of the early period). The prominence of this thesis in
Marx's theoretical work at times obscures his parallel and
equally important theoretical demonstration of capitalism's
simultaneous propensity to negate equality and to differen
tiate the conditions of production. That this facet of the
theory often remains unappreciated is suggested by the as
sessment of Maurice Dobb, who wrote that while "[i]t is
probably true that there were always important qualifica
tions to be made" to the view that capitalist development
"exercised a 'levelling'

influence on the different parts of

the world," the need

to account

for these qualifications was

not fully recognized

when Marx and Engels wrote, and only

became apparent when the phenomena of colonialism and under36
development began to be investigated.
The point is that
while Dobb correctly stresses the need to make "qualifica
tions" regarding the "levelling" effects of capitalist de
velopment, he erroneously maintains that this need was not
"fully recognized" in Marx's (and Engels') time. In fact,
the theory of the reproduction of inequality is an Integral

16

aspect of the analysis found in Capital, and the essential
elements of the theory are identifiable even prior to the
publication of M a r x ’s magnum opus.
The theory of crisis in Capital vol. 3 is naturally
Marx's most complete explanation of the uneveness of capi
talist development. There are, however, two additional ways
in which Marx formulates the tendency of capital accumula
tion to impose and reproduce inequality, and these become
apparent at an even higher level of theoretical abstraction
than the theory of crisis. The first, and more trivial,
concerns the notion that capitalist development produces a
general worsening of the proletariat’s position relative to
the bourgeoisie. A formulation of the relative impoverish
ment thesis is provided by Marx in Wage Labor and Capital
(April 1849):
Let us assume the most favorable case: when productive
capital grows, the demand for labor grows; consequently,
the price of labor, wages, goes up....
The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an
equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants,
social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the
worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give
has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of
the capitalist....[37]
and somewhat more clearly in Capital vo l . 1:
[A]11 methods for the production of surplus value are
at the same time methods of accumulation, and every
extension of accumulation becomes, conversely, a means
for the development of those methods. It follows there
fore that in proportion as capital accumulates, the sit
uation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must
grow worse.[38]
The second sense in which the accumulation process
produces and reproduces inequality is theoretically more
significant. A hint of this perspective is already present
17

in 1847 in The Poverty of Philosophy, where Marx writes of
'competition' and 'monopoly' not as the idealized forms in
which they appear to bourgeois (and petty bourgeois) eco
nomic theory, but in terms of a movement in which one begets
39
the other only to be in turn superseded.
Thus the dynamic
of capitalism, which finds expression in competition, does
not produce a regular procession of forms culminating in
perfect monopoly, but rather engenders a continual motion
where 'competition' gives rise to 'monopoly' which must then
have recourse to 'competition'

in order to maintain itself.

At about the sane time as he was writing the critique
of Proudhon, Marx described capital accumulation and its
effects on the cost of production of commodities in terms
which demonstrate that the "total movement of this disorder
40
is its order,"
A.-®.* » that the differentiation of produc
tion, just as much as its homogenization, is a condition of
capitalism.
In these early texts, the idea which Marx seeks to
express is as yet inadequately developed theoretically, and
only makes an appearance in the form of polemic against
Proudhon’s metaphysical conception of ’monopoly' as negation
of 'competition', or in a series of popular lectures to
41
workers presented at a time (1847)
when Marx had not yet
even worked out the distinction between labor and labor
power. By the time of "The Chapter on Capital" from the
Grundrisse notebooks (late 1857 and early 1858), Marx had
begun to move in the direction of a theoretical elaboration
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of capitalist competition and its relationship to capital
accumulation and the effects of equalization and differen
tiation. He writes there that
Finally: proportionate production (this is already in
Ricardo, et c .) only when it is capital's tendency to
distribute itself in correct proportions, but equally its
necessary tendency— since it strives limitlessly for
surplus labor, surplus productivity, surplus consumption
etc.— to drive beyond the proportion. (In competition
this inner tendency of capital appears as a compul
sion ....)[42]
The final (paranthetical) sentence above presents com
petition separately from the "necessary tendency" of capital
"to drive beyond the proportion." This is among the first
clear indications of a significant theoretical result of
Marxian economics, v i z., the conceptualization of competi
tion not as a ’l a w ’ of capitalist production, but as a
"mechanism by which the essence of capitalist social rela43
tions is transformed into their appearance."
In the same
chapter, capital's need to maintain an ongoing revolution
izing of the "actual mode of labor" is established by Marx
on the basis of the capital relation itself, rather than as
a derivative of the external compulsion of competition.
It is easy to develop the introduction of machinery out
of competition and out of the law of the reduction of
production costs which is triggered by competition. We
are concerned here with developing it out of the relation
of capital to living labor, without reference to other
capitals.[44]
As Marx puts it elsewhere in the same text,
Competition merely expresses as real, posits as an
external necessity, that which lies within the nature of
capital; competition is nothing more than the way in
which the many capitals force the inherent determinants
of capital upon one another and upon themselves.[45]
Already in the Grundrisse notebooks Marx thus distin19

guishes, as may be seen from the passages quoted above,
between the laws of motion of capital and their expression
in competition. Sometime later, in Capital vol.

1, Marx ex

pressly argues that competition is not a law of capital46
ism,
that it merely causes "the immanent laws of capi
talist production [to] confront the individual capitalist as
47
a coercive force external to him,"
and that "a scientific
analysis of competition is possible only if we can grasp the
48
inner nature of capital."
It follows that a study of the
latter must precede the former, and the discussion in vol.

1

consequently proceeds at the level of "capital in general,"
which abstracts from the action of "many capitals" on one
49
another through competition.
Throughout Parts Four and Five of vol. 1 ("The Produc
tion of Relative Surplus Value" and "The Production of
Absolute and Relative Surplus Value"), proceeding from the
already established concept of capital as self-expanding
value, Marx details the manner in which co-operation, the
division of labor and finally the application of machinery
to industry each lead to the cheapening of commodities by
way of reducing the socially necessary time required for
50
their (re)production.
The process does not consist of
optimizing an incremental 'choice of technique* algorithm,
as conceived by both neo-classical and neo-Ricardian
51
analyses.
Rather, Marx shows how a localized innovation in
technique results in the differentiation of production con
ditions; how the extension of the new method implies a
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restructuring of values; and how all the while the process
52
begins anew.
In those regions where it first becomes
established, large scale capitalist industry "acquires an
elasticity,

a capacity for sudden expansion by leaps and
53
bounds...."
The other regions, those in which the penetra
tion of capitalist production had been less swift or com
plete, will "suffer not only from the development of capi
talist production, but also from the incompleteness of that
54
development."
The uneven development of capitalism thus
has its basis in the uneven develpment of capitals.
In its more fully developed form, the capitalist mode
of production extends the production of surplus value prin
cipally through the ever increasing mechanization of produc
tion. It follows that the accumulation of capital is accom
panied by a tendency for the expulsion of living labor from
the production process and the other effects detailed in the
chapter. As already pointed out, these results are obtained
by Marx on the basis of the abstraction "capital in gen
eral," i_.e^ , from a consideration of capitalist social rela
tions and the labor process alone. Competition, which in
volves the mutual interaction of "many capitals" in their
55
struggle over the dividing up of surplus value,
is theo56
retically absent as a concept.
Marx thus states that "it
is not our intention here to consider the way in which the
immanent laws of capitalist production manifest themselves
in the external movement of the individual capitals," even
though he intends to provide examples and illustrations "for
the understanding of the production of relative surplus

value, and merely on the basis of the results already a57
chieved."
Competition therefore does not ’cause* the simultaneous
tendency toward differentiation and equalization,

any more

than it ’causes* the accumulation of capital to proceed or
the rate of profit to fall. The "immanent laws" of capi
talism are theoretically derived from capital's nature as
self-expanding value, a quality of capital in general. Com
petition is merely the vehicle by which these laws manifest
themselves on the 'surface* of bourgeois society and make
themselves felt to the individual capitalists as an exter58
nally imposed compulsion (in an "inverted" form).
It fol
lows that the simultaneous tendency toward differentiation
and equalization is, for Marx, an intrinsic feature of the
process of capital accumulation, and does not flow from or
depend on the ’assumption* of competition.
This unevenness immanent to the accumulation of capital
naturally produces its effects on the 'surface',

in the

forms in which capital actually appears, and "in the action
of different capitals on one another, .i.e.. , in competition,
and in the everyday consciousness of the agents of produc59
tion themselves."
Marx's investigation descends to this
lower level of abstraction,

the consideration of the con

crete forms of capital's movement,

in Capital vol. 3. After

establishing the concept of profit in Part One, Marx devotes
Parts Two, Three and Four to a concrete examination of the
60
"constant equalization of ever-renewed inequalities."
It

is not necessary here to delve into a discussion of these
specific relations, as this has already been ably and thor61
oughly accomplished by others.
For present purposes, it
should suffice to have established that M a r x ’s theory en
visions a necessarily uneven development (equalizationdifferentiation) immanent to the accumulation process.
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C. Implications for the Working Class Movement
Marx's general theory of the capitalist mode of produc
tion posits unevenness as an inherent feature of capitalist
development,

flowing from the nature of capital.

obtain this result,

In order to

it has consequently been sufficient to

consider the most abstract level of analysis as found in
62
Capital.
Implicitly, the result itself suggests a poten
tial pitfall which night be encountered in efforts to meta
morphose certain abstract ramifications into specific out
comes,

, to give them concrete expression as 'predic63
tions’.
In particular, since the Marxist theory of the

capitalist mode of production rejects any notion of capital
ist development as a symmetrical process,

it is not possible

to deduce from the theory anything like a one-to-one cor
respondence between the extent of capitalist development and
the stage of evolution of the working class struggle in its
64
concrete forms.
The uneven and contradictory nature of the accumulation
process is therefore concretely manifested in, among other
things, ambivalent tendencies in working class responses to
the rule of capital. This is clearly evident from a textual
survey of the works in which Marx and Engels undertake
analyses at lower levels of abstraction, those which deal
with the specific historical situation. They produced numer
ous examples of this type of research, both in the form of
systematic investigations and irregular commentary. Only
those which pertain explicitly to the prospects for interna65
tionalism, however, will be considered below.

For the "two man party," as Marx and Engels were cal
led, concrete analysis generally meant the investigation or
propagandization of issues directly connected to the politi
cal struggles in which they were involved.
66
Prior to about 1850,
Marx and Engels frequently ex
pressed themselves in writings and speeches characterized by
a high degree of generality and a predominantly descriptive
67
(rather than theoretical) approach.
Thus in an 1845 arti
cle on the anniversary of the proclamation of the First
French Republic (1792), Engels declared that the "great mass
of proletarians are, by their very nature, free from na
tional prejudices" and that workers "in all countries have
68
one and the same interest."
The implications of the dis
cussion found in The German Ideology are virtually identi
cal, as may be seen from the relevant passages cited in
subheading A of this chapter.
Similarly, speaking in 1847 at a commemoration of the
1830 Polish uprising, Engels made note of the "elimination
of opposed interests" between workers, a consequence of the
69
widespread application of machinery to production.
On the
same occasion, Marx talked in equally general terms, but
drew some rather different conclusions:
For the peoples to be able to truly unite, they must
have common interests. And in order that their interests
may become common, the existing property relations must
be done away with, for these property relations involve
the exploitation of some nations by others: the abolition
of existing property relations is the concern only of the
working class.[70]
For Engels, therefore, it seemed that (capitalist) machine
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production and its generalization would be sufficient to
serve as the basis for establishing a commonality of inter
ests among the proletariat, whereas J!arx appeared to suggest
that such a commonality could only arise as a consequence of
the revolution.

With regard to the oppression of Poland, the

subject of their talks, both Marx and Engels insisted that
"Poland must be liberated not in Poland but in England,"
.i.e. , the victory of the English workers was seen as a
condition for the end of the oppression of the Polish peo
ple. The reason for this was simply that "England is the
[country] where the contradiction between the proletariat
71
and the bourgeoisie is most highly developed."
The Manifesto of the Communist Party, drafted in 1848
by both Marx and Engels, contains numerous passages which
closely correspond to the quotations above. Where Engels had
earlier spoken of the "elimination of opposed interests,"
the Manifesto proclaims that "differences and antagonisms
72
between the people are more and more vanishing."
While it is hardly necessary to underscore the politi
cal nature of the Manifesto, it is equally clear that the
authors of the pamphlet considered it to be based on a
73
scientific theory of history.
And the philosophy of histo
ry which implicitly resides between the lines of the Mani
festo brings to the fore the levelling and equalizing tend
encies of the process of accumulation, while suppressing the
effects of the unevenness of capitalist development. Al
though the latter aspect of the theory was not entirely
74
unknown to Marx at the time,
it had not as yet been com
25

pletely or explicitly worked out, hence the reason for its
theoretical absence in the P.Ianife s t o .
A theoretical silence produces its effects just as '.yell
as a theoretical concept which is explicitly present.

In

this case, the result for Marx and Engels is that interna
tionalism frequently appears as an objective ’condition’ in
which the proletariat finds itself. There is, of course,

the

simple attendant political conclusion: ’’The working men have
75
no country.”
Among M a r x ’s writings it is perhaps in the
Manifesto that this approach finds its highest expression.
But even here, the reduction of internationalism to an
objective condition is not complete, because according to
the Manifesto, one of the distinguishing features of the
communists viz-a-viz other working class parties is that the
communists "point out and bring to the fore the common
interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all
76
nationality."
In this passage, internationalism has ceased
to be a condition;

it is rather a political program to be

forged , i^£. , the common interests must be brought ’’to the
front.”
After the Manifesto such a tension or ambivalence in
Marx's work is less and less evident. As the discussion in
the first two subheadings of this chapter sought to show,
Marx had become increasingly rigorous and consistent in
distinguishing levels of abstraction in theoretical analysis
and their relation to one another.

In particular, the tend

encies to metamorphose abstractions, the teleological formu
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lations, and the conflation of levels of abstraction which
at times had crept into his (and Engels’) work were by 1850
being systematically rejected. So in March 1850, for exam
ple, the notion of international working class solidarity as
77
a political program is fairly unambiguously expressed,
with political implications which are notably similar to
those found in passages from the Critique of the Gotha
78
Programme, written 25 years later.
It is not valid to argue, by way of a ’defense’ of the
Manifesto, that since the pamphlet was produced as a ’mere
l y ’ political text the conclusions therein were necessarily
79
dictated by political exigency.
The fallacy of such rea
soning becomes apparent if the Manifesto is compared to the
numerous other ’merely* political works penned and spoken by
Marx during his tenure on the General Council of the Inter
national Working M e n’s Association (1864-1876), later fre80
quently referred to as the First Internatonal.
Marx's
presentations to the International ranged from the highly
general (£.g., the "Inaugural Address") to the rather spe
cific (e.g., the reports on the Franco-Prussian War, on the
question of amnesty for Irish political prisoners, e t c .). In
each instance, however, the viability of international work
ing class solidarity was neither premised as a general
condition, nor deduced from the abstract theory.
While the bulk of Marx's "Inaugural Address" was a
description of the proletariat's dismal economic condition
and a historical "review of the adventures of the working
81
classes since 1845,"
the speech closed with an exhortation
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to the workers on the need to "conquer political power." To
be sure, the basis for the realization of this objective,
according to Marx, will be found in solidarity which crosses
national boundaries. But the prospects for solidarity are no
longer sought in abstract formulae ("the elimination of
opposed interests");

instead, it is recognized that positive

results can only be achieved through the "fight" for a
02
concrete "policy."
That the recognized potential existed for real contra
dictions to emerge within the working class, and even within
the International itself, may be amply illustrated by refer
ence to the Association's history and Marx's activities.
Members of the General Council, Marx included, successfully
struggled to prevent efforts at introducing apologetic reso83
lutions regarding the Polish Insurrection of 1863.
Some
what later, when German strikebreakers were imported to stem
the tailor's strikes in England (Spring 1866), the General
Council acted to keep the tailors informed and arranged for
agitation among the Germans; Marx wrote circulars to both
84
the English and German workers.
When the First International commenced discussion of
the Irish question in November 1869, Marx opened the debate
85
condemning the English government's Irish policy.
Over the
objections of some English chauvinists on the Council, a
strong resolution of solidarity with the Irish people was
86
passed.
At this time, Marx argued that the English prole
tariat was incapable of effecting the revolution. As long as
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the English workers, by virtue of their "hostility" to the
Irish, supported English landlordism in Ireland, the posi
tion of the ruling classes in England was impregnable.

It is

notable that Marx did not see the hostility of the English
workers as principally rooted in ethnic or religious consid
erations, false consciousness, or political immaturity.
Rather, there was an ’objective’ contradiction at play,
i^.e^ , the English workers were the concrete beneficiaries of
87
the oppression of the Irish.
The political conclusion is striking, particularly in
contrast with the earlier proclamations on Poland: because
"Ireland is the bulwark of English landlordism" the decisive
blow against the latter can only be accomplished in the
former.

In Ireland "the operation is a hundred times more

easy" due to the "concentrated" nature of the struggle
(against landlordism), its simultaneously national charac
ter, and because of the greater revolutionary ardor of the
88
Irish people.
One of the most significant events which took place
during the period of the First International’s existence was
the short-lived proclamation of the Paris Commune. The Asso
ciation collected money and found employment for refugees
89
after the defeat of the Commune in late May 1871.
At the
behest of the International, Marx produced The Civil War in
France (May 1871), an analysis of the victory and defeat of
the Commune, which served as an Address of the General
90
Council.
Marx had also earlier written two other Addresses
for the International on the Franco-Prussian War and the
80

establishment of the Third French Republic. These documents
called on all sections of the International to support first
the Republic and then the Commune.

Internationalist synna91
92
thies were indeed displayed in England,
the U.S.A.,
and
93
in Germany (despite repression there).
Nevertheless, Marx

ascribed the defeat of the Commune to an insufficiently
94
vigorous reaction by the (European) working class.
The breakup of the First International (effectively by
1872 and officially in 1876) brought a temporary hiatus to
the concerted efforts at establishing an international work
ing class movement. The split between Marxists and the
anarchist followers of Mikhail Bakunin at the Fifth General
Congress (the Hague,

1872) closed the period of the Interna

tional’s useful political life. Perhaps the best analysis of
this turn of events, and its consequences and prospects,

is

provided by Engels, in two letters. One to August Bebel:
After the Commune [the International] had a colossal
success. The bruised and shattered bourgeoisie ascribed
omnipotence to it. The great mass of the membership
believed things would stay like that for all eternity. We
knew very well that the bubble must burst. All riff-raff
attached themselves to it.... The bubble burst at the
Hague.... And if we had come out In a conciliatory way at
the Hague, if we had hushed up the breaking out of the
split— what would have been the result? The sectarians,
especially the Bakuninists, would have had another year
in which to perpetrate, in the name of the International,
still greater stupidities and infamies; the workers of
the most developed countries would have turned away in
disgust;.... Then the International would indeed have
gone to pieces--gone to pieces through ’u ni ty ’! Instead
of this we have now got rid of the rotten
elements....[95]
And another to Friedrich Sorge:
In order to produce a new International after the
fashion of the old, an alliance of all proletarian par
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ties of all countries, a general suppression of the labor
movement, like that which prevailed from 1849-64, would
be necessary. For this the proletarian world has now
become too big, too extensive.[98]
*

*

*

Despite the encouraging expressions of international
solidarity which at times had characterized the working
class movement, such results had been by no means general or
automatically forthcoming, either prior to the Internation
al's convocation or even during the years of its greatest
influence.
In 1852, long before the founding of the Association,
Engels wrote to Marx about the situation in France. With
Louis Bonaparte's coup d' etat,
the temporary prosperity, and prospects of the glory of
an empire, the [French] workers seem to have become
completely bourgeois after all. It will take a severe
chastisement by crises if they are to become good for
anything again soon.[97]
Throughout the tenure of the First International, cer
tain English trade union leaders had frequently adopted
98
openly national chauvinist positions.
Writing to Ludwig
Kugelmann in 1868, Marx noted that the Irish question repre
sented an opportunity for "intriguers" within the labor
99
movement "for joining up with the bourgeois liberals."
Six
years later, again in a letter to Kugelmann, Marx wrote that
the English labor movement was making progress only among
the rural workers, and that the industrial proletarians
needed "to get rid of their present leaders" before any
100

progress was possible.
These pessimistic assessments were not, however, con-

32

fined only to the leaders of the labor movement. To a cer
tain extent, Marx felt that the English working class as a
whole had acquiesced to the domination of the bourgeoisie.
Several times in the 1860s, in correspondence with Engels,
Marx wrote of the "sheepish attitude" and "apparent bour
geois infection" afflicting the English workers.

In this

exchange of letters, Engels wrote that "the revolutionary
energy of the English proletariat has to all extents and
purposes completely evaporated and the English proletarian
is in complete agreement with the rule of the bour101
geoisie."
Such a political and ideological capitulation was con
ditioned by a particular economic situation. Already in
1845, Engels had written of England's industrial monopoly in
The Condition of the Working Class in England. At that time,
he expected that such a monopoly would accelerate the devel
opment of a proletariat with increasingly revolutionary
102
attitudes.
By 1858, however, the industrial monopoly
seemed to be producing different effects, and Engels wrote
to Marx that
the English proletariat is actually becoming more and
more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all coun
tries is apparently aiming at the possession of a bour
geois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside
the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole
world this is of course to a certain extent justifi
able .[103]
Engels' connection of England's industrial monopoly to the
co-optation of the English working class is frequently ex
pressed. In a letter to Marx In 1881: "The British working
man just will not budge, he must be shaken up by events, by
33
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the loss of the industrial monopoly."

In a letter to Karl

Kautsky in 18S2:
You ask me what the English workers think about colo
nial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about
politics in general: the sane as the bourgeois think.
There is no worker’s party here, there are only Conserva
tives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers are cheerful
ly consuming their share of England's monopoly of the
world market and the colonies.[105]
And in a letter to August Bebel in 1883:
Do not on any account whatever let yourself be deluded
that there is a real proletarian movement going on
here....
Participation in the domination of the world market was
and is the basis of the political nullity of the English
workers. The tail of the bourgeoisie in the exploitation
of this monopoly but nevertheless sharing in its advan
tages, politically they are naturally the tail of the
'great Liberal Party', which for its part pays them small
attentions, recognizes trade unions and strikes as legit
imate factors...and has given the mass of the better
placed workers the vote.[106]
Note that the emergence of England’s "monopoly of the
world market" was nothing more than the uneven development
of capitalism, .i.e.., the concrete expression of the uneven
development of capitals, which Marx had already theorized.
Once large scale capitalist industry (especially the produc
tion of machines by means of machinery) becomes established
in a particular region, according to Marx, it acquires a
dynamic "elasticity"— the expansion of production becomes
107
"indispensable."
The immediate effect of this is to ruin
less highly developed industries in other regions, and to
establish a
new and International division of labor... suited to the
requirements of the main industrial countries, and [to
convert] one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultur
al field of production for supplying the other part,
which remains a pre-eminently industrial field.[108]
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England's industrial monopoly was the material basis of
the "bourgeois proletariat" in Great Britain- While the
uneven development of capitalism made these results possi
ble, it also created the conditions which would subsequently
undermine them. Engels recognized this, and in 1835 (after
Marx's death) in an article for The Commonwealth (newspaper)
which was later re-printed as part of the 1892 "Preface" of
The Condition of the Working Class in England, he tended to
distinguish between "a small, privileged, 'protected' minor109
ity"
and the "great bulk" of the working class. The
fruits of England's industrial monopoly "were very unequally
parcelled out," although "even the great mass had, at least,
a temporary share now and then." Most significantly, how
ever, Engels argued that as a consequence of the "breakdown"
of England's "monopoly of the world market," the English
proletariat would in general lose its "privileged posi
tion. ... And that is the reason why there will be Socialism
110
again inEngland."
Immediately after repeating the phrases cited above,
Engels continued to write in the 1892 "Preface:"
Needless to say that there is indeed 'Socialism again
in England', and plenty of it— Socialism of all shades:
Socialism conscious an unconscious, Socialism prosaic and
poetic, Socialism of the working-class and of the middle
class, for, verily, that abomination of abominations,
Socialism, has not only become respectable, but has ac
tually donned evening dress and lounges lazily on drawing
room causeuses.[111]
Engels counterposes this rather ironic appraisal to a genu
inely positive development, viz., "the revival of the East
End." Paraphrasing the aged Engels' remarks would not do

justice to their stylish quality and the heartfelt hopeful
ness they seek to convey,

so the rather long passage will

simply be quoted in full. Writing of London's East End,
Engels stated:
That immense haunt of misery is no longer the stagnant
pool it was six years ago. It has shaken off its torpid
despair, has returned to life, and has become the home of
what is called the 'New Unionism’, that is to say, of the
organization of the great mass of 'unskilled' workers.
This organization may to a great extent adopt the form of
the old Unions of 'skilled' workers but it essentially
different in character. The old Unions preserve the tra
ditions of the time when they were founded, and look upon
the wages system as a once-for-all established, final
fact, which they at best can modify in the interest of
their members. The new Unions were founded at a time when
the faith in the eternity of the wages system was severe
ly shaken; their founders and promoters were Socialists
either consciously or by feeling; the masses, whose adhe
sion gave them strength, were rough, neglected, looked
down upon by the working-class aristocracy; but they had
this immense advantage, that their minds were virgin
soil, entirely free from the inherited 'respectable'
bourgeois prejudices which hampered the brains of the
better situated 'old' Unionists. And thus we see now
these new Unions taking the lead of the working-class
movement generally, and more and more taking in tow the
rich and proud 'old* Unions.
Undoubtedly, the East Enders have commited colossal
blunders; so have their predecessors, and so do the
doctrinaire Socialists who pooh-pooh them. A large class,
like a great nation, never learns better or quicker than
by undergoing the consequences of its own mistakes. And
for all the faults committed in past, present and future,
the revival of the East End of London remains one of the
greatest and most fruitful facts of this fin de siecle,
and glad and proud I am to have lived to see it .[112J
It would not be unreasonable to suggest that Engels'
hopes were not realized. From the 1890s until the First
World War, international socialism was embodied in the poli
tics and economics of the Second International. Some have
argued, both then and subsequently, that the "drawing room
socialism" berated by Engels had crept unnoticed into the

world view shared by certain tendencies constituting the
Second International. Others maintain that Engels himself
was partly responsible for that transformation of terrain.
These issues will be more fully explored in the next
chapter.
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Chapter II
INTERNATIONALISM, A PLETHORA OF 'ISMS’,
THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL AND ITS COLLAPSE
A.

Introduction

Six years after Marx's death and six years before
Engels',

the founding of the Second International took place

on the hundredth anniversary of the storming of the Bas
tille. Concurrently with the reformist Possibilist Congress,
and only a few Paris blocks away, the avowedly socialist
Second International first convened on 14. July 1889.
Edouard Vaillant and Wilhelm Liebknecht,

the leading French

and German representatives to the International, were elect
ed joint presidents. Their handshake came to symbolize the
international solidarity of the proletariat against the
bourgeoisie.
Delegates from France included Vaillant, a Blanquist
and a member of the Paris Commune; the Marxists Jules
Guesde, Charles Longuet, and Paul Lafargue; and Sebastian
Faure, a representative of the Anarchists. Coming from the
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic
Party of Germany— the SPD) were Liebknecht, Eduard Bern
stein, and Klara Zetkin. Another SPD representative was
Georg Heinrich von Vollmar, Bavarian ex-officer, a champion
of reformism, and soon to become Bernstein's supporter in
the 'revisionist' current. Also from Germany, although not a
member of the SPD, was the trade union leader Karl Legien.
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Another major group came from England, representing both
trades unions and political parties. Finally,
smaller delegations from Belgium, Austria,
dinavian countries, Russia, Poland,

there were

Italy,

the Balkans,

the Scan
Switzer-

1

land, the U.S.A. and Argentina.
2
were in attendance.

All told, some 400 persons

The SPD itself arose from the merger of the various
German socialist parties at the socialist unity congress at
3
Gotha in 1875.
While this unification brought together the
followers of Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle, the former in
sisted that too many programmatic concessions had been made
to the latter--see Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme.
But by the time of the Erfurt congress of the SPD (1891) the
bickering Lassalleans,

lacking leadership, lost considerable

influence, and the Erfurt Programme reflected a substantial
ly Marxist perspective. The accumulation of capital was seen
as leading to the concentration and centralization of capi
tal, creation of a reserve army of the unemployed, and
recurrent crises. There was no theory of crisis offered,
implicitly or explicitly, other than the statement that the
crisis was "founded in the essence of the capitalistic
method of production." The document also maintained that
"[t]he interests of the working class are the same in all
lands with capitalistic methods of production." Owing to the
development and extension of the world market,
the state of workers in any one country becomes constant
ly more dependent upon the state of workers in other
countries.... Conscious of this, the Social Democratic
Party of Germany feels and declares Itself one with the
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4
class conscious workers of all other lands.
Finally, the ultimate goal of the SPD, a classless society,
was clearly posed in the so-called maximum programme;

and a

list of immediate demands comprised the minimum programme.
In France, the unification of the disparate socialist
groupings into a single party was not accomplished until
5
1905,
when the unity congress held in Paris provided for
the merger of four relatively large organizations and some
6
seven small ones into the SFIO. At this time, three funda
mental principles of unity were established: recognition of
internationalism as an imperative, work directed at devel
oping the organization with the aim of capturing state
power, and an affirmation of the eventual goal, .i.e.*, abol7
ishing private ownership of the means of production.
For British socialists, unification Into a single or
ganization was not forthcoming, and the four principal au
tonomous groups— the Labour Party (LP), a federation of
trades unions; the Independent Labour Party (ILP), an indi8

vidual membership party; the British Socialist Party (BSP);
and the Fabian Society— maintained separate organizations
throughout the tenure of the International, although af
filiations and overlap existed among some of them (e.g., the
9
LP and the ILP).
Furthermore, a purely federal Labour
Representation Committee (established in 1900) accepted
10

representatives from most labor organizations.

Originally,

the official British sections of the International were the
BSP and the ILP, although the LP was (reluctantly) admitted
11
in 1908.
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So while mediations by the International Socialist
12
Bureau (ISB)
succeeded in unifying French socialism, simi
lar efforts met with failure in the case of England. Also
unsuccessful were the attempts to unify the Russian Social
Democratic Party, split into the Bolshevik and Menshevik
factions since 1903. Throughout the period of their dissen
sion, both factions of the Russian Social Democracy main13
tained delegations to the International.
Plainly put, substantial contradictions characterized
the relations within and between the different national
sections of the Second International. The object herein
cannot be to detail the specificity of those relations in
their full intricacy.

Instead, after a review of the perti

nent resolutions, documents and stated positions of the
Second International, both as a whole and as a conglomera
tion of conflicting tendencies,

the discussion will shift to

an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the prin
cipal Marxist groupings. The major emphasis will consist in
setting out the diverse conceptions of capitalist develop
ment and the accumulation of capital, and linking these to
the implications regarding the prospects for international
ism which emerge from the various analyses.

49

B. The Second International Before the War:
Resolutions, Statements, Tendencies
Judged on the immediate content of its official pro
nouncements,

it would be necessary to conclude that the

Second International considered the international solidarity
of the working class as a given fact--the proletariat's
commitment to this principle was seen as unshakable. Between
1889 and 1914 congresses of the International met nine
times. Far-reaching issues were argued and discussed, in
cluding the colonial question,

the wrangle around Bern

stein's 'revision' of Marxism, strategies for extension of
the franchise,

the relative merits of parliamentary activity

as against mass action (the general strike and insurrection
variants both had adherents), and the question of war.
At the founding congress Vaillant introduced a resolu
tion condemning standing armies and urging their replacement
14
by people's militias.
Although the document implied that
standing armies may provoke Avar, the ultimate cause of war
was seen to reside in the capitalist mode of production, and
the resolution stated that war could finally be abolished
15
only with the victory of socialism.
While the question of
what to do should war threaten to break out was by and large
passed over, there were already indications of future points
of debate: should bourgeois militarism be opposed through
parliamentary activity or mass action?
A similar anti-war resolution was passed at the Brus
sels congress (1891), where the discussion of appropriate
responses to the eventuality of conflagration came to the

fore. The Dutch delegation, led by Donela Nieuwenhuis, sub
mitted the idea that social democrats should threaten to
initiate a general strike whenever capitalist belligerence
led to the brink of open conflict. Although the ensuing
debate was lively, the notion of a general strike was re
jected as an "anarchist" deviation, and the congress con
fined itself to a strategy of refusing to vote for war
16

credits and manpower.

Opposition to the general strike

weapon was especially voiced by the German delegation, which
feared (probably correctly) that vigorous anti-militarist
activity would invoke repression from the German monarchy.
The SPD was particularly anxious to expand its parliamentary
activity, since the recent lapse of the German AntiSocialist Law in 1890 was immediately followed by a major
17
electoral success for the Social Democrats.
In an optimistic moment at the London congress (1896),
the International established a tribunal intended to arbi
trate disputes between nations, but this not surprisingly
18

came to nothing.

The International Socialist Bureau was

established somewhat later, in 1900. Headquartered in Brus
sels, the ISB's function would be "to initiate and organize
co-ordinated protest movements and anti-militarist agitation
in all countries on all occasions of international impor19
tance."
Unfortunately, the ISB's success in this respect
proved to be illusory, and some critics have charged that
the Bureau was never more than a "letterbox" for
20
socialism.
After the turn of the century, the issue of war or
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peace ceased to be primarily theoretical. Crisis upon crisis
in rapid succession made the threat of a general war seem
immediate:

the Spanish-American War, intervention in the

Boxer Rebellion,

the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, the

French and German conflicts in the Middle East and North
Africa,

the Russian and Austrian conflict in the Balkans. By

the time of the important Stuttgart congress (1907), the two
major perspectives— mass strike vs. parliamentary activity-had crystallized within the International.

It should be

emphasized that while broad groupings in the SPD advocated
parliamentarism and a French majority favored mass action,
both positions could be found in each of the parties, along
with an embryonic ’revolutionary left* whose importance was
yet to be revealed, and a ’right’ wing or ’social imperial
ist' faction which endorsed the "civilizing mission" of
colonialism and supported ’purely defensive’ arms build21

ups.

Indeed, almost all of the delegations at Stuttgart

found themselves split over these issues. Thus the ultra
left French anarchist Gustav Herve launched a virulent at
tack on the "bourgeoisified" SPD, submitting a resolution
calling for "anti-patriotism" and a military strike in case
22
of war.
A more moderate proposal by Vaillant and the
French pacifist-socialist Jean Jaures called for the preven
tion of war by all means ranging from parliamentary activity
23
to the mass strike.
Finally, a minority within the French
delegation led by Guesde called only for the "most effec
tive" tactics for the prevention of war— this came to noth-
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24
ing more than a ratification of the status quo.
Within the SPD, a majority sided with August Bebel
(head of the SPD's parliamentary group), who proposed a
resolution similar to the one offered by Guesde,

> one

which did not commit any of the sections to specific ac
tions, and allowed a maximum latitude of individual re25
sponse.
The notorious reformist von Vollmar vehemently
responded to Herve's speech with, in Lenin’s characteriza
tion, "the extraordinary conceit of a man infatuated with
26
stereotyped parliamentarism."
And Rosa Luxemburg, although
officially a representative of the All-Russia Social Demo
cratic Party, found support in the left wing of the SPD by
insisting on mass action not only as a tactic for ending
27
war, but a means of overthrowing capitalism as well.
In the ensuing debate, Jaures emphasized the optimism
of the militant left in the power of activism, and denied
the "necessity" of war under capitalism (although he never
doubted capitalism’s tendency to generate conflict). Bebel,
on the other hand, contended that war under capitalism was
unavoidable, that any effort to initiate mass action as a
response to war would be futile in view of government re
pression, and that therefore the principal task for social
ists was to push for socialism (which for the SPD of course
28
meant parliamentary activity).
It is symptomatic of the
politics of the International and its subsequent development
that Jaures the internationalist found himself defending
bourgeois democracy

■> France) against the "pseudo29
Parliament" of the German monarchy.
Bebel could then re
53

spond:

"Bourgeois monarchy, bourgeois republic, both are

class states.... The monarchy is not so bad, nor the repub30
lie so good as you suggest."
Eventually, a sub-committee including Bebel, von Vollmar, Jaures, Guesde, Luxemburg and Viktor Adler (Social
Democratic Party of Austria) was charged with producing a
document to which all could agree--the result, in the words
of historian James Joll, was "a long and involved resolution
which contained something for everybody while commiting
31
nobody to anything."
An amendment submitted by Luxemburg,
Lenin and Julius Martov seemed unobtrusive enough since,
according to another astute observation by Joll, "no one
except its sponsors took it seriously." But in this amend
ment, consisting of only a single sentence,

it was already

possible to discern (in retrospect, at least) the bases for
the coming split in international socialism:
Should war ever break out in spite of all of this, it
is [the Social Democrats'] duty to intercede for its
speedy end, and to strive with all their power to make
use of the violent economic and political crisis brought
about by the war to rouse the people, and thereby to
hasten the abolition of class rule.[32]
The resolution passed unanimously amid great enthusiasm.
Also at the Stuttgart congress, a significant discus
sion developed around the question of colonialism, an issue
obviously linked to the relationship of the various sections
of the International to 'their* respective governments.
Prior to Stuttgart, all congresses of the International had
unequivocally condemned all aspects and manifestations of
colonial rule in their resolutions, but in 1907 the commit
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tee charged with drafting a document on colonialism produced
a paper which began:
The Congress confirms that the usefulness or the neces
sity of colonies in general— but especially for the work
ing class— is greatly exaggerated. But it does not repu
diate in principle and for all time every form of colo
nialism, which under a socialist system could perform a
civilizing mission.[33]
The latter sentence was inserted at the behest of the com
mittee najority,

led by Eduard David of Germany and H. van

Kol of Holland, and resulted in three days of heated debate:
one day in the committee and two at the plenum. Bernstein,
David, van Kol and Ramsay MacDonald spoke in favor of the
motion as offered. A minority of the committee, outraged at
the wording of the resolution, offered an alternative, one
similar to those passed at earlier congresses and which
condemned all colonialism. Kautsky, Georg Ledebour and Harry
Quelch spoke for the minority version. Ultimately, the cong
ress as a whole defeated the majority resolution, but only
34
by a small margin— 127 to 108.
At the Copenhagen congress (1910), Vaillant's mass
action proposals were endorsed by Keir Hardie, recently
elected MP of the British ILP, a combative but non35
revolutionary individual membership socialist party.

The

ILP's political stance propelled Hardie toward the militant
camp, which included Jaures and Vaillant. Their joint reso
lution, which stated that parliamentary activity alone would
be ineffective unless supported by a mass strike, was adopt
ed by the draft committee. The congress as a whole, however,
failed to approve it, and chose instead to submit the motion
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to the ISB for consideration at the next congress— scheduled
36
to be held in Vienna in August 1914.
By then, of course,
there was little to discuss. The majority of the SPD de
clined to support the general strike notion on the grounds
that if successful,

such a strike would ensure,

in the event

of war, that the most highly 'organized* and 'class con37
scious* proletariat would be defeated.
Later, at a July
1914 congress of the SFIO, Guesde opposed the general strike
38
group on precisely the same grounds.
Meanwhile, the prospects for war mounted: the Morocco
crisis and the Balkan wars raised great alarm. The ISB,
under direction of its secretary Camille Huysmans, scheduled
an extraordinary congress to meet in Basle during November
1912. Joll describes the mystical quality of the session,
39
held in a cathedral.
There was an abundance of rhetoric
and self-congratulatory pronouncements. The resolutions from
Stuttgart and Copenhagen were re-affirmed without, again,
any specification of concrete measures. That fall there were
large anti-war demonstrations all over Europe, and the Bal40
kan crisis passed without a general conflagration.
The
easing of tensions caused a wave of optimism to engulf the
voluntarist militant group— they became convinced of the
International's strength and capacity to prevent war.
The so-called orthodox Marxist faction (hereafter also
referred to as the 'center*, in anticipation of post-1914
political alignments) was encouraged by the defusing of the
crisis, but continued to believe that Social Democracy did
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not possess sufficient strength,

in any nation,

to prevent

fighting in case of mobilization of the war machine. Adler
thus remarked: "It unfortunately does not depend on us
41
Social Democrats whether there is a war or not."
Faced
with this realization, and circumscribed by its committment
to parliamentarism, the center grouping was forced toward
pacifist sentiments (more on this in subheading D below).
This drift was expressed in hopes of attracting bourgeois
anti-war groups to a common front. To an extent, the easing
of tensions contributed to the spawning of illusions among
this tendency as well, with the political consequence that
42
they above all began to fear 'rocking the boat'.
Only among the revolutionary left, notably Lenin and
Leon Trotsky, was there a refusal to see anything but a
temporary detente in the passing of the crisis. Furthermore,
the revolutionary wing harbored no illusions about the In
ternational's potency, and were thus in agreement with the
center regarding the ineffectuality of 'opposing1 the out
break of war. Trotsky wrote:
Once mobilization is declared, the Social Democracy
finds itself face to face with the concentrated power of
the government, which is supported by a powerful military
apparatus.143]
Lenin had also noted, and quite early on, the futility of
the naive expectations of the militants (_i.e. , Hardie, Vaillant, Jaures and the rather incoherent Herve) and the com
plete chauvinism of the right (i,.£. , von Vollmar, David and
44
Bernstein).
It yet remained for Lenin to appreciate Luxem
bur g’s perspicacity in her recognition of the imperative of
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breaking with the center (i_.e,. , Kautsky and Hugo Haase, the
latter taking over leadership of the S P D 's parliamentary
group following the death of Bebel).
*

*

*

The course of events between the incident at Sarajevo
(28. June,

1914) and Austria's ultimatum to Serbia (23.

July) must have seemed to move with inordinate speed for
most members of the International. Faster yet must have been
the days between 23. July and the German declaration of war
on Russia on 1. August.
Prior to the German declaration,

a hasty meeting of the

ISB was called in Brussels (28-29. July) with the hope of
avoiding a European war. Some of the delegates,

such as

Adler, had already given up hope and were crushed and im45
mobilized.
Others, such as Jaures, felt compelled to
praise the "peaceful policy" of the French government, al
though he did issue grave warnings (of revolution) in case
46
war did break out.
Haase and even Luxemburg felt that
47
Kaiser Wilhelm II was too afraid to risk war.
Keir Hardie
insisted that England could not be drawn into war. No one at
the conference thought to ask what should be done in case
48
war did actually break out.
On 28. July, Austria declared war on Serbia. At the ISB
meeting, there was still a feeling that the conflict might
remain isolated. Haase had meanwhile returned to Berlin from
the ISB meeting, and on 30. July met with the Reichstag
Group and the SPD executive. At this time, a majority of the
49
SPD leadership was still resolutely against Avar.
Haase and
58

Ledebour spoke, urging a vote to reject war credits in the
50
Reichstag.
A personal blow to the International cane on
31. July, when a young French 'patriot' assasinated Jaures.
On 1. August,

the German government declared war on

Russia. Owing to press censorship,

the SPD Reichstag Group

had only a limited awareness of passing events. Specifical
ly, they did not know that on the previous day Germany had
demanded a declaration of neutrality from France. Further
more, the government

'revealed'

(untrue) information that

Russian troops had crossed the German frontier and that the
51
French had bombed Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.
Under these
conditions,

the Reichstag Group reversed itself, and decided

(78 to 14) to vote in favor of war credits. The 14 opposed
submitted to party discipline, so the vote in the Reichstag
52
on 4. August was unanimous.
In France, the parliament also met on 4. August, and
the vote for war credits was also unanimous. The French
socialist deputies found it easy to rationalize their ac
tions, citing the German declaration of war on France the
day before and the movement of German troops into Belgium, a
53
neutral nation, the previous night.
The European war had
truly begun, and within a matter of days England and Rus54
sia
were also involved.
*

*

*

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it seems possible
to identify four broad tendencies within the International—
the right,

the 'orthodox* center, the militant (albeit gen
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erally non-Marxist) left, and the revolutionary left. A re
markable transformation in these political positions was
effected by the eruption of war.
Needless to say, the right quickly moved to a perspec
tive almost indistinguishable from that of the bourgeois
parties. Certain elements within the center, although ini
tially ambivalent with regard to the voting of war credits,
soon succumbed when faced with the overwhelming support for
the war within the various parliaments. And although there
had been anti-war rallies as late as 2. August,

the militant

left found that once war had been declared, anti-war mass
action was notable only for its absence. Some members of the
militant tendency (£.g.» Guesde, Marcel Sembat) subsequently
even came to accept positions on wartime cabinets.
55
incidentally, became a French patriot).

(Herve,

Fundamentally, there was a mingling of the center and
militant left groups, followed by the uneven crystalliza
tion, over the first years of the war, of two relatively
distinct positions. On the one hand, a ‘pro-war’ or ’defense
of the fatherland* group emerged, including such personages
as Vaillant, Guesde, Sembat and Georgi Plekhanov. On the
other hand, a ’pacifist* wing appeared which, while opposed
to the war, acquiesced to voting for war credits while
waiting for a ’solution'

to be found. This group found
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Haase, Kautsky and (later) Bernstein among its members.
Finally, the revolutionary left, remaining largely
intact, undertook an immediate campaign to explain the col
lapse of the International, and sought to formulate a viable
60

but principled position on the imperialist war. Within this
perspective, a range of reponses to the war became promi
nent, from Luxemburg's slogan of "struggle against capital
ist class rule" to Lenin's tactic of "revolutionary
defeatism."
The following subheadings of this chapter seek to exam
ine the underlying theoretical premises and conceptions of
the accumulation process held by these principal factions,
and to reveal the links to movements in the political and
ideological spheres. The results should serve to help ex
plain the diverse positions, sketched out above, on the
prospects for proletarian internationalism in a concrete
historical setting.
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C. Eduard Bernstein and the 'Revision* of Marxism
The first 'ism* to be defined by the clash of theoreti
cal and political standpoints operating within the framework
of the International was the 'revisionism*

(beginning in the

late 1890s) associated with Eduard Bernstein. Even before
Bernstein launched his critique, the political content of
revisionism was expressly present within the SPD.

In 1891,

von Vollmar (in a speech to the Erfurt congress) spoke of
the primacy of immediate objectives and the need to pursue
57
"the path of calm, legal, parliamentary activity...."
Von
Vollmar, however, was no theoretician.

In fact, by distin

guishing between the reformists and the revisionists within
the SPD, Gary Steenson draws attention to the explicitly
anti-theoretical attitude of the reformists (e.g., von Vol58
Imar).
Thus Bernstein's novelt 3^, which he himself recog
nized, was the effort to ratify theoretically the already
existing practical program of the SPD (i_.e^, reformist par59
liamentary activity), with which he agreed.
Somewhat paradoxically, one of Bernstein's principal
antagonists in the subsequent debate surrounding the revi
sion of Marxism came to be Karl Kautsky,

'High Priest' of

orthodoxy in the SPD's center faction— paradoxically because
Kautsky and Bernstein had collaborated in 1891, less than a
decade earlier, to draft the Erfurt Programme of the SPD.
In 1896, a year after Engels' death, Bernstein began to
publish a series of articles in the SPD theoretical organ
Die Neue Z e i t . These were subsequently collected,

somewhat

refined and published (in 1899) as a book: Die Voraus62

setzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufhaben der Sozialdemo60
kratie,
appearing in English translation under the title
Evolutionary Socialism.
The assault which Bernstein engineered proceeded along
many fronts. Addressing himself to the SPD, Bernstein argued
for a political strategy of expanding legal, parliamentary
and above all evolutionary methods of struggle.

,f[l]n my

judgement a greater security for success lies in a steady
advance than in the possibilities offered by a catastrophic
61
crash.'’
Bernstein furthermore contended that in urging
this approach he was doing no more than acting on the advice
given by Engels in an 1895 preface (written shortly before
his death) to Marx's The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to
1850. Citing Engels, Bernstein wrote that
the time of political surprises, of the 'revolutions of
small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious
masses' was today at an end, that a collision on a large
scale with the military would be the means of checking
the steady growth of social democracy.... [T]he next task
of the party should be 'to work for an uninterrupted
increase of its votes' or to carry on a slow propaganda
of parliamentary activity.[62]
Before continuing, note that Ernest Mandel has effec
tively put to rest the legend which makes Engels the progen
itor of Bernstein's theses, a misconception which still
enjoys widespread currency.

In actuality, Engels' manuscript

was not printed in f u l l , and the excised passages lend the
text an entirely different meaning from that suggested by
Bernstein. As Engels himself wrote to Paul Lafargue:
'Liebknecht [the editor] played a dirty trick on me. He
took from my introduction to Marx's articles on France
between 1848 and 1850 everything he could use to support
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a peaceful tactic at any price.... But I recommend such a
tactic only for Germany today, and even here with strong
reservations *.[63]
On the opening page of Evolutionary Socialism, Bern
stein makes clear that the principal thrust of his critique
will be to subject Marxist theory to empirical test, since
"what is not capable of such proof is no longer science...."
Moreover, he contends:
In all sciences a distinction can be drawn between a
pure science and an applied science. The first consists
of priciples and of a knowledge, which are derived from
the whole series of corresponding experiences and there
fore looked upon as universally valid.... From the appli
cation of these principles to single phenomena or to
particular cases of practical experience, is formed an
applied science....[64]
Now, according to Bernstein,

the division of Marxism into

its "pure" and "applied" aspects "has not hitherto been
attempted." At first glance, Marx's analysis of the capi
talist mode of production may appear to be "applied" Marx
ism, since it deals with a historically specific and de
limited form of social organization. But in truth, says
Bernstein,

the theory of capitalism "is a thouroughly essen

tial application" of "pure" Marxism, and consequently "the
general or chief propositions of [the] deductions regarding
modern society must be ascribed to the pure doctrine of
65
Marxism."
Thus the empirical critique, by bringing into
question the validity of certain derived propositions, at
the sane time (and somewhat contrary to Bernstein's original
account of the relation between "pure" and "applied" sci
ence) can be made to refute the "pure" theory as well.
Having framed the issue in this manner, Bernstein pro-
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ceeds to examine the "nost important element in the founda
tion of Marxism,... the materialist interpretation of histo
ry." For Bernstein:
To be a materialist means first of all to trace back
all phenomena to the necessary movements of matter....
Mechanical facts determine, in the last resort, all oc
curences, even those which appear to be caused by ideas.
It is, finally, always the movement of matter which
determines the form of ideas and the directions of the
will; and thus these also are inevitable. The materialist
is thus a Calvinist without God.[66]
But beyond this passage, Bernstein never again refers
to the "movement of matter" as having any privileged status
in Marxism (or, for that matter, in any other non-Marxist
materialist philosophy). Instead, his concern moves as unob
trusively as possible to an effort aimed at revealing the
existence of a necessary link between a (any) materialist
eplstemology (but M a r x ’s in particular) and a belief in
historical necessity or determinism ("the inevitableness of
all historical events").

And by quoting from Mar x’s 1859

"Preface,” Bernstein concludes that for Marx the economic
(taking now the place of the "movement of matter") is "the
determining factor" by which "the inevitable is accomplished
67
in human history."
Marx, in Bernstein's view took a "dogmatic" stand by
erecting such a sharp distinction between "consciousness"
and "existence... that we are nearly driven to conclude that
men were regarded solely as living agents of historical
powers whose work they carry out positively against their
68
knowledge and will."
This conception of the historical
process is not ascribed to Engels, who (we are told) in the
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period after Marx's death adopted a much more "qualified"
69
position. Invoking two letters written by Engels,
Bernstein quotes passages therein which emphasize the effectivity of non-economic factors, and maintains that these
formulations convey a rather different meaning than the ones
produced by Marx himself. In the end, the entire matter
70
reduces, for Bernstein, to "a question of proportion."
Thus while Bernstein does not deny the significance of the
economic, it becomes necessary, in his opinion, to consider
the economic as merely one factor among many— this "eclecti
cism" is then simply the "rebellion of sober reason" against
dogma, and points the way to a rational reconstruction of
scientific socialism which avoids the deterministic formula71
tions intrinsic to Marxian materialism.
After all this, however, Bernstein surprisingly an
nounced that he still preferred to retain the notion of the
"Economic Interpretation of History," provided that his
qualifications were adopted. He also inexplicably continued
to refer to it as the "Marxist conception of history,"
although Marx had specifically been held responsible for its
"deterministic" formulations,

i . , those which were sub72
sequently "corrected" by Engels.
Foremost among Bernstein's objections to the "dogma" is
the vision of necessary "collapse" which he imputes to the
Marxist theory of capital accumulation.

In Bernstein’s read

ing of Marx, the collapse of capitalist society is conceived
as the necessary and inevitable outcome of the accumulation
process. The "coercive lav/s of competition" and "the growing
66

wealth of capital in society1' act to bring down the rate of
profit: "competition...presses constantly on the market
price of commodities," forcing capitalists to cheapen pro
duction costs. The principal means by which costs are low
ered is mechanization, which entails a rising organic compo
sition of capital and a concommitant falling rate of
73
profit.
This interpretation of Marx's law of the tendency of
the rate of profit to fall is no doubt muddled by ascribing
74
the fall to the "coercive laws" of competition.
But even
more striking is the fact that these references, which are
no more than passing comments from an introductory chapter,
are actually the sole passages in Evolutionary Socialism
where Bernstein even considers Marx's crisis theory to be
bound up with profitability at all. The discussion is inter
rupted at this point by Bernstein's recapitulation of the
Marxian theory of value.
The first page of the chapter on value theory in Evolu
tionary Socialism is also virtually the last where Bernstein
renders an accurate account. He begins with the reasonable
claim that the theory of surplus value, for Marx,

is the

"pivot" on which the workings of the capitalist mode of
production are understood. But Bernstein then complains that
Marx, having equated value with the socially necessary labor
time required for (re)production, finds that such a concept
of value entails all manner of abstraction. In particular,
it is necessary to (i) "leave aside” use-value,

C>7

(ii) reduce

complex to simple labor,
ductivities,

(iii) allow for differential pro

(iv) allow for the deviation of prices of

prodiiction from values and (v) deduct ground rent from the
75
"total value"[?].
After all of these allowances, Bernstein
claims that value becomes no more than a "pure abstract
concept." Marx, like Smith, is then forced to regard value
under capitalist production as the sum [!] of profits, wages
76
and rent.
For Bernstein, the "fundamental" debate in Marxism
prior to the publication of vol. 3 of Capital, a debate in
which Bernstein proudly notes he participated,

revolved

around the question of whether "socially necessary labor
time" referred to the "amount produced" or to "the manner of
the production." According to Bernstein, the resolution of
this momentous issue was made largely irrelevant with the
publication of vol. 3, since there it is discovered that
commodities do not even exchange at values, but at prices of
production. Following this disclosure, "[w]hat takes the
first place is the value of the total production of socie
ty. . .— that is, not the individual, but the total social
77
surplus value."
From this, Bernstein infers that the amount of the
total surplus value realized depends on the relation between
total production and total demand, and according to this
perspective the individual value (s i c ) of a commodity is
"determined by the labor time which was necessary to produce
it under normal conditions of production to that amount
which the market...can take in each case." Since there can
68

be no measure of social need, "value as conceived above is a
purely abstract entity," not unlike the (subjective) value
of the marginal utility theoreticians--and of equally lim78
ited applicability.
And if all of this is true, it re
quires no great feat of deduction to conclude that the
theory of surplus value (the "pivot" of Marx's system)
collapses as ■well. But fortunately, all is not lost because
"practical experience" shows first, that supply and demand
tend to equalize themselves (obviating the need for a theory
of value!); and second, that some people consume without
working (obviating the need for a "deductive proof" of the
79
theory of surplus labor!).
It must be said in Bernstein's
defense that his recourse to the empirical is a testament to
consistency.
A full critique of Bernstein's appraisal of the Marxian
theory of value is not necessary for present purposes, but a
few summary points can be readily made and briefly elab
orated. First, Bernstein's complaint that the theory "is
above all misleading in this that it always appears again
and again as the measure of the actual exploitation of the
80
worker"
will re-emerge as an element of his observation
that the position of the working class under capitalism is
steadily improving (i..e_., the basis of his argument against
the "class struggle"). Second, and highly important, his
treatment of the labor theory of value allowed Bernstein to
detach the subsequent discussion of crisis from any founda
tion in value theory, thus expelling any notion of crisis as
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intrinsic to capitalism.

Indeed, as already noted, the ac

tual discussion of crisis in Evolutionary Socialism does not
even indirectly refer to profitability. Rather, the section
on crisis dwells on two topics: the role of the credit
system and disproportions stemming from the anarchy of
81
production.
According to Bernstein, "the enormous extension of the
world market” reduces the possibility of crisis by virtue of
enhancing flexibility (in transport, finance, etc.) and
therefore increasing the likelihood that the adjustment of
disturbances will be accomplished locally, without precipi
tating a massive crisis in all parts of the system. In
particular,

"the elasticity of the modern credit system and

the rise of industrial Kartels" has facilitated the smooth
operation of the capitalist market to the extent that "gen
eral commercial crises similar to the earlier ones are to be
82
regarded as improbable."
True, says Bernstein,

the credit system in the early

days of capitalism served on occasion to fuel speculation
and hence instability. But he argues that in addition to
this "destructive" role, Marx himself had assigned a "cre
ative" content to speculation insofar as it aids in the
83
development and extension of capitalist production.
And
once established, the maturing of a particular branch of
production coincides with a diminution of "the speculative
momentum.... The conditions and movements of the market are
then more exactly foreseen and are taken into consideration
84
with greater certainty."
Bernstein concedes that credit
70

may nevertheless act as a "hothouse forcing... overproduc
tion." But here too, in his opinion, a countervailing in
fluence has emerged in the form of cartels and trusts, which
are able to regulate production with ever greater precision.
To deny this is to deny the superiority of organization
over anarchic competition. But we do so if we deny on
principle that Kartels can work as a modifying influence
on the nature and frequency of crises.[85]
The conclusion is self-evident. Marx may have more or
less correctly identified the source of economic crises at
the time in which he wrote Capital, but social development
had so altered economic conditions that it was certainly no
longer possible in 1900 to argue that capitalism was threat
ened by "collapse." Moreover, even the recurrent fluctua
tions seemed to diminish over time. Naturally, external
factors— war, general crop failures, etc.— could still in
duce a crisis, but "there is no urgent reason for concluding
that such a crisis will come to pass for purely economic
86
reasons."
For Bernstein, M a r x ’s errors were not confined to the
crisis theory. "The Marxist doctrine of class war" rests,
according to Bernstein, on the argument that capitalist
development entails the concentration and centralization of
capital in the hands of an ever smaller, wealthier bourgeoi
sie and the impoverishment and degradation of an ever larg
er, increasingly destitute proletariat. To this interpreta
tion Bernstein counterposes his own contention that
conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition
of things and classes.... The enormous increase in social
wealth is not accompanied by a decreasing number of large
71

capitalists but by an increasing number of capitalists of
all degrees.[87]
Indeed, the economic 'facts’ demonstrate that rather than
generating a concentration of wealth, capitalist development
disperses it (as evidenced by the growing number of share88
holders).
The principal characteristic of the capitalist
mode of production, for Bernstein, consists in the rapid
increase in the productivity of labor, leading to
the production of masses of commodities. Where are these
riches?... If the 'capitalist magnates' had ten times as
large stomachs as popular satire attributes to them...,
their consumption would only be a feather in the scale
against the mass of yearly national product....[89]
Bernstein concludes that the "riches" must obviously be
accruing to the middle and working classes. Thus once again,
in the best modern tradition,

the 'facts' contradict the

'theory', and Bernstein provides a falsification of Marx.
Since in Bernstein's schema "class is a social stratum
which is largely formed by similarity of living condi90
tions,"
and observation shows a wide spectrum of "living
conditions" (even within the ranks of the propertyless), it
follows that the "middle classes" not only are not de91
d i ni ng , they are even increasing.
At the same time, these
differences in "living conditions" create such tensions
within the working class that, according to Bernstein,

it

becomes impossible to even speak of the proletariat as
92
anything except a "purely mental construct."
In an important essay, Lucio Colletti criticizes Bern
stein's reduction of value to a mental generalization as an
93
egregious misreading of M a r x ’s theory.
While Colletti
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links Bernstein’s mistake to the (vulgar) understanding of exploitation as a violation of the law of equivalent ex94
change (similar to Proudhon’s "theft"),
grasping this
connection only uncovers the tip of the iceberg.
When Bernstein severs value theory from the theory of
capital accumulation and crisis, a twofold result directly
obtains. First, it becomes possible to think of crisis as a
problem of disproportions or periodic outbreaks of specula
tive fever, both of which can be gradually eliminated
through regulation and the perfection of the credit sys95
tern.
This implies an enhanced appreciation of the pros
pects for reform, which of course leads to a reliance on the
(bourgeois) parliament and efforts to 'perfect' the parlia
ment. The conception of the 'interests' of the 'nation as a
whole' is thus smuggled onto the arena, with clear implica96
tions for working class organizations.
Second, once value
theory is abandoned, accumulation takes on the aspect of a
process whose aim is the production of "riches" in the form
of "masses of commodities" which appear merely as use97
values.
Consumption, rather than the expansion of value,
has become the object of capitalist production; all that is
left for socialism is to effect a more or less equal distri
bution of these "riches."
It is in Bernstein’s discussion of the nature of civil
society that the implications of his theory of capitalist
development are combined and their links with the theory
most fully revealed. Bernstein openly states that acceptance
of his arguments regarding the crisis theory leads directly
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to the view that social democracy must proceed by "evolu
tion," an imperative if the socialist movement was "to avoid
the steady growth of social democracy by lawful means being
98
interrupted by a political revolution."
There is an in
ference here: since for the SPD "lawful means" signified
parliamentary methods, fealty to parliamentary methods also
implied fealty to the parliament, i..e., the emergence of a
state of affairs in which the supposed interests of the
working class come to be linked and identified with the
continued maintenance and development of the parliament,
rather than its revolutionary supersession.
A similar theme is evident when Bernstein speaks of
" [d]emocracy [as] the suppression of class government," and
when he maintains that the "right to vote in a democracy
makes its members virtually partners in the community, and
this virtual partnership must in the end lead to real part99
nershlp."
Plainly, this line of reasoning leads somewhat
beyond the mere renunciation of violent methods as a means
of obtaining political power for the working class. Rather,
it rejects any notion whatsoever of the state as guarantor
or reproducer of particular social relations by conceiving
the modern representative state as a perfectly class neutral
or non-class institution.
To be sure, Marx had also made mention of the progres
sive aspects of capitalism (and its ideology, bourgeois
liberalism) viz-a-viz archaic forms of social organization.
But Marx had nowhere argued that even the most democratic
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bourgeois government was anything but a class state.
Bernstein consequently places himself far afield from Marx's
101
theses
when he argued that ” [t]here is actually no really
liberal thought which does not also belong to the elements
102
of the ideas of socialism,"
and that for the full reali
zation of socialism the "liberal organizations of modern so
ciety. ..do not need to be destroyed, but only to be further
103
developed."
It is not a major leap frciu here to the con
tention that with the development of liberalism the worker
"moves from being a proletarian to a citizen..,[and becomes]
a fellow owner of the common property of the nation." Ob104
viously, such a worker increasingly "has a fatherland."
Whereas for Bernstein it thus comes to pass that West
ern workers can and should establish an identity of in
terests with the fatherland, the same cannot be said of the
inhabitants of the colonies, since
only a conditional right of savages to the land occupied
by them can be recognized. The higher civilization ulti
mately can claim a higher right. Not the conquest, but
the cultivation, of the land gives the historical legal
title to its use.[105]
And here Bernstein claims he is only following Marx [!],
citing the following passage from Capital vol. 3:
Even a whole society, a nation, nay, all contempora
neous societies taken together are not proprietors of the
earth. They are only its tenants, its usufructuaries, and
have to leave it improved as boni patres familias to the
following generation.
In addition to such non sequiturs, much of Bernstein's
writing is infused with homages to Germany's "honourable
share in the civilizing work of the world" and considera106
tions of Germany's "future rights."
Here again, Bern75

stein's sympathetic biographer concocts an apologia. Con
ceding that Bernstein "supported" colonialism, Gay immedi
ately warns that it would be a "grave misconception” to
ignore the fact that this support was "qualified." In par
ticular, Gay argues that Bernstein's favorable attitude to
colonialism was confined to the British variety, insofar as
this supposedly enlightened form was capable of "bringing
107
advancement to backward nations."
Bernstein was not alone in the SPD in voicing support
of colonialism, and it must be said that others provided
much less "qualified" endorsements. Ludwig Quessel, for
instance, was unhappy with Germany's 'meager' endowment of
colonies, and thought it only fair that Portugal should cede
its colonies to Germany, since Portugal had shown Itself to
be manifestly incapable of performing the "civilizing mis108
sion."
In a similar vein, Gerhard Hildebrand saw that
"our [Europe'S--N.K.] well being, our civilization, is based
upon the payment of tribute by foreign peoples." Should
these "peoples" in the colonial areas begin on a course of
independent economic development, Europe might find itself
without adequate food supplies and markets for export.
Clearly,

the colonies had to be maintained in a state of

dependence. Hildebrand justifies himself:
A mass of humanity consisting of 290-300 millions,
crowded into the narrow space of the Western half of
Europe, which is blessed with a superior civilization,
must claim the right to colonize the backward, sparsely
populated lands such as Africa, where the people have
proved themselves incapable of progress.[ 109]
Alongside Bernstein's revisionism, and clearly linked
76

to it via the implicit or explicit abandonment of interna
tionalist principles, a second 'ism’ had thus made its
appearance within the Second International: social imperial
ism, _i .e^. , socialism in words and imperialism in deeds.
Concretely, social imperialism manifested itself (as already
discussed in subheading B above) in the struggle around the
issue of colonialism. The manner in which the anti
revisionist Marxists now came to develop theoretical expla
nations of revisionism, social imperialism and the connec
tions between them is discussed in subheadings D and E
below.
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D.
Karl Kautsky, Georgi Plekhanov,
and the Orthodox* Critique of Revisionism
The response to Bernstein and the revisionist tide was
swift. From the ’center* camp, Georgi Plekhanov immediately
launched a vituperative critique of Bernstein’s philosoph
ical theses, while Karl Kautsky (the ’High Priest’ of doc
trinal purity within the SPD) somewhat belatedly went on the
attack against the economic theory of revisionism as well as
its philosophical grounding.
When Bernstein began publishing his articles in Die
Neue Zeit toward the end of 1896, Plekhanov was one of the
first to react. Kautsky delayed, however, and continued to
publish Bernstein’s work without comment. Some have vaguely
sought to explain Kautsky's hesitation as "symptomatic’’ of
the general absence of an "articulate opposition" to revi110
sionism within the SPD.
What this implies, of course, is
that Bernstein’s critique of Marxism was devastating. Proba
bly closer to the mark are those explanations which empha
size Kautsky’s friendship with Bernstein, and more impor
tantly,

the tactical considerations of SPD leaders over

provoking a split with the revisionists, who had powerful
111

allies in the SPD affiliated trade unions.

In their

personal correspondence, Kautsky and August Bebel rather
quickly concurred that Bernstein was beyond the pale. Viktor
Adler, however, counseled that a break would be inopportune
because Bernstein might prove more troublesome outside the
constraints imposed by party discipline. By March 1899 even
Adler had become fed up with Bernstein’s contentions, and
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Kautsky proceeded to work out a critique of revisionism.
*

*

*

Plekhanov’s earliest (Marxist) theoretical writings,
however, appeared in 1883, long before the revisionist con
troversy. In that year, he published Socialism and the
Political Struggle, followed a year later by Our Differ
ences .
The former was a critique of the theoretical and polit
ical positions of the Russian populist Narodnaya Volya group
from a Marxist perspective.

In the pamphlet, Plekhanov de

nied that Marx had argued "that Russia must go through
exactly the same phases of historical and economic develop
ment as the West," and insofar as Capital was concerned with
"the history of West European relations," these were "used
by Marx only as the basis of the history of capitalist
production." The principal aim of Socialism and the Politi
cal Struggle was to show that class conflict is the motivat
ing force of history, and that in modern industrial society,
and increasingly in Russia,

the proletariat would be the
113
class which asumes the key historical role.
The Narodnaya
Volya group erred, said Plekhanov,

in regarding workers as

merely an auxiliary force in the revolution,

and in empha

sizing the recruitment of intellectuals and members of "the
114
officer corps."
Having said all this, Plekhanov immediately grew cau
tious in his assessment of the prospects for socialist
revolution in Russia.
The socialist organization of production implies such a
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character of economic relations as will make that organi
zation the logical conclusion of the entire previous
development of the country.... In other words, socialist
organization, like any other, requires the appropriate
basis. But that basis does not exist in Russia.[115]
The most that could be hoped for in the Russia of the 1880s
was "to achieve free political institutions...and to create
elements for the setting up of the future worker’s socialist
116
party...."
For Plekhanov,

the appropriate political strategy was

consequently to support the bourgeoisie (quoting the Mani
festo) " ’whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against
117
the absolute monarchy’
Narodnaya Volya was mistaken in
believing that an immediate transition to socialism was
possible on the basis of the village commune, argued.
Plekhanov, and therefore the appropriate if paradoxical
strategy to achieve socialism was to ’support' the develop
ment of capitalism.
Many of these same themes were further developed in Our
Differences. Moreover, Plekhanov also sought to show that
capitalism was already implanted and developing in Russia,
citing statistics on industrial concerns, numbers of work
ers, the expansion of the market and the dissolution of the
118
village commune.
The laws of motion of capitalism were at
work with the irresistible and blind harshness of laws of
nature. But to discover this or that law of nature or of
social development means, firstly, to be able to avoid
clashing with it and, consequently, to avoid expending
one's efforts in vain, and, secondly, to be able to
regulate its application in such a manner as to draw
profit from it.[119]
There was an historical "peculiarity" of Russian capi
talism, according to Plekhanov, and it consisted in the fact
80

that because of a prior capitalist development in Europe,
and the lessons which were drawn from it, "the socialist
movement in [Russia] began when capitalism was only in the
120
embryo."
Plekhanov's political conclusion is the same as
previously: Russian socialists should "put aside all
thoughts of siezing power, leaving that to our worker's
socialist party of the future." Rather, efforts should be
121
directed towards the creation of such a party.
The "char
acter of the impending revolution" will be bourgeois, con
cluded Plekhanov, but socialists can take comfort in knowing
that because of Russia's "peculiarity," the capitalist phase
122

there will be shorter than in the West.
The debates with the populists occupied Plekhanov dur
ing the 1880s, but shortly after the end of the decade he
began to take note of the unwelcome trends within the SPD.
As noted earlier, revisionism as a political practice was
already firmly established in German social-deraocracy at
least since the Erfurt congress (1891) of the party, thus
well before Bernstein's formulation of the theoretical bases
of revisionism. At the congress, von Vollmar had exhorted
party members to seek an accomodation with the ruling clas
ses and to confine the SPD's activity to the parliamentary
arena. At the time, Plekhanov expressed pleasure at the
rejection of von Vollmar's position by the congress, but
-123
also noted that the danger was not thereby eliminated.
During the spring and summer of 1898, Plekhanov toured
Italy and Switzerland, delivering a series of critical lec
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tures on Bernstein's philosophical arguments. These lectures
ultimately served as the basis for several anti-revisionist
124
articles which Plekhanov published in Die Neue Z ei t .
For Plekhanov, the critique of revisionism was in large
part a continuation of his polemics against the "theory of
factors" put forward in Russia by the "subjectivists" and
liberal populists such as Nikolai Kareyev and Nikolai K.
Mikhailovsky. Proponents of the "theory of factors" inter
preted Marx's "materialist conception of history" to mean
that only the economic "factor" played any active role;
their critique then consisted in seeking to establish that
numerous other "factors" (law, ideology, e t c .) possessed an
independent effectivity, which found expression in the cora125
plex interaction of factors.
Plekhanov had no objection to
the observation that social phenomena are characterized by
the articulation of a myriad of factors--the problem came
when the observer of events
embark[s] on philosophising.... In that case I [the
observer-turned-philosopher] shall not be satisfied with
the external nexus between events, but shall wish to
uncover their inner causes, so that those factors— human
passions, public law, and the economy--which I previously
set off and brought forward, guided almost exclusively by
my artistic instinct, will now acquire a vast new signif
icance for me. I shall see them just as those inner
causes, those 'hidden forces', to whose influence the
events can be ascribed. I shall create a theory of
factors.[126]
The "theory of factors" was flawed, according to Ple
khanov,

in that it "split up social man's activities" and

was consequently unable to take the "synthetic view on
social life." Plekhanov maintained that the "theory of fac
tors" stood in the same relationship to social science as
32

did the early notions of separate physical forces to the
science of physics. In the same way as modern physics devel
oped a unified concept of energy, so too did modern social
127
science (i_.£., "dialectical materialism")
adopt the "syn
thetic view on social life." Granted, the "synthetic view"
was not unique to Marxism— it could be found in Hegel as
well. The advance of Marxism over Hegelianism consisted in
the former’s "eliminat[ion of] teleology from social sci
ence ." Marxism
has shown that men make their history, not so as to march
along a predestined road of progress or because they must
obey the laws of some kind of abstract evolution. They
make it in a striving to satisfy their needs....
The ways of satisfying social m a n ’s needs, and, in
considerable measure, those needs themselves are deter
mined by...the condition of his productive forces.... To
the idealists of all shades and varieties, economic rela
tions have been a function of human nature; the dialecti
cal materialists consider those relations a function of
the social productive forces.[128]
In rejecting what he termed "eclecticism," Plekhanov insist
ed "that men are creating, not several and separated histo
ries... but a single history of their own social rela129
tions...."
The imagery of a unified or "synthetic" social ontology
permeated Plekhanov’s work. Just prior to the publication of
the anti-Bernstein article quoted from above, Plekhanov
produced The Development of the Monlst View of History
(1895), wherein he defined materialism as the view which
"explain[s] psychic phenomena by these or those qualities of
matter, by this or that organization of the human or,

in

more general terms, of the animal body." Moreover, "the most
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consistent and profound thinkers were always inclined to
monism," i,.£. , an unwavering commitment to either material
ism or idealism. The eclectics simply did not understand
"the worthlessness of [their] dualist outlook on the world"
because they (the eclectics) could never
reply satisfactorily to the inevitable question: how
could these two separate substances [i.*©., spirit and
matter], which have nothing in common between them, in
fluence each other?[l30]
And finally, Plekhanov (following Kautsky) asked how
Bernstein could conceive of the possibility of scientific
explanation at all without accepting determinism, i.e.,
131
causality.
Bernstein could respond, of course, by claiming
that he only objected to the explanation of "all occurences"
by the billiard ball-like "movement of matter." By contrast
to what he deemed "purely" materialist explanations, Bern
stein claimed he only wished to leave room for spiritual,
moral, e t c . principles. Plekhanov’s monism was no less dog
matic than Calvinism.
But both Bernstein and Plekhanov muddled the issues. As
already seen above, Bernstein had objected to the determin
ism of billiard ball explanations of social (as opposed to
natural) processes, and claimed that Marx explained the
"inevitableness of all historical events" by the "material
132
productive forces and the conditions of production."
Bernstein himself did not seek to provide the (seemingly
necessary) explanation of why a theory of history rooted in
the development of the productive forces necessarily implied
the "inevitableness" of any particular event in the sense
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that the "movement of matter" might. Plekhanov, meanwhile,
never elaborated his conception of history beyond general
statements about the unified social history which "men are
creating," and which is rooted in the development of the
productive forces. Plekhanov thus certainly left himself
open to charges of crudity, given his "definition" of mate
rialism, when he referred to his theory of history as
materialist.
On the other hand, Plekhanov's sketchy outline does not
necessarily allow Bernstein's deduced criticism of ironclad
determinism. Much depends on the content ascribed to "socio
economic relations" and the "productive forces." If it can
be shown that the forces-relations couplet is conceived as
"an antecedent sphere, prior to any human mediation" (in the
133
words of Lucio Colletti),
and the 'economic factor* is
seen in purely technical terms, then Bernstein might have a
possible avenue along which to press his criticism.

If,

however, Plekhanpv's "definition" of materialism is inter
preted to mean only that the existence of matter is a neces
sary condition for thought, but that ideas, thoughts, e t c .,
are not reducible to the "movement of matter," then Bern
stein would be far wide of the mark.
So in the absence of further elaborations of the re
spective positions, which were not forthcoming,

the dispute

necessarily arrives at an impasse. Plekhanov continued the
attack by heaping scorn on Bernstein, accusing him of igno
rance in philosophical matters. Bernstein, on the other
134
hand, could admit to being a philosophical "layman,"
and
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yet remain smugly secure in the knowledge that the S P D ’s
concrete activities suggested a world-view in keeping with
his revision of Marxism.
Since Plekhanov did no more than take a few passing
135
snipes at Bernstein's use of statistics,
the task of
providing

the refutation of Bernstein's

Karl Kautsky, the chief theoretician of
*

With

*

economics fell to
the SPD.
*

Kautsky too, it is necessary to examine

thetheo

retical writings which preceded the revisionism debates,
both in order to better understand his critique of Bernstein
(and its obscurities) as well as to grasp the general char
acter of his approach.
In 1887, Kautsky wrote The Economic Doctrines of Karl
Marx, intended as a straightforward and unoriginal synopsis
and popularization of Capital and Marx's other major econom
ic writings. The first two parts of the book consist of a
rather rambling and far-ranging recapitulation of roughly
the first eighteen chapters of Marx's magnum opus. In the
third part, Kautsky begins with "Wages," corresponding to
Part Six of Capital vol.

1, but then quickly moves ahead,

dealing with reproduction, accumulation, primitive accumula
tion and crisis theory in the last fifty pages (out of two
hundred and fifty in all).
This last part of the book is also the least satisfac
tory, being both vague and inconsistent. Economic crises are
explained as a consequence of the struggle for markets

86

causing "a period of feverish production," followed by stag
nation. Although the crisis is characterized as one of
"overproduction," there is no indication given as to the
specific source or cause of the demand gap. The prolonged
crisis beginning in the 1870s was due to the gradual diminu
tion of non-capitalist regions of the world. So "instead of
a cycle of 10 years,... since 1873 we had chronic business
stagnation and permanent depression..." due to the shrinkage
136
of markets.
The Class Struggle, Kautsky's commentary on the SPD's
Erfurt Programme, was first published in 1892. Here Kautsky
developed themes from the past, and introduced his own
conceptions of the historical development of capitalism.
Marx's theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall
made an appearance early in the book, although no special
significance was assigned to it other than as an explanation
of the "narrowing" of the capitalist class, i_.e,. , the de137
cline in the profit rate squeezed out smaller capitals.
Crises were once again explained in terms of an "over
production," this time linked to the anarchy of capitalist
commodity production. Due to the unplanned nature of capi
talist production, Kautsky claimed, once an upswing began
individual capitals would increase production and, unaware
of the consequences of their actions, continue to raise
output beyond the point at which demand was saturated. As
before, no explanation of the origin or the nature of the
demand gap was forthcoming.
Ultimately, according to Kautsky,
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this state of affairs

was caused by the fact that capitalist production was for
exchange rather than for use. He provided a rather puzzling
illustrative example of simple commodity circulation,

show

ing how the process could break down if one of the producers
sold but chose not to buy. Conceding that the example was
perhaps oversimplified, Kautsky nevertheless claimed that it
grasped the essential contradiction of capitalism, v i z .,
that production for use "is crowded ever more to the
138
rear."
At this point, Kautsky began to distinguish periodic
crises as just decribed from "chronic" overproduction, which
he saw as rooted in the constant pressure to expand markets
coming up against the continual decline in the number of
non-capitalist areas around the world. The problem became
aggravated by the proletarianization of pre-capitalist pro139
ducers, which "lowers [their] purchasing power."
Capital
ism thus digs its own grave by depriving itself of con140
sumers,
and periods of prosperity become shorter while
crises become longer. Adopting a highly modern-sounding turn
of phrase, Kautsky argued that the "capitalist system begins
141
to suffocate in its own surplus...."
Although the theory of "chronic" overproduction would
142
allow Kautsky to explain imperialism, both in this work
and subsequently, as the quest to annex non-capitalist
agrarian areas for both markets and sources of raw mate143
rials,
the theory of periodic crises left itself open to
Bernstein’s criticisms. The latter had argued, it will be
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recalled, that cartels facilitate planning and that any
overproduction under capitalism could be (and in actuality
was) overcome by increasing consumption, especially working
class consumption. Kautsky’s crisis theory was to remain in
this very loosely formulated and incomplete state, for he
never returned to a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
Perhaps the most noteworthy sections of The Class
Struggle deal with Kautsky's general view of the process of
social development under capitalism.

It is here that one

encounters Kautsky’s efforts to reconcile a denial of crude
determinism (and by implication, fatalism) on the one hand,
with a strong desire to affirm the lawfulness of social
processes (and the inevitability of socialism). On the same
page, Kautsky spoke of 1,the irresistible and Inevitable
nature of the revolution," but nevertheless maintained "that
men are men and not puppets," that "[p]atiently to yield to
what may seem unavoidable is not to allow the social revolu
tion to take its course, but to bring it to a standstill."
The "breakdown of the present social system [is] unavoid
able," but "we do not mean that some fine morning the ex 
ploited classes will find that, without their help, some
144
good fairy has brought about the revolution."
Similarly, in another part of the book, Kautsky de
scribed a logically necessary "final result" of capitalist
development:

"the concentration of all the instruments of

production in the hands of one person or one stock com
pany...." But this "final result" would never in actuality
come about, since the "suffering" of the mass of people
09

"would be so great that [they] will first overthrow capital145
ism."
The notion that the revolution will come about due
to "unbearable conditions" and "degradation" is repeated
146
elsewhere in the book,
and places in jeopardy Kautsky*s
later claims that he did not hold to an *immiseration*
thesis .
The ’official* response to Bernstein's revisionism was
provided by Kautsky in 1899, in his Bernstein und das sozi147
aldemokratische Programm.
Following some jabs at B e r n 
stein's critique of materialism, Kautsky moved to an attack
on the economics of revisionism. Although extremely witty,
Kautsky*s passages in defense of the Marxist labor theory of
value are rather short of economic-theoretical content.
Recall that Bernstein had claimed that the "Boehm--Bawerk
theory" (subjective value theory) and Marx's theory were,
effect,

in

the same due to their 'one-sidedness*; Bernstein

thus considered his own "eclecticism" to be the "rebellion
148
of sober reason" against dogma.
Kautsky ridiculed
Bernstein, remarking how strange it was that all of the
smart people responsible for the development of the two
theories of value had never before noticed the congruence
pointed to by Bernstein, and continued to attack each other
149
with undiminished vigor.
As for Bernstein's 'rebellious
ness', Kautsky argued that genuine rebels were rarely eclec
tics, that they searched for integrity and unity of ideas.
V,'hen someone is able to equate an aspect of Marx with an
150

aspect of Boehm-Bawerk, "it is a long way from rebellion!"
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In regard to Bernstein’s unhappiness with a supposed
Marxist theory of ’’breakdown,” Kautsky argued that Marx and
Engels never held a "breakdown" theory, that "the word stems
from Bernstein...," as does the notion of an "absolute
151
immiseration” of the proletariat.
Moreover, the Erfurt
Programme of the SPD, which Bernstein helped draft, contains
152
no mention of "breakdown."
As correct as these claims may
have been, it has already been seen how Kautsky's own com
mentary on the Erfurt Programme might allow an interpretation
such as Bernstein's.
Bernstein's use of statistics purportedly showing the
persistent stability of small and medium producers (offered
in opposition to Marx's theory of the concentration and
centralization of capital), in Kautsky's view, was both
shoddy and shallow. First, Bernstein did not trace develop
ments over time, he merely pointed to the large numbers of
small and medium producers in various countries at specific
153
moments ijn time.
Second, Kautsky developed the argument
that many of the independent albeit marginal small producers
in the capitalist economy are merely another (the latent)
form of the reserve army of labor. Especially in agricul
ture, a substantial portion of small producers are not so
much viable in (capitalist) economic terms as they are
merely marking time, and able to do so precisely because
154
they are non-capitalist.
And finally, when Bernstein spoke of cartels he did so
seeking to demonstrate the possibility of a 'planned' capi
talism, thereby supposedly disproving Marx's assertions of
91

the necessity of crisis under capitalism. But why then, asks
Kautsky, did Bernstein completely ignore the cartels, pre
tending that they did not exist, when he developed his
critique of Marx’s theory of the concentraton of capital?
155
Bernstein simply could not have it both ways.
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century,
as Lenin would later say, Kautsky was ’’still a Marxist.”
That is, he regarded the bourgeois state as a class state,
and recognized the need for the proletariat to conquer state
156
power.
In The Road to Power (1909), for example, he at
tacks the reformers and revisionists for mistaking the de
velopment (concentration) of capital on the one hand, and
the growth of the proletariat (and its organizations) on the
other, for the "peaceable growth into Socialism" or even the
"midst of Socialism." Rather,
[w]hat appears to the 'reformers’ as a peaceable growth
into Socialism, is only the growth in power of two antag
onistic classes, standing in irreconcilable enmity to
each other.[157]
But Kautsky was also cautious, a trait which earned him the
scorn of Rosa Luxemburg, among others. Socialists, in
Kautsky's view, should refrain from "any purposeless provo
cation of the ruling class" until such a time that capital
ism can be simply pushed over. In an elliptic reference to
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, Kautsky criticized that "fac
tion" of the SPD which seeks "to enrage the capitalist"
158
rather than weaken him.
*

*

*

The recurrent image of Kautsky is thus one of constant
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ambivalence: freedom vs. necessity, revolution vs. parlia
mentarism. Nowhere is this ambivalence more clearly expres
sed than in his attitude towards militarism. The 'orthodox*
Kautsky found it necessary to link imperialism with militar
ism and the arms race, concluding that capitalism (imperial
ism) leads to wars of conquest. By contrast, the interests
of the proletariat were peaceful and "identical... in all
159
lands where capitalist production prevails."
But after
1910, precisely as war seemed more and more likely, Kautsky
(and other members of the Second International’s center,
such as Plekhanov) found that pacifism was the only approach
consistent with determinism and a commitment to parliamenta
ry tactics.
Although socialism was the only ultimate guarantee of
peace,

so ran the line of reasoning, it was not immediately

on the agenda, _i.e., capitalism had not yet reached a suf
ficiently 'mature* state for the revolution to ’occur*.
Consequently,

something had to be done in the short term to

prevent war, until the inevitable advent of socialism abol
ished it forever. The official position paper of the SPD
executive thus stated:
It will be too late to resist once war has broken out.
Vfhat is vital is to avoid a spirit of belligerence
spreading among the masses. Because modern war can hardly
happen without the agreement of the masses and if it does
happen the rulers have everything to fear from its deadly
consequences.[160]
It was felt among the center that the labor movememnt
in all nations was too weak to prevent war, and that there
fore a common front needed to be forged, one which united
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the worker's parties (whose commitment to peace was taken
for granted) and pacifist elements from the petty bourgeoi
sie and the bourgeoisie. "The proper field of anti-war
161

activity therefore was the press and the Parliament,"
rather than the 'adventurist' and 'semi-anarchist' mass ac
tions advocated by, for instance, the majority of the French
section of the International.
In the realm of theory, these pacifist politics com
bined with the deterministic strain in the center's social
theory to produce a position which increasingly affirmed
that capitalist development (during the imperialist phase in
particular) generated detente rather than conflict. The
inexorability of war had become transformed into the inevi
tability of peace. Kautsky in particular began to conceive
of a peaceful phase of "ultra-imperialism," wherein the
major capitalist nations would enter into an unholy alliance
of sorts. He reasoned that two factors were responsible for
the diminishing likelihood of inter-imperialist conflict.
First, the growing "opposition of the more developed agrar
ian zones [colonies— N.K.], which threatens not just one or
other of the imperialist states, but all of them together."
Second, the arms expenditures required to maintain an empire
were creating an ever growing economic burden on the impe162

rialist nations, and would have to be renounced.
Like Kautsky, the French historian Paul Louis, repre
senting a minority tendency in the French movement, argued
that capitalism was entering an epoch of peaceful policies
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for three reasons. First, anticipating Kautsky, he noted the
financial burden of the arms race. Second, he argued that
the possibility of conflict existed only while there still
remained uncolonized areas of the world, and since by the
time he wrote the entire world had been partitioned, the
imperialist nations would peacefully settle down to exploit
163
their domains.
And finally, economic crises, with their
concommitant uncertainties, would create cautious attitudes
164
and reduce the likelihood of war.
These views gained widespread currency. Similar the
ories were advanced by Rudolf Hilferding, Ledebour, Haase
165
and Bebel.
The extent of delusion can be glimpsed by
noting that Louis' article was published in June 1914, while
Kautsky's appeared in print in September of the same year,
when the war had already begun. The editors of Die Neue Zeit
appended a short note to Kautsky's article which baldly
stated that the work, which dismissed the likelihood of war,
"has not lost its relevance" despite the outbreak of
fighting.
Kautsky did not become a German patriot. Most accounts
have it, as already noted, that he only 'acquiesced' to the
war. Kautsky argued that "the International ceases to be an
effective instrument in times of war. It is, on the whole, a
166
peace instrument."
His view of socialist tactics against
the war is summed up by G.D.H. Cole:
[N]ot to stir up the proletariat to mass strikes or
armed insurrection, but to bring the Socialist Parties of
the warring countries back to their senses, and thus to
set on foot a powerful movement in favor of a negotiated
peace.[167]

Rather than seeking to effect a split with the outright
chauvinists in the International, Kautsky continued to ex
press verbal opposition to the war, but only to the degree
allowable from within the SPD. For instance, during the 3.
August Reichstag Group debate he urged the parliamentary
representatives of the SPD to condition voting in favor of
war credits to a promise from the government as to the
168
defensive character of the war. The proposal was rejected.
Later, in June 1915, Kautsky collaborated in drawing up a
manifesto "Against Annexations." The document had the polit169
ical effect which one might imagine.
So the pronounced ambivalence between freedom and ne
cessity in Kautsky*s work found its expression in his polit
ical positions. At first imperialism was seen as necessarily
leading to war, but by 1912 imperialism had become only one
'policy* among many possible ones, so that it could be
’changed* even within the framework of the bourgeois state.
Finally, as must ultimately happen with any undercon
sumption theory, Kautsky*s underconsumptionism caused him to
seek the 'difficulties' of capitalism outside of capitalist
production. The decisive factors became the (threat of)
revolt of the colonies against imperialism, the fiscal cri
sis of the state, e t c . These 'difficulties’, which all of
the national bourgeoisies had in common, would force them to
co-operate,

to pursue peaceful policies,

as a means of

simple survival.
As with Kautsky, Plekhanov's politics conform to his
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his theoretical system. Plekhanov was strongly influenced by
the Manifesto, which first introduced him to the work of
Marx and Engels. Having become a Marxist, Plekhanov*s cen
tral concern, in the Russian context, was to show that the
mainspring of social development was the class struggle and
that consequently the (populist) effort to achieve socialism
via individual persuasion and/or terrorist acts was
170
misplaced.
This project involved, as was seen above, demonstrating
that capitalism in Russia was already implanted and develop
ing. Plekhanov found considerable support in (and took very
much to heart) those passages from the Manifesto proclaiming
the progressive mission of capitalism. Unlike Marx, however,
Plekhanov never developed the corollary aspect— the uneven
and contradictory nature of capitalist development.
As argued in Chapter I above, Marx arrived at his
results when he ceased to treat history in a 'philosophical*
manner and in very general terms. Plekhanov's weakness was
never to have fully grasped this advance over the Manifesto,
and its methodological consequences. Even when Plekhanov
believed that he was conducting 'concrete' investigations,
he remained trapped within his 'philosophical*

theory of

history. This accounts for his infatuation with the progres
sive character of capitalism in Russia, and it is also the
source of the determinism which Colletti attacks.

In the

absence of an explanation of the determinism in Plekhanov's
thinking, one is forced to conclude, with Colletti, that he
was merely a philosophical sinpleton--Plekhanov*s real fail
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ing, however, was not that he held naive philosophical views
(he was in fact an impressive thinker), but that he sought
to understand history philosophically.
It is not so strange, therefore, that Plekhanov cham
pioned the socialist cause by ’supporting'

capitalist de

velopment. Perhaps his greatest political concern was the
premature siezure of power by the working class, a concern
which surfaced both during the 1905 Revolution ("They should
171
not have taken up arms....") and after October 1917.
At the outbreak of World War I , Plekhanov became a
staunch nationalist.

In 1915, he published 0 voine ('On the

War*), which consisted of a scathing attack on the "vulgar
nationalism" of the German and Austrian social democratic
parties. For Plekhanov, it was clear that since Germany
violated Belgian neutrality, attacked France, et c ., that
Germany was more 'guilty' than the other imperialist nations
and deserving of defeat. While this line of argument may
have been convincing to some, Plekhanov no doubt weakened
his case by including, amidst condemnations of "vulgar na
tionalism," passages which justified Russia's entry into the
war on the grounds that it would not do to "lose all influ172
ence on the Balkan peninsula."
In full conformity with his theoretical approach, Ple
khanov *s attitude to the war was also conditioned by the
prospects for socialism (read: further capitalist develop
ment) which the possible outcomes of the war implied. A
German victory, he reasoned, would "halt our [Russian] eco
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nomic development, put an end to the Europeanization of
173
Russia and perpetuate the old order."
His biographer Baron
notes the assymetry of Plekhanov*s claim that while a German
victory would dim hopes for socialism, a Russian victory
would brighten them, in Russia as well as in the other
countries which would "be spared the burden of onerous
174
exactions, or, worse yet, foreign domination.'*
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E. Rosa Luxemburg, Vladimir I. Lenin,
and the ’Left Revolutionary* Response to Revisionism
Along with Plekhanov, Rosa Luxemburg was among the
first to enter the debates around Bernstein's revisionism.
In large measure, she took over the task of pummeling Bern
stein shortly after it was begun by Parvus (Alexander
175
Helphand).
As noted earlier, Luxemburg's most comprehensive asses176
sment of revisionism
proceeded not so much from a direct
asault on the foundations of Bernstein's critique (£.g., she
only devotes a page to Bernstein's rejection of the labor
theory of value); the bulk of her response revolved instead
around efforts to draw out the 'other side' of the issues
raised by Bernstein, i . e . , to deploy Bernstein's own argu
ments against him. For example, where Bernstein placed em
phasis on the "creative" functions of credit, Luxemburg
argued that credit
immensely increases the capacity for the expansion of
production, and thus constitutes an inner driving force
that constantly pushes production to exceed the limits of
the market. After having provoked overproduction, credit
destroys, during the crisis, the very productive forces
it itself created. At the first symptom of the stag
nation, credit melts away. It abandons the exchange proc
ess just when it is still indispensable....[177]
And while Bernstein identified a "more [highly] developed
credit organization" with enhanced "possibilities of adjust178
raent,"
Luxemburg conversely considered that the increased
"elasticity" which accompanies the advance of systems of
credit
renders all capitalist forces extendable, relative, and
sensitive to the highest degree. Doing this, it facili
tates and aggravates crises, which are nothing but the
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periodic collisions of the contradictory forces of the
capitalist economy.[179]
Similarly, for Bernstein the emergence of cartels and
trusts signalled the possibility of planned production and
the amelioration of crises stemming from the "anarchic"
nature of capitalist production, a claim to which Luxemburg
offered a threefold counter-argument.
First, Bernstein's contentions would be valid only if
cartels were dominant in all branches of production. But
since the "aim" of a cartel is to appropriate for itself
(for its own branch) a share of the profit produced in other
branches, cartelization cannot become a "generalized" phe
nomenon because "when it is extended to all important
branches of industry, this tendency cancels its own influ
ence." Second, cartels generally succeed in obtaining 'mo
nopoly' profits domestically only at the expense of 'dump
ing' a large portion of their output on foreign markets at
low prices. "The result is the sharpening of competition
abroad and increased anarchy on the world market...." Final
ly, once production has outstripped the capacity of the
market,

"the forced partial idleness of capital" reaches the

point where those capitals which have been "'socialized'
through organization [j^.e., the cartels— N.K.] will tend to
revert once again to the form of private capital." With the
onset of crisis, "each individual portion will prefer to
take its chances alone," and the cartels "will burst like
bubbles and give way to competition in an aggravated
180
form."
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Luxemburg was perhaps rather more successful in her
rejection of Bernstein’s ’empirical’ propositions. Recall
that the accumulation of capital,

in Bernstein’s conception,

was not at the same time a process of concentration of
capital; evidence for this claim was found in statistics
which indicated rising numbers of middle-sized enter181
prises.
Luxemburg's response consisted in pointing out
that to understand concentration as merely the steady disap
pearance of smaller capitals was to miss the thrust of
M a r x ’s theory of accumulation, viz., that smaller capitals
are the ’’pioneers” of industry, developing new techniques of
production in established branches, and carving out entirely
new branches of production. Having performed the 'entrepre
neurial' function, these capitals immediately "find them
selves under the influence of two antagonistic tend182
encies...."
On the one hand, the process of accumulation
engenders mechanization and a concommitant rise in the scale
of operations, while on the other, periodic crises and the
attendant devalorization of old capital (temporarily) re
store the conditions in which smaller capitals are able to
introduce innovative techniques or extend capitalist produc
tion to new spheres of activity.
The struggle of the average-size enterprise against big
capital cannot be considered a regularly proceeding bat
tle in which the troops of the weaker party continue to
melt away directly and quantitatively. It should rather
be regarded as a periodic mowing down of small capital,
which rapidly grows up again only to be mowed down once
more by large industry.[183]
Bernstein simply misused the statistics: the concentration
of capital empirically
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shows itself, first, in the progressive increase of the
minimum amount of capital necessary for the functioning
of enterprises in the old branches of production; second,
in the constant diminution of the interval of time during
which the small capitalists conserve the opportunity to
exploit the new branches of production.[184]
Bernstein had also provided statistics on stockownership, aiming to demonstrate that the observable increase in
the number of shareholders further refutes Marx’s thesis and
suggests that the "increasing number of capitalists" attests
to a dispersal, rather than a concentration of social
185
wealth.
By finding an "increasing number of capitalists,"
while at the same time maintaining that he speaks only of
186
"men and not of entrepreneurs,"
Bernstein committed an
error, in Luxemburg's view, by moving the discussion "from
the relation between capital and labor to the relation
187
between rich and poor.":
For Bernstein, the category 'cap
italist' was merely "a fiscal unit." Rather than "a category
188
of production" it represented only a claim to income.
For various reasons, in Luxemburg's opinion, Eernstein's conception (and that of the other revisionists) of
189
the transition to socialism was rooted in idealism.
In
Social Reform or Revolution Luxemburg listed the limitations
190
of trade union activity;
critiqued the notion that pro
tective labor legislation was "a piece of 'social control*,
191
and as such--a piece of socialism;"
tried to point out
the utopianism of seeking a road to socialism in the estab192
lishnent of co-operatives;
e t c . First and foremost, how
ever, Luxemburg argued that Bernstein's idealism was a di
rect result of his rejection of the theory of capitalist
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collapse. For Luxemburg, "the theory of capitalist break
down...is the cornerstone of scientific socialism,” without
which the "objective necessity of socialism, the explanation
of socialism as the result of the material development of
193
society, falls away."
A theory of breakdown in well developed or coherent
form is absent in Social Reform or Revolution, but this
hardly represents a failing of a short polemical pamphlet.
Beyond the claim that "as a result of its own inner contra
dictions, capitalism moves toward a point when it will be
194
unbalanced, when it will simply become impossible,"
Luxemburg made no specific argument, although she several
times hints that the root cause of capitalism*s problems
lies in the tendency of production to outstrip the capacity
195
of the market.
Her full theoretical presentation of these
issues appeared more than a decade later in The Accumulation
of Capital (1913) and was further elaborated in The Accumu
lation of Capital— An Anti-Critique (written in 1915, first
published posthumously in 1921).
*

*

*

The early chapters of The Accumulation comprise a his
torical survey of theories of economic reproduction, which
was used by Luxemburg to justify her claim that the investi
gation of economic phenomena must begin from the standpoint
of reproduction.

In particular,

as Luxemburg later clarified

in the Anti-Critique, under capitalism the question of re
production was bound up with the accumulation of capital.

104

The latter was the sine qua non of the capitalist mode of
production, and hence (methodologically) the correct point
196
of departure.
Moreover, argued Luxemburg, it was only possible to
understand accumulation from the perspective of the '’total,"
or social, capital. She reasoned that the contrary approach,
the perspective of the "individual" capital ("the popular
platform of vulgar economics"), created difficulties, v i z .,
that the conditions which must obtain for accumulation to
take place (ts.g. , realization) seem to 'disappear' into the
197
circulation process of other (individual) capitals.
If
the problem of reproduction was examined from the standpoint
of the social capital, however, the requisite conditions of
accumulation had nowhere to go— they could not vanish, they
had to must remain visible.
Luxemburg believed that Marx went further than most in
correctly posing the relevant problems, because "for the
first time in the second volume of Capital" he approached
the problem of capitalist reproduction "from the standpoint
198
of total capital."
Having examined the (second) example
of expanded reproduction which Marx offered in Chapter 21 of
vol. 2, Luxemburg concluded that Marx's solution was formal
ly correct— but whether this solution could be regarded as
theoretically sound, or if it was merely an "exercise" in
solving "fool-proof" mathematical models, could only be
determined by reference to "the concrete social conditions
199
of accumulation."
V'hat are the "concrete social conditions?" Accumulation
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is impossible, Luxemburg argued, unless at least a portion
of the total surplus value produced is realized and thrown
back into production,

i_.e., the valorized commodity capital

as it emerges from the production process must be success
fully transformed into money capital and then capitalized in
the form of additional means of production and means of
subsistence. Marx's schemes of reproduction do indeed demon
strate where the surplus value goes once it is returned to
production. But merely the ("subjective") "desire [!] to
accumulate" on the part of capitalists, and the existence of
correct (technical) proportions between the various depart
ments of production, can only be the necessary conditions
for accumulation to proceed— they are not in themselves
sufficient. What is presupposed in all of this, Luxemburg
argued, is "a previous capitalist incentive to enlarge pro
duction" in the form of an "effective demand" for the por200
tion of the surplus product to be capitalized.
So the "concrete social conditions of accumulation"
require that an "effective demand" for the surplus product
arise prior to its (the surplus product's) production (else
the capitalists would have no incentive to produce i t ) . What
is the source of this demand? Luxemburg considered all of
the possibilities, and concluded that neither the capital
ists nor the workers could serve as the origin of the 'ex201
tra' demand.
She argued that workers cannot consume the surplus
product since they are only paid for the value of labor
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power, and in the limiting case (if the ’surplus’ accrued in
its entirety to the direct producers) there could be no
capitalism or, indeed, any class society. Capitalists, on
the other hand, could not ’’spend the total surplus value
like water [because then] there would be no accumulation,”
i,.«3. , at least part of the surplus value must be saved, or
there can only be simple reproduction (without accumula
tion) .
It is at this point that Luxemburg’s error can be
readily identified. She had begun her analysis of reproduc
tion by ”imagin[ing] that all goods produced in capitalist
society were stacked up in a big pile someplace,” a pile of
goods which must be adequate to (i) provide for the subsist
ence of all social classes,

(ii) replace used up fixed and

circulating constant capital, and (iii) provide a source for
202
expanding production (accumulation).
Clearly, the "pile”
was conceived in material terms, .i.e., a "pile" of usevalues.
On the same page that Luxemburg considered the disposi
tion of this "total stock of commodities," however, she also
made the assertion quoted above that the capitalists could
not "spend the total surplus value like water" if accumula
tion was to be possible. But capitalists accumu
late. ..precisely by ’spending’ their surplus value, by
throwing money capital back into circulation. Luxemburg
merely confused ’spending’ in the form of individual or
personal consumption (in which use-values certainly do 'dis
appear',

i..e. , leave the process of circulation) with
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'spending' in the form of productive consumption (in which
money is thrown back into circulation in order to obtain
use-values which do not disappear into individual consump
tion) .
Several critics of Luxemburg's analysis find fault with
this portion of her work without, however, pointing to the
crucial failure to distinguish between individual and pro203
ductive consumption which is at the heart of the problem.
Nikolai Bukharin, writing in 1924, and Michael Bleaney in
1976, both see Luxemburg's error as residing in the "imagery
of heaps." Bleaney writes:
[Luxemburg] imagines the entire social capital being
laid out as one lump, and that the whole of the surplus
value has to be realized simultaneously, at the end of
the period, rather than gradually throughout the course
of it. Hence the images of commodity heaps rather than a
continuous flow of production....[204]
The difficulty does not lie in the pace (gradual vs.
all at once) at which surplus value is realized. Because of
Luxemburg's incorrect pcsing of the matter, an insoluble
dilemma necessarily appears from whichever side the problem
is examined, irrespective of the pace of realization. Either
the capitalists fritter away the surplus value, in which
case there is no realization difficulty but there are also
no savings left to be used for accumulation; or the capital
ists save part of the surplus value, in which case there is
a shortage of effective demand, some of the surplus product
remains unsold, and there is no incentive for further accu
mulation. Either way,

'extra' purchasing power is needed.

Luxemburg did not perceive her error, and went on to
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examine the possible sources of the ’extra' demand which she
imagined was necessary for accumulation to proceed. The only
conclusion, given the parameters established by Luxemburg,
was that the increase in demand had to come from outside the
205
two departments of social production
which appear in
Marx’s tableau, i..e., from outside capitalist society. And
if the realization of surplus value, and hence accumulation,
are dependent on the existence of non-capitalist "buyers,’’
it follows that the
theoretical assumption of a society of capitalists and
workers only...no longer seems adequate when we deal with
the accumulation of gross social capital. As this repre
sents the real historical process of capitalist develop
ment, it seems impossible to me to understand it if one
abstracts from all conditions of historical reality.[206]
According to Luxemburg, Marx incorrectly held to the
"bloodless theoretical fiction" of a purely capitalist so
ciety while correctly (and legitimately) conducting the
investigation from the standpoint of the total social capi
tal. Luxemburg thus maintained that the abstraction of a
society composed only of workers and capitalists was ad
equate to vol. 1, where (she thought) the object of analysis
was the accumulation of the individual capital, but that
pre-capitalist strata and regions had to be considered as
soon as the enquiry shifted to an analysis of the social
capital.
But the pre-capitalist areas...are precisely non-capi
talist, and in order for them to serve as markets,

capital

must transform the natural economies which prevail there
into commodity economies. As Luxemburg puts it, slaves can
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be forced to work, but only commodity producers can also
207
serve as buyers.
The peoples of the peripheral areas are
thus made 'free' in a ’liberation' which capital conducts
with its familiar " ’heroic means', the axe of political
208
violence."
Luxemburg felt that her demonstration of this impera
tive need for capital to penetrate non-capitalist regions
constituted a "wholly new and strictly scientific analysis
209
of imperialism and its contradictions."
Having established
the basis of imperialism, Luxemburg continued the line of
her reasoning:
[A]s soon as simple commodity production has superseded
natural economy, capital must turn against it. No sooner
has capital called it to life, than the two must compete
for means of production, labor power and markets....
The general result of the struggle between capitalism
and simple commodity production is this: after substitut
ing commodity economy for natural economy, capital takes
the place of simple commodity economy.... Thus capital
cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist or
ganizations, nor, on the other hand, can it tolerate
their continued existence side by side with itself. Only
the continuous and progressive disintegration of non
capitalist organizations makes accumulation of capital
possible.
The premises which are postulated in Marx's diagram of
accumulation accordingly represent no more than the his
torical tendency of the movement of accumulation and its
logical conclusion.[210]
Thus the purely capitalist society, said Luxemburg,
which could not be legitimately 'assumed' into existence as
Marx had tried to do in vol. 2, was nevertheless the logical
final result of capitalist development on a world scale.
Luxemburg's analysis,

however, showed that in a purely capi

talist world, "accumulation, _i ,e_. , further expansion of
capital, becomes impossible." The collapse or breakdown of
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capitalism follows as an "objective historical necessity."
The schema of expanded reproduction "is precisely in its
insolubility the exact prognosis of the economically una211
voidable downfall of capitalism...."
With the twilight of imperialism, according to Luxem
burg, the "decisive struggle" shifts away from colonial
forays, and "catastrophe" comes full circle to haunt the
imperialist powers themselves.

In the centers, "the civi

lized peoples of Europe" experience the disaster of contin
uous war, and under these circumstances "the position of the
proletariat with regard to imperialism leads to a general
212
confrontation with the rule of capital."
Elsewhere,
Luxemburg argued that the impending breakdown and "the abso
lute and undivided rule of capital aggravates class struggle
throughout the world...to such an extent that...it must lead
to the rebellion of the international proletariat against
213
the existence of the rule of capital."
There is an ambiguity here. Although Luxemburg speaks
of a "general confrontation," in one passage the arena of
conflict is Europe, while in the other it appears to be
global. Despite this vagueness, one thing is absolutely
clear: all traces of national differences have disappeared,
and internationalism reigns. Luxemburg’s theoretical conclu
sions thus strongly echo propositions found in the Manifesto
sixty years earlier, _i .e. , the internationalism of the work
ing class is an objective condition which the historical
development of capitalism enjoins upon the proletariat.
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Actually (and paradoxically, given the next point to be
made), Luxemburg's underconsuraptionism places the critical
determinant of capitalist development, working class inter
nationalism, and the socialist revolution itself outside
capitalist society,

i_.e_. , the possibility of capitalist

development depends on the existence of non-capitalist
areas.
One of the inferences drawn by Luxemburg from this
analysis concerns the prospects of revolt against imperial
ism by the oppressed peoples of the colonies- Paradoxically,
given the centrality of the 'non-capitalist areas'

to her

analysis, she ignored the possibility of a conscious, genu
inely anti-capitalist revolutionary movement developing in
those regions only recently penetrated by capital, i...e. , the
class struggles in the colonies (whether against imperialism
214
or otherwise) are regarded as ineffectual.
The decisive
conflict must either wait until the entire world is capital
ist or, if it takes place sooner, must come through the
215
initiative of the European working class.
Luxemburg's inclination to disregard the internal dy
namic of the dominated social formations is presented as a
virtue by J.P. Nettl in his two volume biographical tome.
While Nettl generally prefers to downplay Luxemburg’s theo
retical work, he argues that on the question of colonialism
The Accumulation of Capital yielded a "meaningful result"
and cori’ectly anticipated certain trends in capitalist world
economy. Specifically, he argues that
[o]nce the notion of colonial exploitation becomes cen
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tral and is brought up to date, the basic confrontation
between rich and poor societies— which is today’s real
dialectic--subsumes the 'old* form of class conflict
within society.... This then is an ’international* or
'class' line-up that cuts across national boundaries or
rather makes these boundaries into mere markers of auton
omy rather than absolute isolation— as Rosa Luxemburg
actually advocated.[216]
Given Luxemburg’s drubbing of Bernstein precisely on
217
the conflation of 'rich-poor' and 'class' contradictions,
it seems plausible to doubt whether she would have accepted
these efforts by Nettl on her behalf.
The Accumulation of Capital was characterized by Luxem
burg herself as "a purely theoretical study on an abstract
218

scientific problem...."

Yet the conclusions reached

therein had earlier seen the light of day in their 'practi
cal' incarnation as the polemic against Bernstein, and they
subsequently re-appeared in her political writings during
the war. Thus, for example, The Crisis in the German Social
Democracy (The Junius Pamphlet), written in 1915, repeats
Luxemburg's familiar theses: the "weakness" of the proletar
iat, i_.e^ , its capitulation to patriotism, would be recog
nized and criticized by the working class as an "error" and
rectified by "the inexorable laws of history" which "assure"
219
the proletariat of "its final victory."
Luxemburg never clearly articulated the theoretical
relation betwen her abstract writings and the more concrete
220
investigations,
although she was certainly aware that
some form of connection existed. In partcular, Luxemburg
generally expressed this notion by reference to some neces221
sary 'unity' of theory and practice.
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By way of a critique, it would doubtless be possible to
identify instances where Luxemburg ’concretized' abstract
222
theoretical results,
and then to link these with her
conclusions regarding proletarian internationalism. There
is, however, an even more striking characteristic of Luxem
burg's theoretical work which portends her judgements on the
international solidarity of workers— an extreme teleology
renders internationalism the necessary consequence of a
historical

'goal' pre-ordained by Luxemburg's theory of

accumulation. This is clearly evident when she wrote that
the class struggle is only the ideological reflection of
the objective historical necessity of socialism, result
ing from the objective impossibility of capitalism at a
certain stage.[223]
It really could not have been put more plainly: the class
struggle, rather than being the mainspring of history, has
been reduced to the pale mirror of a historical finality
inscribed within and by the theory.
This particular vision of the historical process, co
herently worked out only in 1913 with the writing of The
Accumulation of Capital, had nevertheless been implicitly
present in Luxemburg's work from the start. As early as
1899, in Social Reform or Revolution, Luxemburg character
ized the revisionist and opportunist current as merely a
normal and expected "vacillation and hesitation" along the
224
movement toward "the great final goal."
Despite her incisive and anticipatory condemnation of
225
the opportunists,
the teleological thrust of Luxemburg's
theory kept her from posing the emergence of revisionism as
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a (theoretical, rather than practical) problem to be ex
plained. Her inability to theorize a basis for opportunism
beyond that of a minor eddy in the channel of history would
later, in 1914, prevent Luxemburg from arriving at either a
satisfactory account of the collapse of the International,
or (more importantly) an effective, concrete and revolution
ary anti-war strategy. These points will be discussed in
subheading F below.
This would seem an appropriate place at which to stress
that nothing in the present work seeks to impugn Luxemburg
as a person or revolutionary. Her failure to articulate a
coherent anti-war strategy does not, of course,

in any way

obscure her valiant and heroic opposition to the war, for
which she was imprisoned. It is necessary to point this out
because some authors perplexingly continue to interpret any
theoretical criticism of Luxemburg as an effort to tarnish
226
her image.
Norman Geras, for example, has recently pointed out
that Luxemburg’s theory of capitalist breakdown provides
grist for the mill of those political enemies who seek to
227
ascribe a fatalism to her outlook.
In one of the more
sophisticated efforts to "recover" Luxemburg, Geras claims
that while it is undoubtedly true that she held to a theory
of an absolute limit to accumulation (breakdown), Luxemburg
did not believe that capitalist collapse assured the passage
to socialisn--for the latter, conscious political interven228
tion was necessary.
Consequently, Geras argues, far from
being a fatalist,

Luxemburg left open the possibility of an
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historical alternative, a contingency best expressed in her
229
formula (borrowed from Engels): 'Socialism or Barbarism*.
Geras advances an interpretation of this slogan which
seeks to remove the apparent contradiction between the in
evitability of breakdown and the open-endedness of 'social
ism or barbarism'. How? For a 'dialectician', as Marx once
ironically remarked,

"nothing simpler... than to posit [these
230
opposites] as identical,"
so Geras merely maintains that
these seemingly irreconcilable perspectives,
these two ideas, so far from being contradictory, are not
even different. They are one and the same idea. For
Luxemburg, 'barbarism* signifies nothing other than the
collapse of capitalism.[231]
Thus the breakdown merely shows "that it is not socialism
but barbarism that is inevitable." And moreover, the col
lapse itself is "a process of which both the forms and the
232
end result are a species of barbarism."
It is not immediately obvious what this line of reason
ing seeks to prove, what

in Luxemburg's work it seeks to

salvage, or how it is to be interpreted in light of Luxem
burg's own insistence regarding the objective necessity of
socialism. By counterposing the inevitability of barbarism
(collapse) to the contingency of socialism in Luxemburg's
work, Geras seems pleased to discover that for "Luxem
burg...what the inevitability of capitalist collapse proves
is not the redundancy, but the urgent indispensability, of
233
conscious revolutionary struggle...."
Moreover, Geras
holds that his operation has displaced the tension (between
activism and fatalism) which many commentators have found in
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Luxemburg's work.
But no displacement of the activism-fatalism couplet is
accomplished merely by pointing out that for Luxemburg the
emergence of socialism entails development of the 'subjec
tive factor'. Rather, the contradiction remains precisely
because Luxemburg affirms a strict separation of "social
consciousness...as an active factor" from "the blind game of
234
forces."
Thus everything is predetermined except the pro
letariat's active intervention— far from any displacement,
the tension remains in the form of 'fatalism with a volunta235
rist twist'.
This brings an important point into sharp
relief. Obviously, Luxemburg was not a fatalist (far from
it) in the sense that she was a dedicated revolutionary
activist.

In fact, Luxemburg's formula reveals a belief in

the power of activism such as to border on voluntarism,
_i

, the 'choice' between barbarism and socialism hinges on

whether or not we 'act*. There is naturally a trivial sense
in which this is true, but the notion of revolution as a
236
'choice* remains a fundamentally idealist one.
Y/hile conceding that "it is not easy to make sense" of
Luxemburg's theory of breakdown, or of the attendant "apoca
lyptic vision," Geras argues that the chief virtue of Luxem
burg's work, and his interpretation of it, consists in a
recognition of "the profoundly and inescapably contradictory
237
nature of the whole of capitalist development."
Geras
condemns as "mechanistic" that view which conceives capital
ism as a "progressive" system in its 'youth' but bound by
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fetters in its 'maturity*. Rather, the "bad sides" of capi238
talism emerge with the "good" from "the very origins."
These topics raised by Geras are important ones, to be
sure, although hardly original. Yfhat seems inappropriate,
however, is his effort to attribute such views to Luxemburg.
Moreover, this effort is simply puzzling if another of
Geras' articles on Luxemburg,

"Between the Russian Revolu

tions," is taken into consideration. Rather than chronicling
the "good sides" and "bad sides" of capitalist development,
Geras here approvingly describes Luxemburg's attitude toward
bourgeois democracy in terms decidely similar to those just
dismissed as "mechanistic:"
Bourgeois democracy, according to Luxemburg, had played
a necessary though limited historical role in the bour
geoisie's struggle against feudalism and in its mobiliza
tion of the masses in that cause. But so soon as this
struggle was completed or compromised, so soon as its
'stimulating fire* went out,...then bourgeois democracy
lost its historical purpose, became useless and dispen
sable to the bourgeoisie itself.... Hence the assertions
that 'democratic institutions...have completely exhausted
their fxmction as aids in the development of bourgeois
society,' that *liberalism... is now absolutely useless to
bourgeois society,' that 'bourgeois democracy must logi
cally move in a descending line1 ....[239]
The point is that unless the "process" of collapse is
presumed to begin at the very dawn of capitalism, the only
possible interpretation of the breakdown theory is precisely
the one originally opposed by Geras, v i z ., that the main
springs of capitalist development gradually become its fet
ters. Likewise,

it is not necessary to accept the misguided

platitudes of the various "philosophies of pure progress" in
order to oppose a notion of the capitalist 'dialectic* as
leading to "the complete absence of culture and civiliza1 18

240
tion...total social breakdown,

chaos.”

It is entirely

possible to uphold the immanence of contradiction, crisis
and unevenness in capitalist development,

to affirm the

historicity of the system itself, and to work for its over
throw, without subscribing to a teleological philosophy of
history (even a sophisticated one). It is no accident that
Geras closed his essay with a pithy quotation from the
consummate prophet of darkness, Herbert Marcuse.
*

*

*

For a variety of reasons, an adequate treatment of
L en in ’s position, given the objectives and context of this
study, presents difficulties by comparison with, for exam
ple, Luxemburg or Bernstein. First, Lenin never furnished a
theoretical treatise comparable to Luxemburg's The Accumula
tion of Capital (or even her Anti-Critique). Consequently,
it is necessary to construct L e n i n ’s theoretical system from
fragments scattered throughout the forty-five volume Col
lected Forks and from the theoretical approach which implicitly informs his 'practical' writings. Moreover, Lenin never
exercised the central presence of a Kautsky, Bernstein or
Luxemburg within the Second International (especially prior
to the 1907 Stuttgart congress)— Lenin’s real significance
only became apparent after the outbreak of the war. Rather
than producing, for example, a direct response to Bernstein,
Lenin almost always conducted his encounters on Russian
terrain— thus one finds polemics directed against "our
Bernstein" or the "Russian revisionists." While this by no
241
means suggests a necessary shortcoming on Lenin's part,
it
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does complicate somewhat the task of contrasting his posi
tion to those held by Marxists more directly involved in the
West European struggles. The most legitimate approach to the
analysis of Lenin's thinking is one which 'straddles' the
collapse of the Second International and the emergence of
the Third International.
Aside from some elementary primers on Marx's doctrines,
the most significant of Lenin's writings which explicitly
put forward his theoretical considerations on the accumula
tion process are only three in number and were (unfortunate
ly) all written before Lenin turned twenty-nine.

It is by

now a commonplace that these works were directed against the
Narodniks (agrarian-populists), in opposition to whom Lenin
sought to demonstrate the viability of capitalist develop242
ment in Russia.
The Narodniks took: as their starting point the condi
tions which obtained in late nineteenth-century Russia: a
relatively underdeveloped capitalist sector co-existing with
(and within) a large, predominantly simple commodity and
243
natural economy.
While correctly observing increasing pov
erty and destitution among the mass of the peasantry, the
Narodniks were incorrect to see in this a perfectly generalizable trend of "impoverishment of the people.'' Rather, the
process actually consisted in the differentiation of petty
commodity producers into a relatively well-off stratum of
embryonic 'entrepreneurs’ on the one hand, and on the other,
a multitude of increasingly landless,
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"depeasantized" peas

244
ants.
For the Narodniks, it seemed self-evident that a vigor
ous capitalism would be characterized by a thriving, well
developed market for commodities, a feature which Russia
decidedly lacked. Moreover,

the "impoverishment’' which the

Narodniks observed and constantly drew attention to could
only serve, in their view, to even further restrict the
extension of the market. Eventually, any continued develop
ment along capitalist lines would simply become impossible.
Against these arguments, Lenin brought to bear the full
force of his considerable polemical talents. "On the SoCalled Market Question," an article directed against a N a 
rodnik author, sought to rectify what to Lenin seemed an
erroneous application of M a r x ’s reproduction schemes. After
correcting and clarifying some technical issues, Lenin u n 
dertook to critique the Narodnik counterposition of a capi
talist "sphere" to the "people’s system." The Narodnik ef
forts centered on articulating the relationship between the
two sectors, but Lenin proceeded from what he considered to
be a symptomatic weakness of their theory, v iz ., the impos
sibility of explaining, from the Narodnik point of view, how
Russian capitalism arose in the first place.
For a Marxist it was possible to grasp, Lenin argued,
not only how capitalism could develop from simple commodity
production, but also to understand the further development
and extension of the capitalist node of production. From a
245
tableau representing six production "periods,"
Lenin traced
the process by which a natural economy in period one is
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transformed first into a simple and then into a capitalist
commodity economy with an extensive division of labor. In
deed, the "development of capitalism depicted in this table
is accompanied by the 'impoverishment' of the 'people'"...
246
but also (!) by "an expansion of the market."
The first conclusion which Lenin drew from his analysis
is that under a regime of commodity production,

"the concept

'market' is quite inseparable from the concept of the social
247
division of labor...."
The extension and deepening of the
division of labor determine the "dimensions of the market,"
and since there are no theoretical limits to the division of
labor under capitalism,

there is also no "problem" as re

gards growth of the market. Contrary to the expectations of
the Narodniks, the transformation of natural economy into an
economy of simple commodity producers, and the differentia
tion of these into an incipient proletariat and rural bour
geoisie, far from restricting the growth of the market, are
actually part and parcel of the extension of market rela248
tions.
The emergence of capitalism, as Lenin informed the
Narodniks, was not an "accident" or the result of "taking
249
the wrong road."
A Marxist analysis could prove the genesis
of capitalism in the conditions of simple commodity produc
tion, and Lenin provided statistics on land holdings, the
employment of instruments of labor and the hiring of wage
250
labor in order to explain the process of differentiation.
While the mass of poor peasants was becoming increasingly

122

dispossessed, an examination of the statistics on grain
marketings shows that this
’impoverishment of the masses’, the complete decline of
the farms of 40% of the peasants, the formation of a
rural proletariat have led to the produce of 90,000
[additional] dessiatines of land under crops being thrown
on to the market.[251]
Impoverishment of the masses, but growth of the market— the
solution to this Narodnik paradox consisted in showing that
impoverishment was a phenomenon inextricably bound up with
proletarianization.
The bulk of ”0n the So-Called Market Question" had been
devoted to elucidating the argument outlined above, v i z .,
that the development of capitalism is at the same time the
extension of the market. The first portion of the article
had also, however, schematically raised some separate (al
beit related) problems concerning the relationship between
252
the two departments of social production.
Lenin's Narodnik adversary had argued that in Marx's
reproduction schemes accumulation in Department I took place
entirely "independently" of production in Department II.
Lenin replied that this interpretation was incorrect if for
no other reason than that accumulation (the expansion of
production) required additional outlays on variable capital,
253
which would be spent on the product of Department II.
The
grain of truth in the Narodnik argument, however, concerned
the "predominance" of Department I in capitalist develop
ment, in the sense that the inevitable mechanization of
production under capitalism implied a more rapid growth of
254
Department I relative to Department II.
But beyond purely
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gestural indications, at this tirae Lenin provided neither a
detailed investigation of this phenomenon, nor did he sug
gest the relationship of these issues to the "market ques
tion ."
The latter connection was explicitly and systematically
drawn out in "A Characterization of Economic Romanticism."
This theoretical article linked the two previously disjoint
ed domains, i_.e^, the accumulation of capital and the reali
zation problem. Lenin posed the issue unambiguously:
To expand production it is first of all necessary to
produce means of production, and for this it is conse
quently necessary to expand that department of social
production which manufactures means of production, it is
necessary tc> draw into it workers who immediately present
a demand for articles of consumption, too. Hence 'con
sumption' develops after 'accumulation' or after 'produc
tion' ; strange though it may seem, it cannot be otherwise
in capitalist society.[255]
Likening the Narodnik doctrine to Jean Sisraondi's un
derconsumption theory, Lenin pointed out that both incor
rectly posit that "production must correspond to consump256
tion,...production is determined by revenue."
Also, both
the Narodniks and Sismondi drew false inferences from their
respective analyses:
'Those who urge unlimited production are mistaken',
says Sismondi (I, 121). Excess of production over revenue
causes over-production (I, 106). An increase in wealth is
beneficial only 'when it is proportionate to itself, when
none of its parts develops with excessive rapidity' (I,
409). The good Sismondi thinks that 'disproportionate'
development is not development (as our Narodniks d o ) ;
that this disproportion is not a law of the present
system of social economy, and of its development, but a
’mistake' of the legislator, e t c .; that in this the
European governments are artificially imitating England,
a country that has taken the wrong path.[257]
For Lenin, however, accumulation could be possible
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precisely (and only) if there was an "excess of production
over revenue." And the very process of accumulation, since
it presupposes additional otitlays on constant and variable
capital, "creates a market for [its output] and itself
258
determines consumption."
Nevertheless, the rates of development of the two de
partments of social production must be unequal, for the same
reason that Lenin gave earlier (the mechanization of produc
tion which accompanies capitalist development implies a more
rapid growth of Department I). Under these conditions,
therefore, the 'market' as a whole may expand, while the
market for consumer goods stagnates or even contracts.
This development of the productive forces of society
without a corresponding development of consumption is, of
course, a contradiction, but the sort of contradiction
that exists in reality, that springs from the very nature
of capitalism.[259]
Thus Lenin clearly rejected any formulation of a 'rea
lization problem* per s e ,

, any conception which poses

the realization of surplus value as a special 'difficulty',
and ascribes to this 'difficulty*

the character of an imma

nent feature of the capitalist mode of production. Granted,
as Lenin argued in The Development of Capitalism in Russia,
the process of accumulation proceeds as a series of disloca
tions and crises, some of which appear in the form of crises
of realization (unsold commodities).

Indeed, capitalism

'knows' no other form of development. The point, however,
that
if one speaks of the 'difficulties' of realization, of
the crises, e t c . arising therefrom, one must admit that
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is

these 'difficulties’ are not only possible but are neces
sary as regards all parts of the capitalist product, and
not as regards surplus value alone.[260]
The ’difficulty* is hence not one of realization as such,
but of the disproportionalities which arise from the anarchy
of capitalist production.
Roman Rosdolsky has recently drawn attention to an
apparent problem in L e n i n ’s theory. Since for Rosdolsky the
"contradiction between production and consumption... plays a
261
key role in M a r x ’s theory,”
he is troubled by L e n i n ’s
treatment of realization. On the one hand, Lenin had argued:
'The consumer power of society* and the 'proportional
relation of the various branches of production’— these
are not conditions that are isolated, independent of, and
unconnected with, each other. On the contrary, a definite
condition of consumption is one of the elements of pro
portionality. [262]
Rosdolsky concedes that ’consumption’ and ’proportion
a lity’ are related, but claims that "it in no way follows
from this that the concepts... cannot be separated from one
another, or that they should always be regarded as equiva263
lent."
The reasoning here seems faulty. First, Lenin never
claimed that consumption and proportionality were "equiva
lent." Second,

it is_ the case that in Marxist theory con

sumption cannot be "separated" from proportionality— or more
generally, from the pattern of accumulation. Consumption is
determined by accumulation, i_.ji. , the investment spending of
capitalists fixes both the outlays on variable capital
(hence workers’ consumption) and the capitalists' own con
sumption. It is in bourgeois economic theory that consump
tion takes on the aspect of an independent category, govern
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ed by exogenously given 'preferences' and 'endowments*.
Rosdolsky then goes on to claim that Lenin contradicted
the statement just quoted above when he (Lenin) wrote:
It follows from [Marx's] theory that even with an
ideally smooth and proportional reproduction and circula
tion of the aggregate social capital, the contradiction
between the growth of production and the narrow limits of
consumption is inevitable.[264]
So it seems it must be one or the other: either Lenin
is "uncomfortably close" to a disproportionality theory of
crisis, or he recognizes the production-consumption "contra
diction" and is consequently not fully consistent with his
arguments on the realization problem. Rosdolsky, however,
somewhat ungenerously chooses to attribute both shortcomings
to Lenin, concluding that Lenin at the same time contradict
ed himself, and held what "essentially amounts to a dispro265
portionality theory of crises...."
Now, Rosdolsky is entirely correct in his claim that
Lenin's crisis theory is "essentially" one of disproportionality; this will be further discussed below. But Lenin is
fully consistent, contrary to Rosdolsky's contention, on the
production-consumption relation. The passage from Lenin just
cited, which made mention of "the contradiction between the
growth of production and the narrow limits of consumption,"
is read by Rosdolsky as an endorsement of the "overproduc
tion" (_i .e^, underconsumption) theory which Lenin had ear
lier rejected (hence the seeming inconsistency). Lenin is
very clear, however, regarding the content of the produc
tion-consumption *contradiction':
In a developing capitalist society [the output of con127

stant capital] must necessarily grow more rapidly than
all the other parts of the product. Only this law will
explain one of the most profound contradictions of capi
talism: the growth of the national wealth proceeds with
tremendous rapidity, while the growth of national con
sumption proceeds (if at all) very slowly.[266]
Rosdolsky has thus not uncovered any inconsistency in
Lenin's notion of the production-consumption 'contradic
tion*— he has merely overlooked the fact that Lenin ascribes
an entirely different meaning to the expression than does
Rosdolsky. Lenin's formulation is thus in full accord with
his earlier rejection of realization as a particular
'problem*.
Rosdolsky's confused treatment of Lenin stems in part
from his own lack of clarity on the 'overproduction* theory.
From the rather surprising statement that Marx's views on
the question were a "synthesis" of Ricardo and Sismondi, and
after conceding that "capitalist production does in fact
create its own market," Rosdolsky claims that capitalism
nevertheless does not "abolish" the realization problem, but
only "solves" it "dialectically." He says that
from this [dialectical] perspective the extended repro
duction of capital is neither 'impossible', nor can it
proceed ad infiniturn, since the capitalist mode of pro
duction must reproduce its internal contradictions at a
continually higher level, until the 'spiral' of capital
ist development reaches its end.[267]
But if capitalism can "solve" the realization problem
for one period, it can equally be "solved" for any number of
periods. An overproduction "contradiction" postponed until
the "end" of the capitalist "spiral" is, after all, still an
overproduction problem. And leaving "dialectical" explana
tions aside for a moment, overproduction always has one
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ultimate cause, viz., the inability of the system to gener
ate sufficient effective demand to realize the entire com
modity product— in other words, underconsumption. Rosdolsky's rejection of underconsumption explanations of the
realization problem is thus purely gestural. He has simply
fallen into the familiar and erroneous habit of considering
"overproduction" as somehow ’different’ from "underconsump
tion. "
Strictly speaking,
'theoretical'

after 1899 Lenin never produced any

investigations of the accumulation process.

In

the year that Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital
was published (1913), Lenin jotted down some unfavorable
marginal comments, and also stated in a letter to Lev
Kamenev:
I have read Rosa's new book Die Akkumulation des
Kapitals. She has got into a shocking muddle. She has
distorted Marx. I am very glad that Pannekoek and
Eckstein and 0. Bauer have all with one accord condemned
her, and said against her what I said in 1899 against the
Narodniks.[268]
*

*

*

Beyond these strictly marginal and incomplete frag
ments,

it is only possible to draw inferences regarding the

mature Lenin's theoretical perspective from a critical as
sessment of what is perhaps his best known work, Imperial
ism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). From the start,
however, the nature of the book imposes certain limitations
which nay make the undertaking unfeasible.

Imperial ism is a

non-theoretical text (in the sense that it does not seek to
develop a theory of imperialism as does, for example, Niko
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lai I. Bukharin's contemporaneous Imperialism and World
Economy) ; as all 'non-theoretical' works, however, Imperial
ism is of course informed by an implicit theoretical per
spective which the symptomatic reading can uncover and make
explicit. The genuine obstacle to laying bare the implicit
theory of Imperialism Is suggested by the subtitle of the
269
book itself: "A Popular Outline."
Less a book than a
pamphlet,

serious doubts must be expressed regarding the

extent to which any significant theoretical points can be
inferred from Imperialism. As Anthony Brewer has observed,
however, the canonization of the booklet has created a
situation In which criticism of the edifice of post-Leninist
thinking on imperialism must begin with an assessment of the
270
(implicit) theory of Imperialism itself.
Lenin's aim in writing Imperialism was to refute
Kautsky's notion of imperialism as the "preferred policy" of
finance capital. Rather than a particular "policy," which
could at a later time be supplanted by a different "policy,"
Lenin argued that imperialism was a specific, historically
concrete stage of capitalist development and, as such,

'nec

essary* . "[I Imperialism is the monopoly stage of capital
ism," according to Lenin's "briefest possible definition," a
definition which must be supplemented by drawing out the
five "basic features" of imperialism:
(1)
the concentration of production and capital has
developed to such a high stage that it has created monop
olies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2)
the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and
the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital', of
a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as
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distinguished from the export of commodities acquires
exceptional importance; (4) the formation of interna
tional monopolist capitalist associations which share the
world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division
of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is
completed.[271]
Primarily the third, and to a certain extent the first, of
these "basic features" are of immediate relevance here.
Lenin's treatment of the "monopolies" requires only
brief mention. Cloaking his discussion in pseudo-Hegelian
verbiage, Lenin writes of the particular "attributes" of
capitalism which, at a certain stage of its development, are
"transformed into their opposites." Thus:
Free competition is the basic feature of capitalism,
and of commodity production generally; monopoly is the
exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the
latter being transformed into monopoly before our
eyes....[272]
I will only mention the problems which are apparent in this
passage:

(i) the discussion in Chapter I, subheading B above

suggests that this formulation of the competition-monopoly
relation is not adequate to Marxist theory;

(ii) if "free

competition" is the "basic feature" of capitalism, and "mo
nopoly" is the "exact opposite" of "free competition," it
becomes difficult to think of imperialism as a stage of
capitalism, .i.e., imperialism seems to become qualitatively
different from capitalism. Textual evidence can be cited to
support the claim that Lenin vacillated between the two
273
posi tions.
The significance of the monopolies consists in their
274
ability to earn above average profits,
to forecast and
plan raw material requirements and market demand, and to
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establish "the most complete socialization of production."
Lenin stressed, however, that this socialization and rudi
mentary planning was incapable of ameliorating capitalism's
recurring periods of crisis.
[T]he monopoly created in certain branches of industry
increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capi
talist production as a w h o l e . The disparity between the
development of agriculture and that of industry, which is
characteristic of capitalism in general, is increased.
The privileged position of the most highly cartelised,
so-called heavy industry, especially coal and iron,
causes Ta still greater lack of co-ordination' in other
branches of industry....[276]
The above passage clearly links capitalist crises to
the "anarchy" of capitalist commodity production,

and is

suggestive of a disproportionality theory of crisis. Lenin
would therefore seem to be fully consistent (at least on the
issue of crisis theory) as between 1916 and his polemics
against the Narodniks almost twenty years earlier. But note
that the reasoning which seeks to connect the appearance of
monopoly (and the possibility of regulation) in some sectors
with even greater anarchy in others is, at best, poorly
developed; Lenin does no more than suggest that rapid rates
of technological change in the monopolised sectors lead to
greater "disparity" and, consequently, greater "anarchy and
277
crises."
A few pages previously, speaking of the emergence of
monopolies, Lenin cryptically suggested that monopolies and
(partial) regulation do not abolish the contradictions in
herent to capitalism because while "[p]roduction becomes
278
s o c i a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n remains private."
If he somehow
intended this notion to be linked with the subsequent argu
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ments about crisis, Lenin gave no explicit indication of it
in Imperialism.
The link was made nineteen years earlier, however,

in

the section on crises in "A Characterization of Economic
Romanticism.” There Lenin had counterposed the "scientific
analysis of accumulation" (Marxism) to the views of the
"Russian followers of Sismondi" (Narodniks). According to
Lenin, the Narodniks explained crises "by the contradiction
between production and consumption by the working class,"
whereas Marxists referred to "the contradiction between the
social character of production and the private character of
appropriation." On the same page, Lenin summed up the argu
ment: "To put it more briefly,
by underconsumption,
279
tion."

[Narodnism] explains crises

[Marxism] bv the anarchy of produc-

Without ambiguity, Lenin thus equated the social pro
duction/private appropriation contradiction with the anarchy
of production;

they were, in his view, the same explanation

of crisis. The difficulty is that Lenin never elaborated his
understanding of this identification, and an elaboration
would seem necessary since the reasoning involved is by no
means transparently obvious.
Returning to Imperialism, there are two possible inter
pretations. On the one hand, Lenin could have intended to
equate the anarchy of production with the social production/
private appropriation contradiction as he had in the 1897
article. In this case, the sane difficulty arises as
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before— there is no adequate explanation provided. On the
other hand, the two contradictions could be regarded as
distinct.

If this alternative is chosen, and Lenin’s views

regarding the monopolies' abilities to plan production and
sales are taken at face value,

there is no indication given

of why crises should be intrinsic to the imperialist stage
of capitalism except for the obscure and unexplained refer
ence to the social production/private appropriation con
tradiction .
In Lenin's argument,

the issues of crisis and monopoly

are theoretically connected, albeit loosely, to the third
"basic feature" of imperialism,

the export of capital. The

"monopolist position" of the "rich countries" leads to the
280
accumulation there of an "enormous 'surplus of capital'."
But "there could be no question of a surplus of capital,"
continues Lenin, "if capitalism could develop agricul
ture ,...[ and] if it could raise the living standards of the
281
masses."
In the same paragraph, Lenin advances the corol
lary argument:
The need to export capital arises from the fact that in
a few countries capitalism has become 'overripe' and
(owing to the backward state of agriculture and the
poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for
'profitable' investment.[282]
By contrast to those nations where capitalism is "over
ripe," the prospects for profitable investment are relative
ly greater in the "backward countries," where "capital is
scarce,

the price of land is relatively low, wages are low,
283
[and] raw materials are cheap."
The argument seems clear enough, although incompletely
134

developed: monopoly,

the underdevelopment of agriculture and

restricted mass consumption in the developed capitalist
countries combine to provide a dearth of profitable invest
ment outlets. As a consequence, capital is exported to the
peripheral areas in order to take advantage of the relative
ly more profitable investment opportunities there.
Somewhat surprisingly, Lenin's approach has been inter
preted as an underconsumption theory. Anthony Brewer, for
example, writes:
If the reference to the poverty of the masses and the
backwardness of agriculture is to mean anything, it must
surely represent an underconsumptionist analysis. Accumu
lation is held up by lack of markets.... This is the
argument put forward by [John] Hobson, and Lenin thought
very highly of Hobson and drew on his analysis
extensively.[284]
On the other hand, however, Brewer qualifies his assessment
by pointing to Lenin’s anti-underconsumption polemics against the Narodniks. Brewer concludes by adopting a rather
agnostic stance, claiming that "clearer evidence of a change
of mind" from the anti-Narodnik writings would be necessary
before Lenin could be characterized as an underconsumptionist.
Clearer evidence does exist, but not for a change of
mind on Lenin's part.

In the very paragraph in question,

where Lenin points to the limited consumption of the masses
285
as one of the causes of stagnant profitability,
he also
rails against the "petty bourgeois critics of capitalism"
who suggest that imperialism could be 'reformed' by a more
just distribution of income, i.e., by raising the consump
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tion of the masses. Although he does not explicitly say so
here, Lenin's allusion is no doubt to Hobson, because Lenin
characterized Hobson in precisely the same manner on other
286
occasions.
So while Brewer is correct to point out that
Lenin "thought highly" of Hobson's work, this favorable
assessment did not amount to an unequivocal endorsement—
notably, it was specifically Ilobson's underconsumptionism
287
that Lenin singled out for criticism.
Moreover, a theoretical criticism may be addressed at
Brewer himself. Underconsumption arguments typically fasten
to an alleged difficulty in realizing the surplus value
embodied in commodity capital under conditions of expanded
288
reproduction.
In Lenin's case, there was never any refer
ence to an unsaleable or unrealizable portion of the surplus
product.

Instead, the discussion in Imperialism concerned

the existence of a relative surplus of capital seeking
(more) profitable investment outlets. Lenin is explicit— the
capital is in money (not commodity) form, _i.e., surplus
value which has already been realized.

If Brewer Interprets

this as an underconsumption milieu, he is simply in error.
On the basis of this evidence it seems reasonable to sup
plant Brewer's agnosticism with a stronger statement—
289
Lenin's theory is not a variety of underconsumptionism,
*

*

*

Thus there are, to be sure, considerable weaknesses in
Lenin’s thinking. The real strength of Lenin's approach is
revealed, however, precisely in and through an investigation
of the tensions and seeming inconsistencies which are appar
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ent throughout his work. This is not an apologia. Certain of
Lenin’s theses may have been wrong, weak on internal logical
consistency, or incompletely worked out. These limitations
have been pointed to above. The favorable appraisal of his
work as a whole, however, depends more on the demonstration
that Lenin displayed considerable sophistication in linking
concrete analysis with abstract theoretical principles,

that

he allowed the theory to guide the concrete work, without
falling into the by now familiar trap of metamorphosing the
abstract, of treating the concrete as merely the outward
manifestation of abstract theory.
For example, it was no doubt a weakness on Lenin's part
to hold a disproportionality theory of crisis (having deci
sively rejected underconsumptionisra and failed to appreciate
the falling rate of profit explanation), and simultaneously
to insist on the inevitability of crisis under capitalism,
without having clearly explained why a planned capitalism
would be unable to do away with the anarchy of the market.
But it was a strength to maintain that the inevitabili
ty of crisis (despite the fact that this notion was poorly
worked out) did not allow the deduction of the necessity of
capitalist collapse, and certainly not the a priori elabora
tion of the necessary forms of that collapse as Luxemburg
sought to do (see also in Chapter III below the discussion
of the second congress of the Communist International,

at

which Lenin rejected the notion of a 'hopeless' final crisis
of capitalism from which there is no escape). The crisis is
inevitable, but the collapse is not; the socialist revolu
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tion is not made by will alone, nor is it automatically
called forth by the crisis; yet the crisis creates the
objectively revolutionary situation, which can be exploited
by the intervention of political movements. L e n i n ’s analysis
of the concrete situation reveals a complex interplay of
both abstract theory and highly particular, concrete inves
tigation. The abstract is not merely a general (inferred)
case of the concrete, nor is the concrete a metamorphosis of
the abstract. Both (or several) levels of analysis co-exist
throughout the analysis in constant interaction, one never
predominates over the other(s), the two (or more) never
collapse into one. There is no trace of teleology, but
neither is there ’freedom’.
Before
of

turning to an examination of Le nin’s assessment

the prospects for working

class

internationalism,

one

more illustrative example will help to demonstrate his meth
od and his conception of history and politics.
In the period of reaction after the Russian Revolution
of 1905, especially during the tenure of Pyotr A. Stolypin
as Chairman of the Tsar's Council of Ministers (1906-1911),
the agrarian question loomed large in the debates among
Russian socialists. Briefly, Stolypin's policies sought to
break up the persistent communal form of Russian village
agriculture, and solidify private ownership (in order to
ensure ’stability',

i..£• , capitalism),

but without dis

mantling the large landed estates and the ’superstructure’
290
of the landed oligarchy.
In other words, Stolypin was
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pursuing a path of development in agriculture along the
lines that Lenin had for some time been describing as the
291
path to capitalism in agriculture ''via Junker.”
Briefly, Mensheviks such as Plekhanov, Pavel Axelrod
and Theodore Dan were convinced that the success of
Stolypin's policies was 'impossible'. Since, in their view,
capitalist development was already underway in Russia, the
only policy which could provide a viable capitalist solution
of the agrarian question was a policy which banked on the
liberal bourgeoisie, not the reactionary landed oligarchy.
Stolypin's measures, which relied on the oligarchy and on
the 'strong' peasant, flew in the face of the laws of his
torical development. Consequently, the Mensheviks sought to
establish a "bloc" with the Kadets (party of the progressive
bourgeoisie), and in general strove to promote the full
development of a bourgeois republic (recall the discussion
of Plekhanov's politics in subheading D above).
Lenin's analysis, by contrast, once again displayed a
striking character. Abstractly,

the laws of capitalist de

velopment were at play in the countryside,

had produced a

"peasant bourgeoisie" and a "peasant proletariat," and
therefore had introduced a specifically capitalist class
dynamic in the Russian rural sector. The task on the agenda
was consequently land reform (and on this the Mensheviks and
Bolsheviks,

indeed the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Harod-

niks, were all in agreement). But the Menshevik vision of
this reform, seemingly 'radical' because it anticipated the
sweeping away of all vestiges of feudalism, obscured the
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fact that "two objectively possible, and historically not
yet finally chosen,

'solutions’ of the agrarian ques

tion... are feasible." If things went "favourably" for
Stolypin, he could succeed:
[Stolypin's plan] means the 'solution' of the agrarian
question in bourgeois Russia in the sense of the final
consolidation of private property over all the
land.... This will be a solution of the Prussian type,
which will certainly ensure the capitalist development of
Russia, but an incredibly slow development, endowing the
Junker with authority for many years....[292]
The Stolypin solution, contrary to the Menshevik's
claims, was 'radical*

in the sense that it was already

breaking up the village commune and the archaic agrarian
structures in Russia. True enough, the other option— the
peasant-bourgeois,

or "via farmer," path— was more radical

yet because it involved the complete breaking up of the
oligarchy's landholdings. But the Mensheviks were mistaken
in thinking that the liberal bourgeoisie was capable,

in

Russia, of carrying out such inroads on the oligarchy's
property.

In the meantime:

The success of Stolypin's policy would involve long
years of violent suppression and extermination of a mass
of peasants who refuse to starve to death and be expelled
from their villages. History has shown examples of the
success of such a policy. It would be empty and foolish
democratic phrase-mongering for us to say that the suc
cess of such a policy in Russia is 'impossible'. It is
possible! But our business is to make the people see
clearly at what a price such success is won, and to fight
with all our strength for another, shorter and more rapid
road of capitalist development through a peasant revolu
tion. A peasant revolution under the leadership of the
proletariat in a capitalist country is difficult, very
difficult, but it is possible and we must fight for
it.[293]
These examples offer a glimpse into Lenin's manner of
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treating the "concrete analysis of a concrete situation." On
the problem of the demise of proletarian internationalism,
Lenin was able to offer a more successful materialist analy
sis than either the theoreticians of the center or revolu
tionaries such as Luxemburg. The center, it will be recal
led, disintegrated into a variety of acl hoc responses to the
war. Luxemburg, as will be seen in greater detail in sub
heading F below, emphasized the ideological bankruptcy of
the International's leadership.
Lenin never denied the ideological component of revi
sionism, terming it "opportunism." Quite early on, in What
Is To Be Done? (1902), he wrote:
That struggle is desirable which is possible, and the
struggle which is possible is that which is going on at
the given moment. This is precisely the trend of unbound
ed opportunism, which passively adapts itself to
spontaneity.[294]
The theoretical and ideological aspects of revisionism were
plain enough: the denial of a scientific socialism,

the

denial of the class struggle in 'democratic' bourgeois so
ciety, etc. All of this had been "presented by Bernstein,"
and finally (in 1899) the opportunist's political practice
was "demonstrated by [Alexandre] Millerand" with his ac295
ceptance of a portfolio In a bourgeois government.
The Marxist considers political questions concretely,
from a class standpoint, and this "makes all the difference"
between Marxism and opportunism which, for example on the
national question,
imagines that democracy eliminates the class struggle,
and that is why [the opportunist] presents all his de
mands in an abstract way, lumped together, 'without res
14 1

ervations', from the standpoint of the interests of the
'whole people*, or even from that of an eternal and
absolute moral principle.[296]
Like Luxemburg, Lenin linked the emergence of revision
ism to the effect of petty bourgeois currents within the
working class movement:
The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its
class roots in society.... Why is it more profound than
the differences of national peculiarities and of degrees
of capitalist development? Because in every capitalist
country, side by side with the proletariat, there are
always a broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie.... A
number of new 'middle strata' are inevitably brought into
existence again and again by capitalism.... It is quite
natural that the petty-bourgeois world-outlook should
again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad work
ers’ parties.[297]
So there can be no doubt that Lenin recognized the
importance of the ideological components of opportunism,
viz., the incursion of petty bourgeois aspirations into the
working class movement, faith in the neutrality and univer
sality of bourgeois democracy, limiting the political objec
tive to that which appears possible at a given moment, and
so on. But beyond the characterization of opportunism as an
ideological deviation,

it was necessary for Lenin to explain

the phenomenon by reference to the material development of
capitalism. Moreover, the analysis of this development could
not be a direct mapping of the theory found in Capital onto
concrete reality (or vice-versa, the theorization of partic
ular concrete phenomena into the general theory of capital),
i_.£. , it could not be an approach such as the one Luxem
burg's methodology repeatedly induced her to adopt as a
consequence of her explicit requirement that the theory in
Capital lay out the "concrete conditions" necessary for
14 2

capitalist development (recall pp. 105-106 above). In other
words, there was more to the opportunist current than merely
the incursion of a petty bourgeois ideological deviation,

it

was not merely a "hesitation" or "vacilation," as Luxemburg
characterized it. Rather, opportunism found roots in, and
was constantly reproduced by, a "negative feature in the
European labor movement, one that can do no little harm to
the proletarian cause." This feature consists of the con
crete benefits of colonialism

which accrue

industrialized nations. Lenin

notes that

to workers in the

as a result of the extensive colonial policy, the Euro
pean proletarian partly finds himself in a position when
it is not his labor, but the labor of the practically
enslaved natives in the colonies, that maintains the
whole of society.... In certain countries this provides
the material and economic basis for infecting the prole
tariat with colonial chauvinism.[298]
This phenomenon may only be temporary, in Lenin’s view, but
it must be understood as a material (and hence political)
reality of the period in question. Lenin's estimation of the
significance of this material

basis for opportunism only

increased with the unfolding of events. In

his notebooks on

imperialism (published as vol. 39 of the Collected Works),
Lenin comments that "social-chauvinism is as inevitable a
product of imperialism as wireless-telegraphy"; he repeated
ly links working class opportunism and social-chauvinism
299
with the "benefits" of colonial policy.
With the publica
tion of Imperialism, this emphasis became even clearer when
Lenin chastized the Marxist Rudolf Hilferding for taking "a
step backward on this question compared with the frankly
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300
pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson."

The latter's

insight, according to Lenin, was the recognition that impe
rialist "superprofits" enable the creation of a corrupt
"labor aristocracy," which becomes "the principal social
301
(not military) prop of the bourgeoisie."
The only political deduction of a general sort which
could legitimately be drawn from the analysis of the phenom
enon of opportunism and its material basis was that of the
necessity in general of decisive and conscious political
intervention of a particular type— hence the deduction and
evolution of the organizational forms of the Bolshevik po
litical party. In the Bolshevik conception, the limits of
the possible are given by the unity of the objective and
subjective in the concrete moment. The 'objectively revolu
tionary situation' cannot in the literal sense be 'created',
but it can (and will, given the chance) slip away. . .
As such, no strategic or tactical implications (other
than party organization and the theory of intervention in
the conjuncture) could be deduced from general principles,
and the appropriate methods of the struggle for revolution
ary and internationalist politics varied according to the
circumstances. Prior to the war, the fight against opportun
ism could (had to) be waged from within a 'unified'

Interna

tional. After the outbreak of war, as will be seen below,
the tactics of splitting off from the chauvinist currents
and the formation of a new International became necessary.
Even so, the question of a split at that time was not a
'simple' one, but was governed by the tempo of the develop
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ment of the crisis. The subtlety of Lenin’s political sense
often evades both critics and admirers.
(unflattering) analysis, therefore,

In one and the same

it is possible to dis

cern evidence of a Lenin who was at one time a mechanical
determinist, seeing concrete events as inevitable stages of
a pre-ordained process, and at another time hatching con302
spiracies and plots of which he alone was the master.
L en in ’s associate Nikolai I. Bukharin, in his anticipa
tory Imperialism and World Economy (1915), provided an anal
ysis of the material basis of working class national chau
vinism which basically concurred with Lenin's 1916 Imperial
i s m , although in a broader and more general fashion. In
addition to the obvious conflict of interests between capi
tal and labor which accumulation engenders, wrote Bukharin,
there exists a parallel but contradictory tendency in capi
talist development. During each of its concrete phases,
capitalism is able to forge material and ideological ties
which establish fleeting (but politically significant) com
monalities of interest between capitalist and worker.

In the

early phase of capitalist development,
when the working class had just begun to emerge and to
separate itself from the small entrepreneurs, when socalled patriarchal relations prevailed between master and
worker, the latter to a considerable degree identified
his interests with the interests of his exploiter.
This identification of interests which are in sub
stance totally opposed to one another was, to be sure,
not suspended in the air. It had a very real basis. ’The
better the business of our shop, the better for m e ’, the
worker of that time used to reason.[303]
Somewhat later, working class opposition to capital
came to be mediated by the "craft ideology" of trade union
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ism ("our sphere of production” ) and "the so-called working
class protectionism with its policy of safeguarding ’nation304
al industry'."
Finally, in the imperialist era, when nar
row trade unionism (and to a lesser extent, working class
protectionism) is gradually overcome, there remains (and at
times is strengthened) "the bond of unity between the work
ing class and the greatest organization of the bourgeoisie,
305
the capitalist state."
This bond, finding its expression
"in the ideology of worker's patriotism," is cemented by
colonialism, and the "industrial prosperity" (which includes
306
higher wages) accompanying imperialist "super-profits."
Despite flaws, which will be further noted below, Bukharin's
conceptualization of the bourgeois state was remarkable in
its anticipation of corporatism in both the democratic and
totalitarian forms.
The final subheading of this chapter analyzes the var
ious responses to the outbreak of war among the revolution
ary left.
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F. Agitation for Peace, Revolutionary Action,
and Defeatism
As noted at the end of subheading B earlier in this
chapter, the commencement of hostilities completely trans
formed the political terrain of the Second International.
Apart from those social imperialists who merely adopted
positions identical to those of the ruling-class parties,
the bulk of the Marxist and militant non-Marxist groupings
fell into a ’defense of the fatherland* faction on the one
hand, and a 'pacifist' faction on the other. The major
figures (and their theoretico-political positions) in these
tendencies have already been discussed in subheadings C and
D above. At this point, attention will focus on the small
group of revolutionary leftists, which became increasingly
visible amid the debris of the International.
Among the revolutionary left there was uniform condem
nation of the war and bitterness toward those socialists who
supported it, particularly the hypocritical center. An exam
ination of the revolutionary left's analysis of the war and
the collapse of the International is especially illuminating
precisely because of the very similar ’gut' reactions of its
leaders: given the outrage and revulsion the revolutionaries
all shared, it becomes all the more clear in their case how
theoretical and methodological differences produced varying
analyses and political stances, despite almost identical
instinctual responses.
Trotsky astutely ascribed the capitulation of popular
sentiment (in favor of the war) to the mass of unpoliticized
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proletarians and petty bourgeois who tend to flow with the
tide of great historical events:
Mobilization and the declaration of war awaken fresh
expectations in [petty bourgeois and working class]
circles whom our agitation practically does not reach and
whom, under ordinary circumstances, it will never en
list.... The same thing happens as at the beginning of a
revolution, but with one all-important difference. A
revolution links these newly aroused elements with the
revolutionary class, but war links them— with the gov
ernment and the army![307]
On the other hand, when explaining the co-optation of
the supposedly politicized leaders of social democracy,
Trotsky emphasized the long history and effects of immersion
in reformist politics. The revisionists wished "to perpet
uate reformism theoretically," and although they were de
feated in the realm of theory during the Bernstein debates,
revisionism "continued to live, drawing sustenance from the
308
actual conduct and the psychology of the whole movement."
Trotsky elaborated (altered?) this argument later, when he
wrote that German revisionism stemmed from a "contradiction"
between the SPD's phraseology and its practice. The revi
sionists did not see that this contradiction was "tempo
rary," so they sought to make revisionism the permanent form
309
of proletarian class struggle.
Either way, it was therefore
the practical experience of activists and agitators, an
experience mired in many years of reformist politics, which
conditioned their behavior in 1914.
According to Trotsky,

the English working class move

ment, which enjoyed the opportunities presented by a 'gen
uine’ parliament, was nonetheless bound by the same histori
cal limitations as the German. Despite the difference in
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organizational forms (the English workers had a parliament,
the German workers had a 'real' Marxist party), the move
ments in both countries "accomodated themselves" to the
existing power, i^.e^, , they were both limited to possibilist
310
aspirations.
Like Lenin, although somewhat later, Trotsky came to
see that "the immediate trade interests of various strata of
the proletariat proved to have a direct dependence upon the
success or failure of the foreign [imperialistic--N.K.]
311
policies of the governments."
Furthermore, agitation or
persuasion alone could neither transform the International
into a revolutionary organization, nor cure those large
312
sections of the proletariat gripped by patriotic fervor.
313
The International had to be split,
and the revolutionizing
314
of the proletariat required a great, historical upheaval.
Unlike Lenin, however, Trotsky at this time lacked
membership in an organization where his views could struc
turally influence events— since 1904 his standing with the
Mensheviks had been ambivalent at best, and he joined the
Bolsheviks only in the late summer of 1917. Contrary to his
own advice, therefore, Trotsky was forced to rely on his
individual persuasive skills and agitational talents. Isaac
Deutscher chronicles Trotsky's juggling tactics on the
emigre paper Nashe Slovo:
Broadly speaking, three groups tried to influence Nashe
S lovo. Martov exerted himself to reconcile his loyalties
to Socialist internationalism and to Menshevism; and
gradually he transferred his old distrust of Bolshevism
to the single-minded 'angular' internationalism which
Lenin preached. At the other extreme were the prodigal
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sons of Bolshevism, Manuilsky and Lozovsky.... Trotsky
held an intermediate position; he tried to curb the proBolshevik group and also to persuade Martov that he
should disassociate himself from Menshevik socialpatriots. ’The editorial conferences', Lunacharsky re
lates, ’dragged on in long debates, in the course of
which Martov evaded with amazing elasticity of mind and
almost sophistic slyness a clear answer.... Trotsky often
attacked him very angrily*. In the first issue of the
paper Martov had, in fact, denounced some of his fol
lowers; but after a few weeks he argued that it was wrong
to charge the social-patriots with treason to socialism.
The pro-Bolshevik group then indignantly turned against
Martov; but Trotsky, for all his anger in debate, still
shrank from a break with him.[315]
With regard to the decisive historical crisis which he
believed was in the making, Trotsky sought Its genesis in a
transformation of the "psychology" of the working class. He
pointed to the irony of the moment:

the bourgeois govern

ments of Europe were dependent for their survival on a mass
of armed workers. "Is it not clear," reasoned Trotsky, that
the workers must begin to see a contradiction between their
heretofore willingness to remain merely a parliamentary
opposition and the ease with which imperialism resorted to
armed force in order to decide questions of ’bourgeois
right*? Trotsky’s political recommendation was a rather
vague exhortation to "agitate for peace" (note the seeming
incongruity with his earlier claim regarding the futility of
agitation alone), and he issued the well-known slogan:
No annexations!
No reparations!
The right of all nations to self-determination!
A United States of Europe
--without monarchies,
--without standing armies,
— without feudal castes,
--without secret diplomacy![316]
*

*

*
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Rosa Luxemburg,

in her famous analysis of the outbreak

of war (The Junius Pamphlet) , provided a brilliant material
ist account of the parallel forces leading Europe to war in
the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
first "line of development" which culminated in war began
with the constitution of the modern European nation-state.
Luxemburg dates this from the time of Bismarck’s war against
France (1870), which "threw the French Republic into the
arms of Russia, [and] split Europe into two opposing
317
camps...."
The second "line of development" consisted in
the imperialist expansion into non-capitalist regions; in
the case of Germany,

this largely meant the exploitation of

Turkey and the subordination of the latter's government to
318
German financial interests.
Responding to those within the SPD who urged "suspen
sion" of the class struggle for the duration of the war,
Luxemburg forcefully argued that the
class struggle is known not to be a social-democratic
invention that can be arbitrarily set aside.... The mod
ern proletariat was not led by the social-democracy into
the class struggle. On the contrary, the international
social democratic movement was called into being by the
class struggle....[319]
Moreover, Luxemburg maintained that in "capitalist society,
invasion and class struggle are not opposites," i_.e^. , inva
sion by a foreign power "is a measure to which the bour
geoisie has frequently and gladly resorted as an effective
320
weapon against the enemy within."
And
[j]ust as invasion is the true and tried weapon in the
hands of capital against the class struggle, so on the
other hand the fearless pursuit of the class struggle has
always proven the most effective preventative of foreign
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invasions.
None of this however, amounted to an argument for the
right of national self-determination couched in fradical*
phraseology. On the contrary, in ’'the present imperialistic
milieu there can be no wars of national self-defense,"
because in the imperialist era national self-determination
implied the maintenance of colonial empires— a glaring con322
tradiction.
Genuine national self-defense required the
formation of a people's militia, "but above all, popular
323
decision making in all questions of peace and war."
As regards the failure of the European proletariat and
its political parties to oppose the war, Luxemburg could
only offer the explanation that the workers were not aware
"of their own interests," i^.e., they were victims of a false
consciousness, and that working class leaders were either
324
traitorous opportunists or naive dupes.
This conclusion is
clearly linked to her analysis of capitalism, in which a
teleological orientation is coupled with the theorization of
the "concrete conditions" of capitalism. When combined,
these twin pitfalls brought the result that working class
allegiance to nationality could not but seem aberrant (in
sofar as there was no basis for such a phenomenon in the
general theory of capitalism), while at the same time the
concrete forms of the appropriate revolutionary response
could only be left open for further capitalist development
itself to determine.
Consequently,

the political task carried a bold name

("revolutionary action"), but was quite modest in its actual
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content: whereas the "great historical hour itself creates
the forms that will carry the revolutionary movement to a
successful outcome," the function of revolutionary socialdemocracy consists in combating the false consciousness of
the working class by providing "a political slogan, clear
ness concerning the political problems and interests of the
325
proletariat in times of war."
*

Lenin,

*

*

living in exile near Cracow at the outbreak of

the war, quickly provided an analysis of the war which
formed the basis of the political tactics he would espouse
326
over the course of the conflict.
In fact, Lenin*s response
can be seen as the logical culmination of his attitude on
the question of war over the course of the debates in the
Second International. Although Lenin did not present the
precise political implications of imperialist war at the
Stuttgart congress (1907) of the International, he was al
ready drawing preliminary conclusions in his analysis of the
congress. In his critique, Lenin naturally opposed the bla
tant chauvinism of rightists such as von Vollmar, but also
remarked on the purely abstract "opposition to war" of the
centrists Bebel and Guesde, and the semi-anarchistic views
of Herve. While von Vollmar spoke of a need for the "defense
of the fatherland," Herve responded with the slogan that
"the proletarian has no fatherland," and demanded that the
proletarian response to all wars must be an immediate mili
tary strike and insurrection. Lenin characterized this posi-
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tion as
blind faith in the miracle-working power of all direct
action; the wrenching of this 'direct action' out of its
general social and political context without the
slightest analysis of the latter: in short, the 'arbi
trarily mechanical interpretation of social phenomena'
(as Karl Liebknecht put it).[327]
While the slogan "the proletarian has no fatherland" is
a principle (to be struggled for) of international social
ism, it cannot be understood to mean that working class
internationalism is a foregone conclusion, or that it can be
realized with the mere issuance of a slogan.
Although his attitude toward the war was not yet con
cretized in 1907 (the particular conditions of the coming
conflict were not yet visible), Lenin's refusal to adhere to
inflexible or abstract formulas is fully consistent with a
post-war (1922) declaration:
[l]t is impossible to 'retaliate' to war by a strike,
just as it is impossible to 'retaliate* to war by a
revolution in the simple and literal sense of these
terms.
We must explain the real situation to the people, show
them...that the ordinary worker's organizations, even if
they call themselves revolutionary organizations, are
utterly helpless in the face of a really impending
war.[328]
In 1914, an approach such as Lenin's meant first and
foremost the recognition of the Imperialist nature of the
war, A.*®* j a- war between nations in the advanced era of
capitalist development. This war had to be distinguished
from wars which the bourgeoisie waged against feudalism,

in

order to constitute the modern bourgeois nation-state. The
opportunists,

in Lenin's view, uncritically transferred the

"defense of the fatherland" slogan from an earlier epoch
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(when it displayed a progressive aspect), to the imperialist
period.

In 1914, the socialist movement "cannot triumph
329
within the old framework of the fatherland."
Since it was not merely a question of betrayal by the
leadership, since opportunism had a mass base, "refusal to
serve with the forces, anti-war strikes, e t c ., are sheer
nonsense." Revolutionary socialists above all had to recog
nize that the class struggle is not suspended at the out330
break of war,
and that consequently
it is the duty of every socialist to conduct proaganda of
the class struggle, in the army as well; work directed
towards turning of a war of the nations into civil war is
the only socialist activity in the era of an imperialist
armed conflict...."[331]
This task could no longer be undertaken within the framework
of the International, which meant that the labor movement
had to be split. In this regard,
the worst possible service Is being rendered to the
proletariat by those who vacillate between opportunism
and revolutionary Social Democracy (like the 'Center* in
the SPD ) , by those who are trying to hush up the collapse
of the Second International or to disguise it with diplo
matic phrases.[332]
An effort to convert the world war Into civil war, an
effort intended to facilitate the defeat of "one's own"
bourgeoisie,

led to the startling formula of "revolutionary

defeatism," or the struggle for the defeat of "one’s own"
country. This concept proved rather too shocking even for
such revolutionaries as Trotsky. Indeed, in the initial
period of the war, Lenin was virtually alone in advocating
333
defeatism, even within the Bolshevik Party
(this fact,
incidentally, should contribute to dispelling the myth,
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widely held among the left as well as in bourgeois circles,
that Lenin's will inexorably guided the Bolsheviks at every
twist and turn). At the outset, Trotsky strongly opposed
Lenin's thesis of revolutionary defeatism as
a connivance for which there is no reason or .justifica
tion and which substitutes an orientation (extremely
arbitrary under present conditions) along the line of a
'lesser evil' for the revolutionary struggle against
w a r . [334]
L enin’s response demanded that Trotsky concretize the mean
ing of 'struggle against war':
A 'revolutionary struggle against war* is merely an
empty and meaningless exclamation,...unless it means
revolutionary action against one's own government even in
wartime.[335]
Trotsky hesitated, but eventually moved toward Lenin's posi
tion. He later wrote in his autobiography that "the es
sentially unimportant differences that still separated me
from Lenin...dwindled into nothing during the next few
336
months."
Even more clearly than in the case of Trotsky, Bu
kharin's analysis of the material basis of working class
patriotism led to political conclusions perfectly similar to
Lenin's. The crisis unleashed by the outbreak of war
severs the last chain that binds the workers to the
masters, their slavish submission to the imperialist
state. The last limitation of the proletariat's philoso
phy is being overcome: its clinging to the narrowness of
the national state, its patriotism.[337]
Steeled in battles forced upon them from above, accus
tomed to looking into the face of death every minute,
[the workers]' begin to break the front of the imperialist
war with the same fearlessness by turning it into civil
war against the bourgeoisie.[338]
Revolutionary defeatism, as Lenin and those who even
tually followed recognized, did not turn on the whim of a
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party (it was not a voluntarist position). Likewise, the
strategy of defeatism very concretely specified the form of
conscious intervention to be taken in the context of the
objectively determined crisis. Good intentions or impeccable
revolutionary credentials were not enough to provide a co
herent, concrete,

and feasible guide to action; the matter

actually hinged on the implicit method behind ’’the concrete
analysis of a concrete situation.”
Perhaps even more clearly than in the period immediate
ly following the outbreak of war, the manner in which Lenin
linked the objective context to the prospects of interven
tion can be seen during April 1917. The well-known "April
Theses" of this period are of course frequently pointed to
as a manifestation of the audacious Lenin, returning from
exile, goading those Bolsheviks still inclined to caution.
It is true that the "Theses” insist on a republic of so
viets, not a parliament, as "the only possible form of a
339
revolutionary government,”
but the contemporaneous analysis
in "The Dual Power” shows how the apparently almost un
limited voluntarism of the "Theses” in fact only urged
particular forms of action in a situation where a multiplic
ity of outcomes existed, where victory or defeat for the
socialist revolution were equally possible.
Did the Provisional Government need to be overthrown?
Yes, ultimately, because it was a bourgeois regime. But this
was not possible in April,

it was not a question of 'simply*

overthrowing the Provisional Government because the alterna-
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tive, the "second government" or the Soviets of Workers'
Deputies, at that time constituted the principal support of
the bourgeois Provisional Government. The truly revolution
ary outcome would be the transfer of power to the Soviets,
_i

, only the Soviets had a genuinely revolutionary poten

tial, but as yet this potential was merely a possibility.
The Soviets themselves needed to be revolutionized, and
hence the party of the class conscious proletariat needed to
win the constituents of the Soviets over to their side— and
340
then overthrow the Provisional Government.
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CHAPTER III
REVOLUTION, THE 'STABILIZATION* OF CAPITALISM,
AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
A.

Introduction

Following the collapse of the Second International in
August 1914, several efforts to salvage the organization
came to naught. French and Belgian socialists refused to
meet with German socialists, as the latter had not (with few
exceptions) opposed the invasion of Belgium. Both blocs, the
French, Belgians, and British on the one hand, and the
Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians on the other, continued
to issue resolutions which claimed that each was struggling
only for the 'right of all peoples to self-determination';
in practice, this of course meant simply that each socialist
party would continue to support
In this setting,

'its* country's war effort.

it was only a matter of time before

those tendencies which had not renounced internationalism
would begin the work of restoring a revolutionary Interna
tional. While Lenin (shortly followed by Trotsky) issued the
call for the Third International in November 1914, most
other internationalists had much vaguer notions of the ap
propriate line of march, and still clung to hopes that
something would come of the old organization, A small,
dispirited group of revolutionary Marxists and left-wing
pacifists met in Zimmerwald and Kienthal

(both in Switzer1
land) during September 1915 and April 1916 respectively.
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Although at both conferences the majorities would not sup
port the formation of a new international,

the decisive

first step of operating outside the Second International had
been taken. The particulars of the process by which the
Zimmerwald movement haltingly stumbled toward the founding
of the Third or Communist International are primarily of
historical interest and will not be reviewed here. Compre
hensive accounts from a variety of perspectives are else2
where availiable.
The founding congress of the Communist International
took place in early March 1919, and was followed by six more
3
congresses over the next sixteen years.
Initially convening
every year, a full congress of the Third International began
meeting less and less frequently after the fourth congress
(1922). A full seven years elapsed between the important
sixth congress (1928) and the final seventh congress (1935).
Established at the first congress,

the Executive Committee

of the Communist International (henceforth ECCI) was vested
with the official authority of the organization between
congresses. It was the ECCI which ultimately dissolved the
Comintern on 10. June,

1943.

Before proceeding further, however, it might be pointed
out that the various histories of the socialist movement
most clearly reveal their partisanship when they turn to
address the question of the Third International. On the
right, one finds that the portrayal of pre-Comintern social
ists as vaguely well-meaning but hopelessly naive and inef
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fectual dreamers is replaced by the image of the Communist
as a ruthless and calculating conspirator. On the other
hand, writers like Julius Braunthal, who claim to profess a
general sympathy for socialist ideals, nevertheless also
undergo a transformation of style when they commence to
relate the history of the Comintern. Braunthal*s change of
expression becomes evident when, by contrast with his ear
lier ambivalent (at best) attitude towards Marxism, he in
creasingly defends ’what Marx really meant* against the
4
views of Lenin.
5
Partisanship, of course, is no bad thing per s e ,
particularly if it is clearly stated and revealed--in such
cases it is easy for the reader to make allowances. For
example, in the preface to his book, the stridently anti
communist writer James Hulse claims to present the first
"balanced, authoritative history" of the Comintern; a page
later, still in the preface, he has already concluded that
the International was no more than "a clumsy attempt to
6
build a far-flung club of like minded fanatics." Well and
good— one knows what to expect, and reads accordingly. At
the other extreme, some extraordinarily apologetic Soviet
accounts are able, with the judicious use of hindsight, to
7
cast embarassing blunders in a favorable light.
Once again,
the political relationship of the analyst(s) to the topic is
clear and unambiguous.
A rather different and more difficult interrogation of
texts is called for in the case of writers like Braunthal or
the Spanish ex-Communist Fernando Claudin. Their ideological
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relationship to the communist movement (narrowly defined) is
manifestly more complex than that of either someone like
Hulse or a coterie of writers at the Institute of MarxismLeninism in Moscow; their sympathetic yet obviously critical
perspective may appear at first sight to offer hope of a
middle ground which will bear more objective results. As
will be seen below, however, such is not the case.
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B.

Missing the Mark

The multiformity of theoretical currents within the
pre-war Second International prevented the ready identifica
tion of any single unifying principle or theme. By contrast,
the development of the Third International’s theoretical
orientation was marked by the centrality of L en in ’s writings
on the national question and his theory of the imperialist
stage of capitalism. This is not to say that there existed a
uniform or homogeneous Third International theory; indeed,
at least through the 1920s, theoretical disputes were con
siderable and there was no shortage of debate. The point is
that the terrain of the debate was so shaped by L enin’s
theory of imperialism (especially after his death) that the
participants defined their own positions largely in terms of
their (implicit or explicit) relationship with Lenin. At
present it is not necessary to dwell on the reasons for this
state of affairs beyond pointing to Lenin’s stature as a
revolutionary leader and to the weight (both quantitative
and qualitative) of the Russian Communist Party (b) in the
Comintern.
While it might appear that the presence of such a
ready-made organizing principle would facilitate the task of
sifting through the development of Comintern theory, this
has not been the case. For example, some analysts (Anthony
Brewer, Bill Warren) insist that Lenin was an undercon8
sumptionist (a "crude" one at that),
while others (Roman
Rosdolsky, Richard Day) are equally adamant that he was a
9
disproportionist. Adding further to the confusion, Day
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maintains that it was precisely Lenin's adherence to a
disproportionality theory of capital accumulation which
10
constituted the salvation of revolutionary Marxism,
while
Rosdolsky feels that Lenin's disproportionality approach led
him perilously close to a reformism of the Austro-Marxist
11
("harmonist") variety.
It should be admitted, as seen in the previous chapter,
that Lenin himself is at least in part to blame for this
confusion, as the theory in Imperialism is indeed marked by
inconsistencies and incompletely formulated propositions
(none of them necessarily fatal). It should also be clear
from the previous chapter that a careful critique of his
theory would not warrant characterizing Lenin as an underconsumptionist. This does not, however, imply agreement with
either Rosdolsky or Day. The grounds for rejecting the
former’s views have already been chronicled;

the following

critique of Day will turn on his proposed schema for organ
izing discussion of the theoretical tendencies in the
Comintern.
At the outset, Day distinguishes two camps in Marxism,
"one associated with Rudolf Hilferding,

the other with Rosa

12

Luxemburg."

The reader is subsequently informed that the

'Hilferding tradition’ was "faithful" to Marx, and numbered
among its adherents Lenin, Bukharin, Trotsky, and Evgeny
13
Preobrazhensky.
By contrast, the 'Luxemburg tradition',
which included Kautsky and ultimately Eugen Yarga and Joseph
Stalin, was misled (Day speaks of a "fundamental reorienta-
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tion" and a "departure") by certain of Engels' statements
14
made after Marx's death.
The Hilferding tradition's ortho
doxy, in Day's view, consisted in its acceptance of a dis
proportionality theory of the business cycle, while the
Luxemburg tradition's error lay in its adoption of a theory
of secular crises of overproduction-underconsumption. (It
might immediately be noted that precious little besides some
very vague shared perspectives on capitalist crisis unites
the individuals who Day rather too easily groups into the
respective 'traditions’). Day then proceeds to argue that
the evolution of the Comintern's (and "Soviet Marxism's"
generally) outlook was shaped by the conflict between the
two traditions. In June 1930, with Stalin's "intervention”
at the sixteenth congress of the All-Russian Communist Party
15
(b), the victory of the Luxemburgist line was complete.
To be sure, Day is correct to note that with the pas
sage of time,

the theory of capitalism prevalent in Comin

tern circles increasingly stressed supposed problems of
underconsumption, i_.e^ , inadequate aggregate demand— this
will be discussed below. Indeed, with minor modifications,
the same view continues to dominate the Soviet understanding
of the workings of capitalism. Day's two-fold explanation of
this outcome,

however,

is mystifying. First, Day notes how

the effects of the political campaign against Bukharin led
to the interpretation of the latter's arguments on "capital
ist stabilization" as suggesting that an "organized" (i,.£. ,
16
without disproportions) capitalism could be crisis-free.
In the highly charged political atmosphere of the Comintern,
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such a view stood no chance of survival, and in Day's opin
ion Bukharin's writing contributed to the demise of the
Hilferding tradition as soon as the two were linked. Himself
in full agreement with the attack on Bukharin, Day must
therefore hasten to absolve the disproportionality position
in general (and Lenin in particular, who Day seems to regard
17
as infallible) from any association with reformism.
As the
second piece of supporting evidence for his thesis, Day
suggests that the timely arrival of the 1930 economic crisis
18
clinched the case for the underconsumptionist view.
Beyond
these two items, Day has little to offer except a standard
Trotskyist interpretation of Stalin's rise to power.
What Day's ’explanation* lacks is any account of how
the Luxemburg tradition could possibly emerge victorious in
a political climate where the 'Luxemburgist deviation* was
19
regarded as a monumental transgression.
Day seemingly
recognizes this when he notes that "[a]n overt rehabilita
tion of Luxemburg was politically problematic," and yet he
maintains that Varga was successful in "refurbishing Luxera20
burg's thesis and presenting it as 'Varga's L a w 1."
The
question begs asking, naturally, just how was Varga able to
accomplish this feat? It does no good to say that the
Luxemburg-underconsumption link had been successfully denied
21
(by Varga) or merely overlooked,
since the connection
between Luxemburg and underconsumption had by then become so
firmly established (for good reason) that such a maneuver
would have been impossible.
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Simply put, Day's account of the emergent Comintern
theory as a product of struggle between the Hilferding and
Luxemburg 'lines* is sutainable only through his remarkably
selective reading of Lenin's Imperialism. At least implicit
ly, Day treats Imperialism as a fully consistent work,
although such an approach is arguably misplaced (recall
Chapter II above). Even more significantly, Day merely avoids mention of a pervasive theme in Imperialism which in
fact represents the basis of subsequent interpretations of
Lenin as an underconsumptionist and explains how 'Varga's
Law' was able to dodge the charge of Luxemburgism. This
theme is Lenin's characterization of imperialism as the
"moribund" (or "overripe," "decaying," or "stagnating")
22
stage of capitalism.
It is necessary to stress that
Lenin's assessment of imperialism as "moribund" capitalism
is neither passing nor incidental, as it runs like a red
thread through the pamphlet.

In fact, an entire chapter

deals with the "Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism."
Day flatly ignores all of this. In his book, there are
only two passing indications of the fact that "Lenin had
23
described monopoly capitalism as moribund and parasitic."
In neither of these two instances is the issue developed or
explored, and in one case its mention merely serves as a
lead-in to a totally gratuitous attack on Bukharin around an
unrelated matter. By closing his eyes to this problem from
the beginning, Day is later able to identify Stalin, Varga,
and others as Luxenburgist-underconsumptionists by deriding
24
their references to "monopolistic rottenness"
without even
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hinting that the imagery of "rottenness" unequivocally
traces its origins to Lenin.
It is easy to agree with Day that over the course of
the 1920s the disproportionality position became increasing
ly likely to be rejected in part for political reasons
(although it surely seems more reasonable,

as suggested

earlier, to put the bulk of the blame for this development
on the political behavior of Hilferding, Austro-Marxists
such as Otto Bauer, e t c ., rather than on any pronouncements
of Bukharin). Contrary to Day's principal argument, however,
the eclipse of the disproportionality view and the subse
quent consolidation of underconsumption as the centerpiece
of Comintern theory did not represent a 'victory' of the
'Luxemburg tradition’. Rather, the underconsumption approach
of the Comintern is rooted far less in the classical Luxemburgist problem (i_.e., the supposed impossibility, under
conditions of expanded reproduction, of realizing the entire
surplus value produced in a fully capitalist society) than
in a realization problem which was seen to be specific to,
or at least increasingly made manifest in, capitalism's
25
monopoly phase ('Varga's Law').
Lenin's thesis of "mori
bund" monopoly was neatly adaptable to the latter view, and
a selective (although arguably incorrect) assimilation of
Lenin's utterances with a decidedly non-Luxemburgist version
of underconsumption eventually became the dominant theoreti
cal perspective within the Comintern. Day had claimed that
” [b]y denouncing Rudolf Hilferding Soviet Marxists would in
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fact cut their final ties with Lenin'* and the disproportion26
ality view,
but this is inaccurate. Correctly put: by
retaining their ties to Lenin's statements on 'rottenness',
the Soviet Marxists were able to rationalize both their
abandonment of the disproportionality approach and their
development of a 'new'

(.i.e. , non-Luxemburgist) undercon

sumption theory as introduced by Varga. A survey and analy
sis of the relevant theoretical and historical material will
be presented below, after a brief critical appraisal of
Lenin's conception of imperialism as the "moribund" stage of
capitalism.
In the 1920 Preface to Imperialism, Lenin mentions the
"parasitism and decay of capitalism, characteristic of its
highest historical stage of development" in connection with
27
the split in the working class movement.
Both here and in
the "Notebooks on Imperialism" John Hobson is favorably
mentioned (at least viz-a-vlz "the ex-1Marxist *" Hilferding)
for pointing out that "the first habit of parasitism" con
sists in the "bribery" of a stratum of the working class—
for Lenin, this bribery constitutes the "economic basis" of
28
social chauvinism and working class support for the war.
At the same time, however, "parasitism and decay" are also
linked to the emergence of 'coupon clippers'. Later in the
pamphlet, this connection is repeated with the claim that
the "rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capi
talism", and Hobson is again quoted on the possibility of
29
bribery.
The imagery of "rottenness" acquires a pseudo-theoreti191

cal content in Imperialism when it is used to support the
thesis of a "surplus of capital" in the advanced countries:
The need to export capital arises from the fact that in
a few countries capitalism has become ’overripe* and
(owing to the backward state of agriculture and the
poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for
'profitable* investment.[30]
The export of capital, Lenin proceeds to argue,

"may tend to

arrest development** in the exporting countries, but only by
"accelerat[ing]" the development of capitalism in the recip31
ient nations.
Yet a third aspect of "rottenness" for Lenin involves
the supposed retardation of technological progress under
monopoly capitalism (which, "like all monopoly,...inevitably
32
engenders a tendency to stagnation and decay").
The argu
ment that capitalist monopoly has "begun to retard progress’*
is repeated at a more general level with respect to capital
ist development per se, and no longer appears confined to
the technoogical aspect, although somewhat paradoxically
Lenin also maintains that during "the epoch of imperial
ism,... [o]n the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapid33
ly than before."
Rather vaguely, Lenin seems to suggest
that this "far more rapid" growth at some (unspecified)
point leads to "parasitism" and to "the decay of the coun34
tries which are richest in capital (Britain)."
As with other arguments in Imperialism, the lack of
specificity on the "stagnation and decay" issue makes a
definitive assessment unlikely. Somewhat charitably, it
could be argued that Lenin's use of the imagery of "rotten
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ness" was primarily confined to the status of a metaphor,
and was generally used to describe types of political behav
ior. More realistically, however, it must be admitted that
Lenin seemed to presume (granted, not in a very rigorous
manner) that "stagnation and decay" was a necessary feature
of capitalist economic development in its advanced phase. It
will be argued in what follows that precisely these illdefined (and yet evocative) supposed features of capitalist
economy during the 'monopoly stage’ made their way into the
theoretical framework of the Comintern.

193

C.

The Theoretical Metamorphosis

It is appropriate (in fact, necessary) to speak of a
metamorphosis in the Comintern’s theory of capitalism: the
documents,

theses, e t c . to be reviewed in the next section

will clearly indicate that a change (from disproportionality
to underconsumption) in outlook took place, yet there was no
explicit theoretical criticism of the disproportionality
approach and no frank avowal of the underconsumption posi
tion. Disproportionality was de facto rejected for a complex
combination of political and economic reasons; the contra
diction of 'unlimited production vs^. restricted consumption*
under capitalism came to be regarded as the root of the
problem, but with precious little forthright discussion of
what exactly this meant or how it stood in relation to the
existing body of Marxian theory. Richard Day noted these
symptoms but, as argued above, his analysis of the trans
formation remains superficial and therefore stands silent
when asked to explain how Varga was able to prevent the
charge of 'Luxenburgism* from sticking. The following dis
cussion aims to uncover the links which Day is unable or
unwilling to provide.
Lenin's influence on the Comintern was both more con
siderable and less direct than that of his colleague
Bukharin— considerable because of Lenin's enormous prestige,
less direct because Bukharin rather than Lenin held execu
tive positions in the Comintern, drafted resolutions and
35

programs, e t c .

Bukharin's Imperialism and Vforld Economy

was the antecessor to Lenin's Imperialism by a year. The
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essential theoretical perspective of Bukharin's book (and
other of his contemporaneous works) will seem familiar in
the course of a review of the early Comintern line in the
next section of this text. Indeed, Bukharin's direct organi
zational ties to the International are evidenced by the not
infrequent word-for-word similarity between early Comintern
resolutions and Bukharin publications. The further evolution
of the Third International's outlook, however, will reveal
how the unelaborated (Leninist) notion of capitalist

'rot

tenness' first came to be integrated into the Comintern
theory, and ultimately allowed the substitution of an underconsuraptionist for a disproportionality perspective. The
following analysis of Bukharin's theory of capitalism will
show that the notion of 'rottenness* is absent in his work,
and that its eventual appearance in the Comintern's stated
view must be attributed to its transposition from Lenin's
theory.
The general thrust of Bukharin’s theory of imperialism
was identical to Lenin's: imperialism is the 'necessary'
(rather than merely 'preferred') policy of finance capital
because imperialism is a definite stage in the development
of capitalism.

In a few respects, however, Bukharin's analy

sis was more coherent and developed than Lenin's.
Bukharin began with the claim that the phenomenon of
imperialism must be conceptualized at the level of world
economy, aa an aspect of international production relations.
The international exchange of commodities is not the deter
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minant, but the outward expression or indication of these
relations:
The example of the commodity market shows that behind
the market relations are hidden production relations. Any
connection between producers who meet in the process of
exchange presupposes the individual labors of the produc
ers having already become elements of the combined labor
of the social whole. Thus production is hidden behind
exchange, production relations are hidden behind exchange
relations.... [W]e may define world economy as a_ system
of production relations a n d , correspondingly, of exchange
relations on a world scale.[36~]
In a rather modern sounding discussion, Bukharin goes on to
detail the effects of the international movement of labor
power (both permanent migration and the gastarbeiter phenom
enon) "as one of the poles of capitalist relations," and the
37
international flow of capital as the other "pole."
At the "national" level, the processes of centraliza
tion and concentration cause the average unit of capital to
grow larger. Ultimately, colossal corporations are increas
ingly able to gauge demand,

’plan* production through the

vertical integration of their operations, and at times even
restrict output in order to maintain selling prices above
prices of production (the latter strategy becomes all the
more viable with the formation of trusts and cartels).

In

turn, however, these immense units of industrial capital
ever more regularly require equally immense injections of
finance to carry on their activities (not only production
activities of course— access to finance is the principal
lever in the process of centralization). The transformation
"of banking capital... into industrial capital (by financing
industrial enterprises)...thus forms a special category:
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finance capital."

At the national level,

therefore, pro

duction exhibits increasing "rationality" in the sense of
being somewhat ’planned’, and less and less resembles cora39
modity production.
The entire process... tends to turn the entire 'nation
al' economy into a single combined enterprise with an
organization connection between all the branches of pro
duction. [403
Increased rationality at the "national" level, however,
could not eliminate capitalism’s recurring crises. Indeed,
economic disruptions would assume even more enlarged dimen
sions as the anarchy inherent in capitalist economy became
41
"reproduced" on the world level.
At this juncture,

it is important to sort out Lenin's

and Bukharin's arguments, since they not only appear to be
similar, but also similarly ambiguous. In particular, they
both suggest that the (at least partial) regulatory poten
tial of the monopolies in actuality intensifies crises. The
ambiguity: if planlessness is the chief cause of crises, why
does 'a little planning' make the crises worse?
Naturally, this is not at all, in and of itself, an
untenable position, but it does require some explanation.
Lenin's two suggestive indications, as argued above, were
inadequate at best and for that reason the ambiguity in his
work remains. Bukharin's discussion is rendered more co
herent than Lenin's by his systematic integration of the
42
role of the capitalist state into the analysis.
Bukharin's work has been frequently, and appropriately,
criticized for its "tendency to absolutise state power and
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treat the state as an all-embracing, omnipotent organization
43
which embodies the collective will of capital."
Anthony
Brewer is one of the few writers, however, to point out also
the virtue of Bukharin's efforts: in an era which perhaps
heralded the view (or at least the implication) that the
nation-state had been transcended (Kautsky), Bukharin was
one of the few who steadfastly posed the theoretical problem
of the strengthening of the bourgeois national state and its
'economic* role during a time of pronounced internationali44
zation of capital.
The passage of more than half a century
has not diminished the validity of this insight, despite
ongoing proclamations that the 'end of sovereignty*

is at

hand.
For Bukharin, the corollary of ever larger units of
capital at the national level was a mutation in the 'econom
ic* functions of the bourgeois state.

Insofar as individual

capitals become major actors at the national level,

they

seek to use the executive, legislative, and judicial appara
tus of 'their' government to advantage in the struggle
against other domestic capitals. This was of course nothing
so terribly new, but as individual capitals (or blocs of
capitals) more and more conducted their operations "with a
view towards world economy," they also increasingly felt an
imperative to cultivate an alliance with the state in its
45
foreign economic policy.
The processes of concentration and centralization, for
Bukharin, imply a narrowing of the class of 'large' capital
ists. Combined with the new forms of industrial organiza
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tion, the trend becomes one of an increasing monolithicity,
with the coalescence of the various fractions of the bour
geoisie into a tight bloc of finance capital. All of this,
together with the growing economic significance of the state
power, heralds a change in the "inner structure” of the
state, which "becomes more than ever before an 'executive
46
committee of the ruling classes'."
In 1920, Bukharin ex
pressed similar ideas in the following way:
The capitalist 'national economy* has changed from an
Irrational system into a rational organization, from a
non-subject economy into an economic subject. This trans
formation has been made posible by the growth of finance
capitalism and the cohesion between the economic and
political organizations of the bourgeoisie.[47]
The result, according to Bukharin, is that "a growing
discord" appears between the
world-wide... basis of social economy and the peculiar
class structure of society, a structure where the ruling
class (the bourgeoisie) itself is split into 'national*
groups with contradictory economic interests... competing
among themselves for the division of the surplus value
created on a world scale.[48]
This form of the 'forces-relations' contradiction,
coupled with the new economic significance of the state,
means that
competition reaches the highest, last conceivable state
of development.... Competition is reduced to a minimum
within the boundaries of 'national* economies, only to
flare up in colossal proportions [at the global
level].[49]
The competitive struggle is 'settled*, and at the same time
the conditions for its resumption (relations of inequality
among imperialist rivals) are restored, in the process of
50
inter-imperialist war.

199

Like Lenin, Bukharin could be interpreted as an underconsumptionist because he explains the export of capital by
reference to a relative ’'overproduction" of capital. The
first mention of overproduction in Bukharin's book, however,
refers not to an excess of ’capital’ (means of production),
51
but to the overproduction of commodities of all types.
A
true overproduction/underconsumption theory is one which
regards the system as incapable of generating (or 'releas
ing') sufficient buying power, in the aggregate, to realize
the entire output at its full value. Since Bukharin does not
restrict himself to a particular type of commodity, it is
tempting to interpret his argument as suggestive of general
overproduction and to reject his own oft-repeated affirma
tions of adherence to a disproportionality theory of crisis.
This, however, would be an incorrect assessment. Rather
than proceeding from an argument couched at the level of the
social capital (i_.e. , the only level at which, as Rosa
Luxemburg correctly saw, an overproduction/underconsumption
theory can be coherently constructed), Bukharin quite unam
biguously derives his 'overproduction' scenario from an
analysis of the behavior of individual capitals in the
process of self-expansion.
In its struggle to amass surplus value,

says Bukharin,

each capital seeks to drive its individual unit costs of
production below those of its rivals (the struggle for
surplus or 'super' profits) and to increase the number of
units sold as rapidly as is feasible (both by securing new
markets and by conquering a larger market share). Naturally,
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cost reduction is also the iuost powerful weapon in the
struggle for markets, as it allows the cost-cutting capital
to undersell its adversaries. Fully in line with Marxian
theory, Bukharin explains the declining unit costs of pro
duction in terms of a falling labor content stemming from
mechanization and innovation. New and more mechanized pro
duction techniques, according to Bukharin,

typically involve

an expanded scale of operations and correspondingly high(er)
52
levels of output.
The ’overproduction* which appears as a
result of the pell-mell expansion of capacity in the various
branches of production is a relative overproduction, i_.«5. ,
the unplanned, anarchic character of the expansion means
that the output of some branches outruns the prevailing
social demand for their output. True enough, this is 'over
production', but it is overproduction stemming from dispro
portionali ty , not from a lack of purchasing power in the
aggregate.
This interpretation of Bukharin's argument is bolstered
by context: Bukharin produced the discussion not as part of
a theory of crisis, but as the explanation of capital's
constant striving to expand into new regions and nations in
order to capture new markets at the expense of rivals. Any
individual capital benefits from international expansion
first by being able to maintain a higher volume of sales
than on the domestic market alone, and apart from any in
trinsic advantages of growth in the course of the competi
tive struggle, a high level of sales also allows the suc
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cessful capital to reap the full benefits of the 'economies
of scale' that the most advanced (high organic composition)
production techniques possess. Second, expansion abroad
allows a capital to capture surplus profits in countries
where methods of production are less advanced (where the
individual value of a unit of output produced by a domestic
capital exceeds the individual value of the importing capi53
tal's production).
The export of capital (as distinguished from merely
foreign trade) is explained by Bukharin later in the book as
the further, more developed, outcome of the same inherent
tendencies of capital. As national capitals secure the as
sistance of ’their* governments by obtaining tariff and
other protection against the import of commodities produced
by competing capitals in other nations, the process of
international expansion detailed above encounters
impediments.
[H]igh tariffs put tremendous obstacles in the way of
commodities seeking to enter a foreign country. Mass
production and mass overproduction make foreign trade
necessary, but foreign trade meets with a barrier in the
form of high tariffs.[54]
Hence the export of capital, which permits capitals to jump
over protectionist barriers to trade by directly establish
ing production facilities in foreign countries.
Nonetheless, although both the export of commodities
and the export of capital necessarily arise from the self
expansion of capital, neither is the result of an impos
sibility of realizing the product domestically,
maintained.

as Luxemburg

"[N]ot the impossibility of doing business at
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home, but the race for higher rates of profit is the motive
power of world capitalism. Even present day ’capitalist
55
plethora’ is no absolute limit."
An even more clearcut
distance from Luxemburg was taken by Bukharin in 1924. At
that time he wrote that "a conflict between production and
consumption...is nothing other than a crisis," but that
these "[c]rises stem from the disproportion of social pro56
duction."
And further: "Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of col
lapse is simply false.... The whole ’collapse* clearly rests
on the impossibility of realization within the framework of
57
a ’pure capitalism', i_,e., on a false theory."
In short, Bukharin is no more an underconsuraptionist
than Lenin. Moreover, Bukharin provided a more coherent and
logical disproportionality theory of crisis and imperialism
than Lenin's. Most significantly from the standpoint of an
analysis of the development of Comintern theory, however,
Bukharin's conceptual framework could not be metamorphosed
into an underconsuraption-based view of a ’moribund’ capital
ism because Bukharin’s work lacked the incohesive yet vivid
imagery of 'decay' so strikingly evident in Lenin's writing.
*

*

*

Perhaps the best representative of the underconsumptionist strand in Comintern thinking, as Richard Day has
correctly argued, was Eugen Varga. An extremely prolific
writer, Varga continued to be intellectually active up to
his death in 1964 at the age of eighty-five. The question
(or rather,

the problem) of "purchasing power" was central
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to Varga's analysis of capitalism from the start.

In the

early post-war years he argued that even though capitalism
in the United States was extraordinarily productive, it had
managed to avoid an economic crisis in the years 1918-1919
only by virtue of exports to Europe. As a consequence of the
war, however, the European nations had been "...economically
weakened and deprived of purchasing power," with the result
that European markets for U.S. goods dried up quickly, by
the spring of 1920. It was this "...decrease of the purchas
ing capacities of [the European] countries in respect to the
United States [that] called forth an overproduction crisis
58
which had been looming even some time before...."
In a contemporaneous article, Varga stated that "[d]uring the war, expenditures on goods far exceeded new produc
tion." This real expenditure (in both senses of the word) on
arms, e t c ., was "veiled" by the creation of vast sums of
"fictitious capital" (whose origins were government spending
and unbacked issues of paper currency, according to
59
Varga).
Illusory wealth masked a deepening real "impover
ishment" insofar as the war effort soaked up not only exist
ing stocks of goods but also dealt a "setback to the mate
rial basis of productivity," through the neglect of agricul
ture, transport, and the maintenance of means of production.
This became simultaneously the explanation of inflation
(higher nominal incomes, reduced quantity of real nonmilitary output), and the irresolvable difficulty of post
war capitalism: the impoverished working class requires at
minimum a return to pre-war living standards, but the di
204

minished productive capacity of Europe makes this impossible
without a prior "real accumulation" of new means of produc
tion. The latter is itself impossible, even in the unlikely
event that capitalists would for a time be willing to forego
profits: despite the very low real wages, productivity is
itself so low that there is no basis for a real surplus
60
("keinen realen Ueberschuss" ).
For Varga, this analysis appeared to demonstrate the
"disintegration of capitalist economy" in central Europe,
and allowed three conclusions:

(i) the European economies

will become ever more dependent on the English and American,
(ii) within Europe, victorious France and Italy will seek to
"exploit" the defeated nations through capital export, and
(ill) the agrarian nations of eastern Europe will experience
a windfall due to the inflated prices of foodstuffs. The
upshot is that the proletariat will increasingly come to
realize that a resolution of the crisis "is impossible on a
capitalist basis" and will therefore "throng the revolution61
ary path."
The strands of thought in these two early articles were
soon joined by Varga to form the judgement that the "direct
economic consequences of the war were the separation of the
world into spheres of relative over-production and absolute
62
under-production."
But this ad hoc synthesis was merely
the short-lived prelude to Varga's adoption of a classic
underconsumption position. Having argued ca. 1921 that the
European economies suffered primarily from a low productive
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capacity and an inability to generate a significant surplus
(which was reasonable, and perfectly compatible with the
view that Europe also did not constitute a viable market for
U.S. products),

by 1925 Varga was saying something rather

different, and claimed to see "a gaping contradiction be
tween the production and realization possibilities of West
European industries" which has been exacerbated by the proc
ess of centralization, specifically by the productivity
enhancing potential of such "re-organization." The potential
output of industry is very high,
[bjut there are no possibilities of disposing of its
products. As a result of the proceeding centralization
process, the low wages and the severe unemployment, the
inner market has little absorption power for mass con
sumption commodities.... Hence a large part of the indus
trial productive apparatus stands idle and there is wide
spread unemployment— not only as a crisis phase but as a
permanent phenomenon.[63]
In other words, by 1925 the European productive apparatus
was capable (in 1921 it was not) of producing a considerable
amount, but this capacity was not being put to use because
there was no evident demand for the output. In 1921 low real
wages were, for Varga, the consequence of industrial disar
ray, but by 1925 they had become the cause of an "idle
productive apparatus."
Varga himself does not specifically invoke any develop
ments in European economy that account for the transition to
his new outlook, which sugests the possibility that he was
not particularly aware of it (the transition), but none of
this has been presented as necessary evidence of some sort
of lapse or contradiction in his reasoning. A consistent
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underconsumption!st view could certainly allow for wartime
devastation as a cause of diminished productive capacity,
and then conjure an injection of products and demand from
’outside' as the explanation for reconstruction. Varga's
article on the U.S.-English inspired Dawes Plan for resched
uling German war reparations payments (more on the Plan in
the following section) came close to providing such a ra
tionale. Varga wrote:
Since the acceptance of the Dawes Plan Germany has
obtained considerable foreign credits.... This means,
therefore, that the market possibilities of the other
part of the world in Germany were increased to the same
amount....
[This has resulted in] a pulling of the German economy
and increased purchase of foreign goods by Germany. It
goes without saying that this cannot last. The turning
point must inevitably come in the near future. When
Germany will have spent the first credits it will have to
pay interest on the credits which it obtains and to remit
the reparation payments provided for in the Dawes
Plan.... When the time for this turning point will have
c o m e, ...[iInstead of absorbing a surplus of goods from
the world market, Germany will throw a surplus of goods
on to the world market and will thereby make the crisis
of the West European industrial countries and the unem
ployment connected with it more acute.[64]
As just noted, the aim up to now was not so much to
assess the strengths or weaknesses of Varga's thinking in
particular or underconsumption theories generally. Rather,
the point has been to demonstrate Varga's clear adoption of
the underconsumption perspective in order to now proceed
with a discussion of the manner in which the two preeminent
Comintern economic theoreticians--Bukharin and Varga—
employed their respective theoretical systems to comprehend
the phenomenon of the "stabilization of capitalism" during
the mid 1920s. In this discussion, it will be argued that
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the underconsuraption approach provided a theoretically less
satisfactory (at least from the standpoint of Marxism) ex
planation of capitalist stabilization, although in many
respects it possessed an intuitive appeal due to its ap
parent correspondence with several highly visible economic
*facts T .
*

*

*

The slow and painful restoration of the European econo
mies in the early 1920s naturally made its impression on
Comintern theoreticians. At the third congress (June 1921)
Trotsky delivered a speech on the economic situation which
departed somewhat from his earlier assessments of capital
is m ’s immediate prospects. Rather than "disintegration and
collapse" (1919), Trotsky now held out the possibility of a
cyclical upturn and linked the brief postwar boom to the
growth in the "self-assurance" of the bourgeoisie. Nonethe
less, Trotsky considered it premature to see in this the
65
restoration of a capitalist "equilibrium.11
The war had
impoverished Europe, even Great Britain, and had shifted to
the United States the role of leader of the capitalist
world. Still, the 1920 economic crisis which followed the
speculative postwar boom had its origins in the U.S. (and
Japan),

"precisely in those countries which were on the
66
upgrade and not in decline in the recent period."
The symptoms of the crisis were considered by Trotsky
to be its causes as well: "America's productive capacity has
grown extraordinarily, but her market has vanished because
Europe is impoverished and can no longer buy American
208

67
goods."

Trotsky integrated this explanation of the proxi

mate causes of the crisis with what would soon become his
trademark— the theory of the supposed 'long waves'

in capi

talist development. According to this view, the developed
capitalist economies had recently entered a downward phase
of the 'long wave', which meant that while cyclical upturns
were not ruled out, it could be expected that they would be
"fleeting, superficial and speculative," whereas downturns
68
would be of a "prolonged character."
The conclusion is
that the bourgeoisie will not find it possible to restore
"equilibrium," that "both the world situation and the future
perspectives are profoundly revolutionary in character,"
that "a new upswing...can by no means act as a check upon
the revolutionary development," although "full guarantees
can be given only by our expert tactics, by our strong
69
organization."
Approximately a year and a half later, speaking to a
Moscow

party meeting in October 1922, Trotsky was less

ambivalent. Rather than possibility,

the upturn was now

fact. Trotsky recalled a "chance remark" he uttered at the
third congress "to the effect that this [i,.£. , 1920— N.K.]
crisis, like every other crisis, is bound to be superseded
by a revival" and then, characteristically, chided those who
failed to perceive the significance of the prognostica70
tion.
The upturn was, however, cyclical and temporary,
"not some kind of blossoming of capitalism, of which, as
suredly, there cannot even be talk" because the general
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"epoch" was one of "capitalist decline."
The characterization of the economic revival as a "sta
bilization of capitalism" was first provided by Bukharin at
the thirteenth congress of the RCP(b) in Hay 1924. He deliv
ered a wide-ranging report on recent changes in the world
economy, the international political situation and, as an
official liaison, developments in the Comintern. Contrasting
the levelling off in the brief economic upturn which had
followed the postwar recession in the United States with a
"relative" (but nonetheless "clearly defined") improvement
in European economic activity, Bukharin claimed that
the present crisis is a general crisis of the capitalist
system, but not a conventional commercial crisis charac
teristic of the normal course of capitalism. It reveals
itself quite frequently, and at times unevenly, from
different sides. Undeniably, in a whole host of countries
a rise in the economic conjuncture is underway, but this
creeping crisis is penetrating into the pores of their
political organisms.[72]
Note that while he correctly ascribes to Bukharin use of the
expression "a certain stabilization" to describe the Euro
pean conjuncture, Richard Day cannot resist this misleading
elaboration: "Generalizing his analysis, Bukharin argued
that capitalism had entered an equilibrium phase, which most
73
Marxists had hitherto thought of as stagnation."
Now, it
should hardly be surprising that Bukharin, comparing 19191920 (even 1923) with 1924, should refer to "a certain
stabilization" of the economic situation in Europe— mere
"stagnation" was an improvement. Bukharin, however, never
referred to an "equilibrium," and in fact the passage quoted
above suggests something altogether different. Day's inter
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pretation actually rests on a subtle but crucial distortion.
Consider the quite different impressions conveyed by Bukharin's own words, quoted above,

and the paraphrased rendi

tion offered by Day: "Bukharin had proclaimed that the
'general crisis of the capitalist system', although con74
tinuing, had become a 'creeping crisis’ ."
In any event,
the ability of capitalism to survive would entail, said
Bukharin, defeat of and/or concessions by the working class
(although Bukharin at this time also favorably cited Varga,
whose own explanation of the stabilization suggested an
illusory accumulation of wealth accomplished through specu
lative forms of centralization). Nota bene: under these
conditions of "stabilization," Bukharin foresaw an "inevi
table ... sharpening of the class struggle," not
75
or a harmonization of relations.

'equilibrium'

At the fifth congress of the Comintern In June 1924
Varga delivered the report on the economic situation, and
made no reference to capitalist stabilization. Having de
fined "crisis" as a period characterized by intensified (but
unspecified) "contradictions of capitalist society," stag
nating or declining production, stagnating or declining
working class living standards and therefore "the objective
possibility of successful struggle for power," Varga went on
to argue that the capitalist world was in crisis, and that a
yet further deterioration could be expected. The economic
improvements in the United States and France were character
ized by Varga as "isolated" and "special," since the general
trend was that of "the decay of capitalist world economy."
21 1

And finally, Varga expressed skepticism concerning the via
bility of the Dawes Plan in terns similar to those already
7G
encountered above.
Even so, delegates from the left (.e.g, . Dengel of
Germany) objected that Varga's prognosis was overly favor
able for capitalism, and that "Varga adopts the opinions of
77
the English press...."
Responding to the discussion, Varga
did speak of "a tendency towards strengthening capital
ism,..." all the while insisting that "I do not mean to say
that such a prospect of capitalism recovering exists; but
what we must fight is the attitude that if such a prospect
78
does exist, it is dangerous to speak of it."
Zinoviev,
without adopting any explicit theoretical orientation, de
fended Varga's remarks by saying
that we must handle the term 'collapse of capitalism*
very carefully.... We must remember that even in Germany,
notwithstanding the many symptoms of the decline and
disruption of capitalism, we have also certain symptoms
of its consolidation....
The situation is very complicated, and it is not
Varga's fault that certain symptoms of the strengthening
of capitalism exist.[793
Zinoviev equivocated by concluding that either "capitalism
may vegetate for a comparatively long period,

[or]...that a

more rapid development of events are speeding up the col80
lapse of capitalism...."
Bukharin was quite visible at the congress, but prima
rily confined himself to reporting on and discussing the
drawing up of a Comintern Programme. He did, however, make a
few passing comments on crisis theory, in one place noting
that "the creation of trusts does not prevent crises," and
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in another offering this observation:
As you know, a theoretical discussion on the theory of
crises is going on in Marxist circles. There are two
formulas which are fundamentally different (disproportionality and underconsumption). We must have a formula
which will express the contradiction between production
and consumption a£ a component part of the anarchy of
production. I will deal with this more fully on another
occasion.[81]
Although Bukharin provided the first mention of "stabi
lization," he had done so at the thirteenth Russian party
congress— the first Comintern reference to a "stabilization
of capitalism" was apparently by Varga at the fifth enlarged
plenum of the ECCI in March 1925 (almost a year after both
the Russian party congress and the fifth Comintern cong82
ress).
Only a few months later, however, Varga was already
changing his mind, and in a presentation to a meeting of
Gosplan workers at the end of May he suggested that stabili
zation is "neither a Marxist nor a Leninist term; in addi83
tion I consider it to be a poorly chosen term."
Beginning
with the claim that the centralization of capital was not
’really' accumulation because surplus value was employed to
expropriate weaker capitalists rather than enlarge produc
tion, Varga asked how it might be possible to establish
empirically whether 'genuine' accumulation or merely para
sitic centralization was taking place. He immediately re
jected value analysis (bourgeois statistics were inade
quate); next, Varga considered the use of data on the in
stallation of new means of production, but found that this
might not count as accumulation either in the event that the
subsequent output "cannot find a market." Varga finally
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settled on growth of output in physical terms as the most
84
adequate index of accumulation.
He presented series for
several important commodities for the years 1900,

1913, and

1924 which, with few exceptions (petroleum and rubber),
showed stagnant levels of output in 1924 relative to 1913,
by contrast with rapid increases in all series between 1900
and 1913. "All my research points to the impossibility of
showing a definitive rise in output," concluded Varga, and
while he left open the possibility that the 1923-1924 con
juncture was merely a cyclical downturn, he immediately
added that the situation in 1925 had deteriorated even
85
further.
Finally, Varga suggested that "permanent unem
ployment" was a new feature of capitalism,

and concluded

that "Lenin, ten years ago, considered imperialism decaying.
I see no reason to offer a brighter prognosis for capi86
talism."
So having introduced the notion of "stabilization" to
the Comintern, Varga almost immediately abandoned it.
Bukharin, however, maintained and continued to develop the
argument that a conjunctural stabilization of capitalism was
at hand. For most commentators,

this appears as the logical

analog of Bukharin's supposed role as the spokesperson of
the

'right* in the Russian party,

.e., moderation in domes

tic politics coupled with a repudiation of the cataclysmic
vision of capitalist collapse. In most such interpretations
(a comprehensive listing follows shortly),

it is generally

presumed that "[w]hile Bukharin pondered the achievements of
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'organized capitalism', Stalin predicted that '"recovery"
contains within itself the germs of its inherent weakness
87
and disintegration'."
Supposedly, Stalin issued Varga
” [a]n implicit directive... to demonstrate that the 'problem
of markets’ [i_.<9., purchasing power— N.K.] would lead to the
third period" characterized by "wars, revolutions,
88
nomic collapse."

and eco-

The two principal contentions in this judgement are
simply wrong. First, the notion that it was necessary for
Stalin to urge on Varga, much less to issue an "implicit
directive," in predicting the economic demise of capitalism
is not convincing. Long before anyone began to take notice
of Stalin, Varga had already been publishing books and
articles "all of which could have carried the same title as
89
his first book, The Decline of Capitalism."
(Moreover,
Varga's resort to underconsumptionist explanations of capi
talism's decline long predates any hint of similar thinking
90
on Stalin's part).
Even at the fifth Comintern congress,
with Varga at his most cautious,

there was no indication

that he regarded a 'real' recovery as possible, or that he
saw the upturns then underway in a few countries as anything
91
other than "special" or exceptional.
E.H. Carr surmises
that at the time of the fifth congress Varga may not have
genuinely believed that the capitalist world was in such
dire straights as his own report suggested, and that the
report may have been "a compromise between Varga's profes
sional conscience and the need for a revolutionary platform
92
which would satisfy the Left."
This may, of course, be
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true.

I will not venture to speculate on Varga's state of

mind, although I have no objection to Carr's doing so. The
point remains that this

'Left* pressure had been brought to

bear on Varga long before any conceivable "implicit direc
tives" b£ Stalin, supposedly decreeing the third period,
could have made themselves felt.
Secondly, the supposition that contradictions internal
to the process of stabilization operate to undermine it does
not originate with Stalin, but with Bukharin.

In his first

tentative mention of stabilization (see above), Bukharin had
noted primarily political contradictions of stabilization—
capitalism could not be stabilized without a defeat of or
concessions by the working class, so that the consequence of
developing stabilization would be, as already noted, an
93
"inevitable... sharpening of the class struggle."
Subse
quent analyses of stabilization refer to the economic as
pects of contradictions as well. The common element in
failures to understand Bukharin's notion of stabilization
(and I do not deny that Bukharin's continued use of the
poorly chosen term contributed to clouding the issues) is
the refusal or inability to see that Bukharin was almost
certainly using 'stabilization' to refer only to the resump
tion of expanded reproduction in some of the capitalist
countries after the chaos of the war and the immediate
postwar period. There is no specific evidence in Bukharin's
own writings or speeches that he imagined the process of
stabilization to imply either a slackening of the contradic-
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tions of capitalism or a new era of unbridled prosperity as
envisioned by social democratic thinkers.
Now, it _i£5 true that for Stalin as well capitalist
stabilization was being undermined, but he expressed this
primarily in terms of the development of the ’other' stabi
lization, i . , that taking place in the Soviet Union.

In

May 1925, shortly after the fifth enlarged plenum of the
ECCI and Varga's introduction of stabilization to the Comin
tern, Stalin delivered a report to the Moscow party organi
zation on the work of the fourteenth conference of the
RCP(b).

Stalin opened the discussion of the international

situation by noting first a "lull" and then an "ebb" in the
revolutionary process. This development did not at all sig
nify, said Stalin, that the revolution has been "cancelled,"
because
we have not only the stabilization of capitalism; we also
have the stabilization of the Soviet system. Thus, we
have two stabilizations....
Who will win? That is the essence of the question. Why
are there two stabilizations, one parallel with the
other? Why are there two poles?.... Because the world has
split into two camps.... Because the international situa
tion will be to an increasing degree determined by the
relation of forces between these two camps.[94]
These are not just different modes of expression, but re
flections of quite divergent theoretical approaches. In the
next section, a review of the concrete political and econom
ic material will reveal that in the 1920s Stalin advocated a
politics that was both 'traditional'

(international give-

and-take diplomacy 'from above' rather than mass mobiliza
tion) and cautious. Pressure from the left was building in
the middle part of the decade, and Stalin ultimately acqui
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esced, but the turn to the left cane despite Stalin, not
because of him. This conclusion does not, of course,

imply

that the particular forms assumed by the politics of the
third period owed nothing to Stalin. Moreover, the intent
here is neither to absolve Stalin of any errors nor to
suggest that no errors were made. At the same time, however,
it might be interjected that from the theory that class
struggle is the motive force of history it does not neces
sarily follow that proletarian political objectives (at
least tactical ones) are only attainable through a poltics
which is directly class (mass) based. Stalin's resort to
'traditional* international diplomacy, therefore, did not by
definition preclude (as frequently seems to be assumed)
internationalist outcomes.
From the outset, Bukharin was careful to distinguish
his understanding of stabilization from that of the Second
International. In June 1925, speaking to a Komsomol (the
Russian communist youth organization) conference, Bukharin
attributed to the *Hilferding-Menshevik* conception of sta
bilization the view that
a new cycle of sounder capitalist development is begin
ning. In the most important capitalist countries, things
are again running on smooth lines,...the curve of capi
talist development is ascending and capitalism is as
suming new forms.[95]
By contrast, according to Bukharin, the Marxist understand
ing of stabilization meant "only...that in the course of
this epoch [the epoch of general capitalist decline— N.K.]
there will be periods of ebb and flow, periods of decay and
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96
periods of expansion of capitalism."

The general thrust of

Bukharin's discussion incorporated the views that capitalist
development will be cyclical even in the "epoch" of its
demise (similar to Trotsky’s contemporaneous opinions), that
any upturns would be of a temporary nature, and that the
cyclical expansions would be "variegated," _i.e., neither
universal nor uniform across regions or countries. One other
basic difference between the social democratic and the Marx
ist conceptions of stabilization was stressed by Bukharin:
in the Marxist view, stabilization did not imply the waning
of inter-imperialist rivalries (indeed, the likelihood of
inter-imperialist war was on the rise) and did not mitigate
the imperialist threat facing the Soviet Union.
Sounding similar themes in his opening speech at the
fifteenth conference of the Russian party in October 1926,
Bukharin noted that pre-war levels of output had been by and
large restored in the capitalist world as a whole, but that
within this average striking imbalances (<3 .g., as between
Europe and the U.S.A., or within Europe itself) remained.
Such unequal development had "already existed during the
normal period of capitalist development, but it has now...
increased to an extent entirely unknown before the war."
This implied that rather than abstract formulas regarding a
'stabilization in general', a "differentiated definition" of
stabilization was required, one that analyzed the particu97
larities and concrete differences between regions.
It was an error to believe, continued Bukharin, that
the restoration of pre-war levels of production signalled
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the resumption of "normal” capitalist development with its
"usual" cycles and crises— rather, a special analysis was
called for to understand the "unique crisis" of postwar
capitalism. Specifically, relatively slow rates of accumula
tion (coupled with grossly depressed working class living
standards) meant that market creation was not proceeding
apace, and that consequently "the problem of finding markets
has become the main question for the capitalist world of
today." The struggle for markets in turn implied even more
intense pressures to reduce costs of production— hence the
"process of capitalist rationalization." Rationalization
would entail efforts to cudgel the working class into fur
ther submission,

the development of new (more intensive)

forms of labor organization, and the introduction of new
productive technologies. Bukharin particularly lamented the
reluctance of many comrades to acknowledge that technologi
cal change was taking place— as opposed to merely the a la.
Taylor reorganization or more intensive use of existing
technologies--and catalogued a list of innovations in coal,
98
steel, potash, and chemical production.
Bukharin's associates were kept busy turning out ar
ticles to buttress the case. C.H. Wurm depicted 1926 as "The
Year of Rationalization in Germany," and like Bukharin con
tended that the "working class is beginning to understand
that the struggle against the effects of capitalist ration99
alization is necessary and inevitable."
V. Demar likewise
interpreted the Comintern line as urging intensification and
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radicalization of political activity, but expressed concern
100
over the apparent political lethargy of the unemployed.
Heckert,

by contrast, took note of a spate of strikes at the

Hamburg docks and thought he detected in this a rising tide
101
of working class activism.
A critical juncture in the development of the analysis
of stabilization and the deduction of political conclusions
took place in November 1926 at the seventh enlarged plenum
of the E C C I . Bukharin delivered keynote written and spoken
reports which, besides repeating his now familiar injunc
tions on the need for a differentiated, concrete analysis of
stabilization, ridiculed the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition for
their confusion. Leaving aside whatever shortcomings or
strengths the already defeated opposition’s arguments may
have revealed, and taking note of Bukharin's more comprehen
sive and organized discourse as compared to his earlier
somewhat casual presentations,

the (in retrospect) most

striking aspect of the report is Bukharin’s extraordinary
failure or inability to clearly demarcate his views from
those of the underconsumptionist approach.
Bukharin began with the well-founded proposition that
the distended unproductive consumption of the war effort,
while producing ’growth' for a period of time, ultimately
acted as a "brake" on the process of accumulation, and in
turn, market creation. As Bukharin pointed out, this was
essentially a reiteration of his opposition to the "incor
rect theoretical conceptions of Rosa Luxemburg, who...re
garded militarism as a form of capitalistic accumula221
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tion...."

At the same time, however, this framework pro

vided a plausible explanation of the economic relations
within Europe ("Balkanization") and between Europe and the
U.S.A (the former suffering a considerable setback relative
to the latter).
Bukharin moved on to specify the "unique" nature of the
European situation in the mid-1920s. In the course of the
"'normal1 crises of capitalist over-production....which
Marx, it will be remembered, connected with the investment
of basic capital" [_i

, disproportionality— N.K.],

the

unfolding of the "disproportion between production and con
sumption" took place "on the basis of the upward curve of
capitalist development." The disproportion of the 1920s,
which likewise found its expression in 'overproduction', was
nonetheless fundamentally different In that its roots ex
tended to "the shortage crises of under-production and un
derconsumption of the war epoch," _i.e. , to the breakdown of
103
accumulation engendered by the war.
(Bukharin's 1920
references to war-induced "expanded negative reproduction"
and its effects in his The Economics of the Transition
Period therefore very clearly and consistently prefigure the
104
1926 analysis).
Empirically, the "unique" character of
the crisis was expressed by "the absence of a regular peri
odical trend of the...economic situation [and by] the fever
ish curve on the economic chart...." The conclusion follows
that stabilization is "conditional, temporary and
105
unstable...."
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The contrast between Bukharin's approach and the underconsumptionist perspective of Varga was rarely more apparent
or nore overlooked than in Varga’s comments at the plenum.
Varga, like Bukharin,

specified a crisis of "overproduc

tion," but added for good measure "a chronic mass unemploy
ment, a chronic shutting down of the means of production."
Although Varga listed several postwar "structural changes"
(the emergence of the Soviet Union, the intensification of
colonial struggles for national liberation, and the economic
decline of Western Europe) which led the 1920s overproduc
tion crisis to display some specific features, its ultimate
causes stemmed from a tendency to underconsumption "always"
present under capitalism, one which "results from two basic
facts that are inseparably bound up with capitalism." These
"facts" were (i) the continual 'striving* of the capitalist
class to increase the rate of surplus value, "whereby the
purchasing power of the proletariat is weakened," and which
comes into conflict with (ii), the tendency (forced by
"competition") to increase "productive capacity" without
106
limit.
The presentation of Bukharin, said Varga, had provided
"explanations which are inadequate because they establish
only the fact [of overproduction— N.K.] without providing a
class-based explanation of the narrowing of the domestic
market." Such a "class-based explanation" would center,
continued Varga, on the two facts listed above while at the
same time incorporating the 'special features' of the post
war situation, these being the reduction of effective demand
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stemming from the expropriation of the petty bourgeoisie and
small capitalists due to inflation, and the virtual disap
pearance of the rentier from the European scene.
argument,

It was this

according to Varga, which distinguished the Marx

ist from the social democratic analysis of overproduction.
The social democrats "stupidly" suggested that the problem
be resolved by raising wages, which the capitalists would
never agree to; even if they did, and the "wage increase was
linked to an increase in productivity of the work force [why
this would necessarily be so was not explained--!!.K.], one
107
would not escape the vicious circle."
As noted, it is remarkable that Bukharin either kept
silent or took no notice of the gulf separating these con
ceptions.

In his reply to the discussion of his speech,

Bukharin did not address Varga's remarks, and indeed men
tioned Varga's name only once (as someone familiar with the
difficulties of compiling data on international trade).
Apart from a rather inconclusive digression on the need to
distinguish the value of the means of production from their
material-technical aspect, and a reply to V. Lominadze, who
had suggested the logical impossibility of overproduction
becuse idled machinery was tantamount to no machinery at all
(i^«3., it should not be counted as part of the "productive
apparatus"), Bukharin had little to say on the theoretical
108
aspects of the stabilization question.
It was also at the seventh enlarged plenum that another
fated expression entered Comintern discourse for the first
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time— the "third period" was at hand, it was said, in antic
ipation of which the task of the communist parties was "to
mobilize the proletariat in preparation for the impending
109
battles."
The term appeared at the plenum in Bukharin1s
spoken report. At the fifteenth congress of the Russian
party in December 1927 Bukharin again described the class
struggle as having entered "a new period...on the basis of
the development of internal contradictions arising from
110
stabilization."
Virtually the entire extant literature on
the Communist International overlooks these first indica111

tions of the third period.
The predilection to see Stalin as the founder of the
third period, and to regard the left turn as merely a tactic
in his coming campaign against the right deviation,

is so

pervasive that it has become virtually impossible to discern
the origins of the new line as stemming from the Comintern
analysis of capitalism. Even Theodore Draper, who so thor
oughly chronicles the accumulation of errors in histories of
the period, in the final instance mistakenly roots the
explanation of the turn to the left in the struggle within
the Russian party. Draper suggests that Bukharin, by speak
ing of "stabilization [as] forming the basis of acuter class
antagonisms....was able to have his cake (capitalist stabi
lization) and eat it too (sharper class struggles)." This
conclusion by Bukharin,

in Draper’s view, was drawn only as

a consequence of the campaign against the left (Trotsky Zinoviev) opposition and Bukharin’s reluctance "to be put in
the position of backing a right-wing line against a left225

wing one." In other words, Draper insists that Bukharin did
not really believe that the growth of stabilization entailed
also the growth of its internal contradictions, but only
112

said so in order "to have his cake and eat it too."
This claim, however, is not sustained by the historical
record. First, Bukharin’s analysis of stabilization incor
porated an analysis of its internal contradictions from the
start (i^.e,. , the first mention of stabilization by Bukharin
at the Russian party’s 1924 congress). Second, Bukharin
expanded and developed the analysis of the contradictions of
stabilization long after the defeat of the opposition (which
can be quite conservatively dated with Trotsky's formal
expulsion from the party in December 1927). And finally, on
the basis of his own analysis, Bukharin explicitly insisted
on the existence of a "change in the situation," calling for
113
a "new tactical line."
This conclusion originated with Bukharin as well: the
most successful and comprehensive "accomplishments" of capi
talist stabilization were to be found together with the most
acute expressions of the contradictions of stabilization.
The empirical material for these views was obtained from
Bukharin’s observation of (primarily) Germany, the 'case
114
study' of stabilization.
Perhaps even more significant
than the coining of the term itself, the 'catastrophist1
outlook so often associated with the third period, and so
seemingly impossible to attribute to the eminently reason
able and respectable Bukharin, in truth emerged for the
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first time in Bukharin1s comments at the seventh enlarged
plenum on the culpability of social democracy in the "prepa115

ration of even more horrible,

even more grandiose wars."

Bukharin similarly depicted the contradictions of stabiliza
tion as "leading inevitably to a c a t a s t r o p h e t h e

'second

round of war'," at the Russian party's fifteenth
1 16
congress.
At the same party congress,

in his political report,

Stalin was pointing to "production in the capitalist coun
tries [which] has transcended the pre-war level," in some
cases "leaping forward," and "to technical progress, ration
alization of capitalist industry, creation of new indus
tries...." Such advances were being undermined, however, "by
the fact that production is growing, that technical progress
and production potentialities are increasing, whereas the
world market, the limits of that market... remain more or
117
less stable...."
Stalin also remarked on the "preparation
of new imperialist wars," but this and other similar com
ments neither prefigured nor went further than Bukharin’s
118
assessment.
The recognition of "a rapid increase in production" in
some capitalist countries came to Varga rather belatedly,
only in 1928. The growth of output, admitted Varga, stemmed
from higher intensity and productivity of labor, but he was
not greatly impressed by technological progress other than
that taking place in the generation of electricity and in
the chemicals industry. Aside from the latter two cases,
Varga claimed not to see much in the way of "fundamentally
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new processe[s]" and maintained that most "innovations are
on old lines.... The great changes have not taken place in
machinery, but in the organization of labor within the
119
factory."
The upshot of this was an aggravation of the
"contradiction between possibilities of production and sale"
stemming from the "reduced number of productive
120
workers ..."
This was among the earliest appearances of *Varga*s
Law' , i_.£. , the notion that under conditions of advanced
capitalism accumulation entails an absolute decline in the
number of productive workers and thereby exacerbates the
market problem (by reducing working class purchasing power).
Note that Varga does not mention the possibility of increas
ing employment of unproductive workers, whose wages are paid
out of surplus value (rather than variable capital). Rather,
the prospect for displaced workers, according to Varga, was
no employment at all: "[W]e today see the development of a
structural unemployment, a growing army of unemployed, espe121

cially in the most advanced capitalist countries."
Varga could point to high (and/or rising) unemployment
rates in certain countries to bolster his arguments. Unem
ployment in Great Britain was of course high throughout the
1920s (due at least in some measure to deliberate deflation
ary policies intended to restore the prewar gold parity of
the English currency). Implicitly, Varga treated the British
122
situation as confirmation of his arguments.
Likewise,
rising unemployment In Germany, the ’showcase' of capitalist
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rationalization, squared nicely with ’Varga's Law'.
At the sixth congress of the Comintern (July 1928),
Bukharin was the preponderant personality:

he delivered the

opening report of the E C C I , responded to the discussion of
the report, chronicled the work of the commission drawing up
a Comintern Programme, and delivered a major commentary on
the ensuing debate.

In his opening report, Bukharin de

scribed the third period as "the period of capitalist recon
struction," characterized by a "growth of the productive
124
forces."
Richard Day siezes on these remarks to imply
that Bukharin thereby envisioned "capitalism's longevity,"
but Day stops short of quoting the remainder of the para
graph, in which Bukharin links the "progress" of capitalism
in the third period to "the growth of forces hostile to
capitalism and [to] the extremely rapid development of its
125
inherent contradictions."
The leitmotiv of the report,
contrary to Day's needlessly sarcastic intimation, is that
the
new lines [of capitalist development] in their turn cause
all the contradictions of capitalism to become more in
tensified. This intensification of contradictions in turn
leads to the great collapse, to the final catastro
phe .[ 126]
Bukharin did argue against the view that the necessary
expression of the contradictions of stabilization was a
univocal collapse (or "decay") of capitalism in all nations
along the lines of the underconsumptionist scenario. He
maintained that the undermining of stabilization was ap
parent
not because capitalism in every country is declining, but

because the structural changes that have occured in world
economy are creating a new situation and are inexorably
leading to the collapse of the whole system.[127]
These contradictions were not only

’external' ones, Bukharin

was not implying (as many of his present-day critics charge)
that the contradictions exist only as between States and
that the contradictions in each given imperialist country
are not becoming sharper.... Partial stabilization is a
two-sided process. On the one hand there is a certain
technico-economical consolidation of capitalism, and on
the other— which must not be left out of sight—
contradictions grow, the class struggle becomes more
acute, unemployment increases.[128]
Perhaps this theme was most clearly expressed by
Bukharin in his reply to the discussion of the initial
report.

In a somewhat exasperated response to Kostrjeva

(Poland), who argued that the appropriate "line of demarca
tion that is drawn between the second and third period is
not the line of technical progress,

[but]....the contradic

tions which accumulated on the basis of the stabilization
process....," Bukharin asked: "Not technical development,
but contradictions! But where do these contradictions come
129
from?"
Varga also participated in the discussion of Bukharin's
report, and made the more extreme claim that any increases
in output in the capitalist countries stemmed exclusively
from an intensification of labor; "the productivity of
labor— or what is the same thing, the productivity of the
130
equipment set in motion by labor— remains unchanged."
Additionally, Varga took this opportunity to deny that he
maintained the "theoretical" impossibility of realization in
a fully capitalist economy as argued by Luxemburg. His
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concern, said Varga, was with a specific "historical proc
ess," namely the transformation of "independent producers
into elements of capitalist economy," which had almost ex
hausted itself in the United States and had exhausted itself
in England. The "impulse” for the expansion of the market
which this process provided was obviously non-recurring, and
so henceforth the market would only grow very slowly, if at
all, whereas output would continue to increase with the
continually rising intensity of labor. The final result, as
Varga had argued before, would necessarily be the emergence
of a "structural unemployment" that was independent of the
"conjuncture" (stage of the business cycle). The level of
unemployment "increasingly ceases to be an indication of the
131
conjuncture."
It is certainly true that Luxemburg's posing of the
problem differed from Varga's. For Luxemburg,
drawing 'third parties'

the process of

into the capitalist sphere, precise

ly by eliminating the 'external' source of demand, would
aggravate the realization problem. By contrast, Varga argued
that it was this very same "historical process" which was
responsible for a rapid but non-recurring expansion of ef
fective demand. Both arguments are nonetheless varieties of
underconsumption theories insofar as both maintained that a
'developed' or 'pure' capitalist system must experience a
chronic crisis of realization ultimately causing the system
to literally 'collapse'

(Luxemburg) or remain mired in a

state of permanent stagnation until it was overthrown
(Varga).

It is thus no accident that Varga, as he became
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increasingly concerned to avoid being linked with Luxemburg,
fastened onto the notion of 'decay* and the argument that an
advanced capitalism must be 'moribund*, despite the fact
that these ideas played no necessary theoretical role in his
system.
From a theoretical standpoint, Bukharin’s reply to the
discussion was notable for his assessment of 'Varga's Law'.
Although he defended (against Lominadze) Varga’s empirical
claim3of an absolute decline in the number of industrial
workers in the United States,

Bukharin maintained that Varga

was "wrong to advance a new ’natural law* of capitalism at
this time." Rather, it was necessary to distinguish the
"various processes giving rise to unemployment," viz., cy
clical factors in addition to the effects of rationalization
and technical progress. It was premature, there was Inade
quate "empirical material," to provide "generalizations"
such as Varga's, although to speak merely of certain con132
crete "facts" was another matter.
More to the point, Bukharin disputed Varga's grounding
of his ’Law* in the proposition "that the internal possibil
ities of American imperialism have been ’exhausted'," a
proposition that Bukharin claimed was "wrong," it was "the
Luxemburg theory." An unidentified "Voice" from the floor
here interjected: "This is what Varga said!" Bukharin re
sponded that "Yes, Varga said it but I disagree with Varga
on this point. It is wrong, it is a reiteration of Rosa
133
Luxemburg's theory."
Note the ambiguity of the interjec-
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tion.

It is not obvious whether the 'this* that Varga was

supposed to have said referred to the depletion of the
"internal possibilities'* of U.S. capitalism, or to his fre
quent repudiations of Luxemburg!sm. Bukharin's response
clearly indicates that he understood the interjection as
referring to Varga's underconsumption argument, and as such
Bukharin merely reiterated his belief that accumulation did
not depend on 'external* sources of demand. Varga had an
other opportunity to speak after this incident, but made no
mention of it and only repeated his claim that the expansion
of the market as a result of proletarianization was a one134
time event.
'Rottenness*, as already argued, was imagery without
theory. Varga succeeded in implanting this imagery in a
highly receptive Comintern, where the absence of a coherent
and explicit theoretical framework allowed the pseudo
concept to acquire an apparent profundity. Decay, by its
nature, is an irreversible process, without

'contradic

tions' . As such, Bukharin's conceptualization of stabiliza
tion as self-limiting growth (this was precisely the strong
point of his approach) was no longer sustainable. Once
accepted, the logic of decay would allow of nothing else
(except decay). Bukharin intuitively understood this, and
suggested that there was "a tendency in our ranks to overes135
timate the so-called parasitic aspect of capitalism."
But
his objections were not strenuous, and in any case Bukha
rin's increasingly precarious position in the Russian party
and the Comintern made his views suspect.
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By the time of the July 1929 tenth enlarged plenum of
the ECCI, which relieved Bukharin of all Comintern posts,
the principal report delivered by 0. Kuusinen warned of the
"overestination of the technical development of capital136
ism."
In the epoch of decay, said Kuusinen, technical
progress is not necessarily what it appears to be:
Big technical inventions are made which do not prove of
special economic value at once, or even at all. For
instance, radio, aircraft and some (not all) chemical
discoveries, important in themselves, are for the time
being of relatively small economic importance. Only the
viewpoint of the development of the productive power of
labor can be a decisive criterion.[137]
Of the latter, Kuusinen claimed to see no evidence— the
"true sense" of capitalist rationalization was the intensi
fication of labor, not the increase in labor productivi138
ty.
This was not among Kuusinen 's more acute insights.
Ironically, Varga's theory for a time ran afoul of
'decay' as well. Rationalization, declared Kuusinen, neces
sarily "brings with it an absolute worsening of the position
139
of the working class."
Varga had allowed for the possi
bility that intensification of labor could be accompanied by
a rising real wage (this was evidently the conclusion he
drew from his observation of Fordism), but Kuusinen argued
that this conception of the standard of living was too
"narrow." The correct conception was that the detrimental
effects of intensification so greatly outweighed the bene
fits afforded by a higher real wage that "the standard of
living is not rising in reality."
The full-blown 'theory of decay' also provided its own
version of the necessity of capitalist collapse. Kuusinen
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s ai d:
I do not know if I an mistaken when I assume that 'the
tendency of the decreasing number of workers’ brought
forward by Comrade Varga contains the germ of a new
theory of the gradual decay of capitalism. The desire to
find a consistent, unequivocal and terse economic motivisation [sic] of the economic collapse of capitalism is a
perfectly legitimate desire.[140]
But 'Varga's Law', continued Kuusinen, was unnecessary for
such a purpose, as Marx himself had already provided "the
general law which applies to the capitalist as well as to
the older modes of production." All that needed to be said
was that the existing (capitalist) relations of production
had become a fetter on the development of the forces of
production (!_.©,. » capitalism had become 'rotten'). "Now is
the time that Marx has predicted. The monopoly of capital
141
has 'become a fetter upon the mode of production....'"
In the setting of the third period and the correspond
ing turn to the left, acceptance of the 'theory of decay'
naturally produced effects on the forms adopted by the
Comintern's political practice--these will be more fully
explored in the following subheading. But in order to accom
plish this exploration in a rational manner, it has first
been necessary to distinguish the claim (advanced here) that
the 'theory of decay'

influenced the forms of political

practice, from the claim (e.g., by Claudin) that the 'theory
of decay' caused or led to the notion of the third pe142
riod.
The latter conception is no more correct than the
widely held view, already discussed, which attributes the
origins of the third period to Stalin or to the Soviet
domestic situation.
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P. The Communist International:
Theses, Resolutions, and Conjunctures
Bourgeois writers frequently launch their crusades
against communism by (quite suddenly) adopting a rather
positive view of the Socialist International, and favorably
comparing the congresses of the pre-war organization to the
143
unrepresentative founding congress of the Comintern.
No
doubt it is easy for hostile critics to complain of the
haste in convening the Communist International, but the
situation was undeniably urgent:
1. Allied military intervention against Soviet Russia
began in April 1918 and expanded throughout June and August.
2. In Germany, after the resignation of dictator Gener
al Erich Ludendorff (September 1918) and the collapse of the
subsequent effort to establish a parliamentary monarchy,
state power was in the grasp of German socialists. From 10.
November 1918 until 19. January 1919, a coalition of SPD and
USPD People's Commissars (Karl Liebknecht at first refused
to be seated as representative of the Spartakus League)
144
proclaimed socialism to be on the agenda.
This changed
quickly when a falling out between the SPD and USPD led to a
confrontation and the establishment of a Revolutionary Com
mittee (this time including Liebknecht, and representatives
of the USPD and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards) ostensibly
committed to the overthrow of the SPD Commissars. Masses of
armed workers were in the streets, but the Committee de
layed. After several days, the revolutionary energy of the
workers dissipated, at which point the Committee inexplica
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bly ’acted' by decreeing the SPD government to be "over
thrown." Seeing its opportunity,

the regime instructed SPD

stalwart Gustav Hoske to "restore order", which Noske under
took by calling on a the-called Free Corps led by former
145
imperial officers.
As might be expected, these latter took
to their task with relish— among many others, Rosa Luxemburg
and Karl Liebknecht were killed. On 19. January the 'social
ist* Commissars relenquished power to a constituent assem
bly, the elections for which were boycotted (over Luxem
burg's objections) by the recently formed ICommunistische
146
Partei Deutschlands, the K P D .
The assembly quickly moved
to establish a bourgeois parliamentary regime.
3. Even as the first congress of the Comintern was in
session, revolution was breaking out in Hungary and Bavaria.
By 21. March 1919, a Hungarian Soviet government came to
power following the resignation of provisional President
Count Michael Karolyi in favor of a communist/social demo
cratic workers' coalition. This revolutionary government
collapsed on 1. August 1919, following an ultimatum by the
Allied Powers and military intervention by Czech, Serbian,
and Rumanian troops.

In Bavaria, following strikes and

street battles since late February, a Soviet Republic was
proclaimed on 7. April 1919 by a group of social democrats.
Communists joined the government after the mutiny of the
Muenich military garrison, but the regime was militarily
overthrown on 1. May 1919.
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First Congress of the Communist International
March 1919
The invitation to the first congress (drafted by
Trotsky) emphasized the need to distinguish the revolution
ary parties and tendencies of the working class movement
front reformist ones. It declared that the "present epoch is
the epoch of the disintegration and collapse of the entire
capitalist world system," and that the tasks of the revolu
tionary proletariat were immediate "seizure of State power"
and the replacement of the bourgeois state with the dicta
torship of the working class. The proletarian dictatorship
was defined as consisting of the "destruction of the state
apparatus of the bourgeoisie," the replacement of this appa
ratus by specifically proletarian organs of self-government
(i..e* , the soviets— simultaneously legislative and execu
tive), and the abolition of private property in the means of
147
production.
As to the "right-wing" (social-chauvinist) and "center"
(e.g., Kautsky) tendencies of the working class movement, it
was said that the correct attitude toward the former was
"unrelenting struggle," while the latter should be subjected
to "the tactics of splitting off the revolutionary elements,
148
and unsparing criticism and exposure of the leaders."
The
invitation was issued specifically to some thirty-nine "par
ties, groups,

and trends," and generally to any party which

accepted the propositions outlined in the document.
The platform (drafted by Bukharin) ultimately adopted
by the congress essentially repeated the major points of the
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invitation with regard to tactics and objectives. Two novel
items, however, merit attention. First, in a preamble to the
platform,

the "epoch of the dissolution of capitalism" was

conceived as the culmination of a historical process in
which (i) " [c]apitalism tried to overcome its own anarchy by
organizing production" at the national level;

(ii) although

"[m]onopoly took the place of free competition [and i]nsane
anarchy was replaced by organization" within each of the
leading capitalist countries,

"the anarchy in world economy

grew ever sharper" in the form of the "struggle between the
largest organized robber states....";

(iii) the proletariat

in the advanced countries was "corrupted" by the bourgeoisie
"[a]t the expense of the plundered colonial peoples...,";
and finally,

(iv)

the same method of steady corruption which created the
patriotism of the working class and its moral submission
was changed by the war into its opposite. Physical anni
hilation, the complete enslavement of the proletariat,
tremendous oppression, impoverishment and deterioration,
world famine— these were the final fruits of civil peace.
It broke down. The imperialist war changed into civil
w a r .[149]
In his greeting to the first congress, and in his
concluding statement, Lenin was as optimistic as the others
regarding the prospect of revolution in Europe. Nonetheless,
he generally avoided, without explicitly criticizing or com
menting on, the language of Trotsky ("disintegration and
150
collapse") and Bukharin ("chaos").
It is tempting to
emphasize these divergent modes of expression, and to as
cribe great import to the difference in semantics. For some,
the temptation becomes all the stronger when they examine
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the accounts of the second Comintern congress, where Lenin
did indeed comment unfavorably on the imagery of the osten
sibly

'insoluble’ crisis of capitalism. For now, it is

sufficient to note that at the first congress, Lenin did not
mention the choice of terminology. Furthermore, it will be
argued shortly that it is all too easy to fasten onto
Lenin's later comments, and to provide them an interpreta
tion which is quite mistaken.
Another aspect of the program worth mentioning concern
ed the anticipated pace of the nationalization and sociali
zation of production under the proletarian dictatorship. The
program envisioned fairly rapid nationalization "of the big
banks,...[the] syndicates and trusts, and of those branches
of industry in which the concentration and centralization of
capital makes this technically feasible." As regards smaller
industrial concerns, "the proletariat must gradually amal
gamate them by ways appropriate to their size"; the smallest
properties "will not be expropriated" at all, and will be
"gradually drawn into socialist organization by example, by
the practical demonstration of the advantages following from
151
the new regime...."
These relatively moderate and pragmatic proposals stand
in sharp contrast to much of the prevailing wisdom which
views the period as one of unbridled 'radicalism’ (all the
more so because it coincides with the onset of war communism
152
in Soviet Russia).
Granted, the 'ultra-left' first cong
ress of the Comintern may have overestimated the prospects
for revolution in Europe (in truth, they merely underesti
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mated the lengths to which social-democracy would go to
thwart the revolution), but this 'ultra-leftism' most cer
tainly did not extend to utopian visions of the immediate
post-revolutionary period.

Insofar as heroic illusions e-

merged over the course of the war communist epoch, these are
properly regarded not as an antecedently formulated 'High
Road to Communism', but as after-the-fact theorizations of
desperate ad hoc measures in response to desperate (civil
153
war and foreign intervention) circumstances.
Apart from the above, one other natter of substance
emerged at the first congress, and this concerned the argu
ment of the KPD that the founding of the Comintern was
premature. Basing itself on the late Rosa Luxemburg's organ
izational directives,

the KPD mandated its delegates (Eugen

Levine and Hugo Eberlein) to vote against forming an Inter
national on the grounds that the communist movement (at
least outside the Soviet republic) lacked any national par154
ties with a mass base.
As it happened, Levine was arrested
at the German border and never reached Moscow, while Eber
lein was swayed by an Austrian delegate and abstained (rath
er than casting a negative ballot) on the vote founding the
Comintern.
*

*

*

Despite the setbacks and defeats suffered by revolu
tionary uprisings outside Russia, optimism regarding the
prospects of world revolution continued to prevail.
1. Hopes for a revolutionary resurgence in Germany had
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been heightened by the rapid defeat of the Kapp putsch
(March 1920). Troops under the command of General von
Luttwitz had driven the Y/eimar government out of Berlin (an
easy task, insofar as the Reichswehr refused to come to the
aid of 'its* government), and installed a reactionary regime
under Wolfgang Kapp. This government, however, quickly col
lapsed under pressure of a massive general strike called by
the trade union federation and supported by communist rank
and file. The KPD leadership opposed the strike on the
grounds that it was not the proletariat’s task to defend a
bourgeois republic (also, they were still likely inclined to
caution after the disaster of January 1919); the EC C I,
however, was enthusiastic about the developments because the
"German workers have got arms, that is the chief
155
thing....”
The Kapp coup d' etat lasted only five days,
and once again, given the disarray into which the Weimar
coalition had fallen, a worker’s government in Germany was a
real possibility. Karl Legien, a trade union leader, called
for the formation of a labor government (as opposed to
either a coalition with bourgeois parties or a revolutionary
soviet republic). Since this would not have been a bourgeois
government,

the KPD agreed to participate as a loyal opposi

tion, but bickering within USPD ranks allowed the Weimar
regime, in spite of itself, to maintain a tenuous hold on
156
power.
The chance for a non-capitalist, much less revolu
tionary socialist, government once again slipped from the
very grasp of those who professed to be struggling for the
transformation of bourgeois society.
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2. In April 1920, nationalist Polish forces under the
reactionary-masquerading-as-socialist Marshal Josef
Pilsudski invaded Soviet Russia with an army of half a
million, and succeeded in capturing Kiev by May. Within only
a few weeks, the Red Army under General Mikhail Tukhachevsky
liberated Kiev, drove Pilsudski out of the Ukraine, and
entered Poland. Pilsudski's request for armistice negotia
tions was rejected, and the Red Army approached the gates of
Warsaw by July.
3. The civil war in Soviet Russia was essentially over,
soviet power was being consolidated, and the allied military
blockade against the regime had been lifted.
Second Congress of the Communist International
July-August 1920
As if to appease subsequent critics, representation at
the second congress was considerably broader than at the
first, and this change found reflection in the fact that the
serious organizational work of the Comintern only began with
the 1920 congress. Over 200 delegates from 41 countries were
in attendance, either as full member delegates or observers
with consultative status. The SFIO and USPD found themselves
in the latter category, although within a few months of the
Congress, the majority of both the French socialists and
German independents voted to formally affiliate with the
Third International, causing splits in both parties. With
the affiliation of the revolutionary sections of German and
French socialism, the Comintern’s membership came to include
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several mass political parties: the Russian, of course, also
157
the Italian Socialist Party,
the Norwegian Labor Party,
and now the French and German Communist Parties.
On the opening day of the second congress, Lenin pres
ented a draft document which was ultimately adopted as the
"Theses on the Basic Tasks of the Communist Internation158
a l ."
Lenin introduced the draft theses in his "Report on
the International Situation," and explicitly noted that they
159
contained "nothing that is materially new."
After elabo
rating on the notions of proletarian dictatorship and soviet
power, Lenin turned to a brief discussion of the problem of
internationalism.
As in the concurrent preface to the 1920 edition of
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, in his speech
Lenin tied the existence of an opportunist and nationalchauvinist "labor aristocracy" to the "sop" obtained from
160
the exploitation of the colonies.
In his comments to the
congress, however,

the theme was further developed and began

to incorporate the notions (i) that revolutionary European
and American socialists will find It more difficult "to get
rid of this disease" than Russian socialists did, on account
of the much more weakly developed material basis of oppor
tunism in backward Russia;

(il) that the "treatment of this

disease" will require deeper, more profound splits in the
161
working class movement than previously thought;
(iii) and
perhaps most interestingly, that the smashing of imperialism
(and, presumably,

the final defeat of the opportunist labor

aristocracy) may hinge on
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a union between revolutionary proletarians of the capi
talist, advanced countries, and the revolutionary masses
[i..£., not necesarily proletarian— N.K.] of ... colonial,
Eastern countries.... World imperialism shall fall when
the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited workers in
each country...merges with the revolutionary onslaught of
hundreds of millions [of exploited persons in the
colonies].[162]
This is a striking statement,

interesting for a number

of reasons. Firstly, it reflects what in 1920 represented
for Lenin a novel political position--revolutionary interna
tionalism was becoming as much identified,

in L e n i n ’s new

thinking, with the political solidarity of workers in the
developed countries and the oppresed masses of the colonies,
as it was previously (during World War I) identified with
proletarian attitudes to the imperialist war, i_.e.. , as an
aspect of the politics internal to the advanced social
formation. The passage quoted above serves as one of the
earliest indications of this theme, which would take on
increasing importance during L e n i n ’s few remaining years.
Despite this change of outlook, note what remains the same
as before: merely the shared experience of being oppressed
by imperialism and threatened by inter-imperialist war did
not provide assurances that the ’’union" between colonial
toilers and European workers would simply be a condition
which they found imposed upon themselves by ’blind’ forces.
Rather, ” [i]t is on ourselves that the consolidation of
163
unity depends.”
Once again, the concrete situation is
regarded as the particular set of constraints within which
political intervention takes place, and hence the analysis
reveals both the possibilities and the limits of what polit24 5

ical intervention can accomplish.
Secondly, Lenin’s emergent

'third worldisn' raises the

question of the relationship between his and Luxemburg’s
theoretical views. For the latter, of course, the colonies
were the ’non-capitalist areas’ without which capitalism
ostensibly could not exist, and her The Accumulation of
Capital consequently accorded them explicit theoretical and
empirical consideration. As already noted in the previous
chapter, given the theoretical centrality of the colonial
regions to her analysis, Luxemburg’s subsequent discussion
of their place in the revolutionary process was disappoint
ingly brief and vague. But the real difficulty in Luxem
burg's analysis had been that the socialist revolution in
the developed nations was simply ’there’, erected by the
analysis itself as its own result. Luxemburg was not a
fatalist, naturally she Icnew that revolutions did not just
'happen', and this was central to her life and thought as an
activist. But she had failed to pose the question of the
revolution as a theoretical problem for investigation in the
sense that its failure to occur had to and could only be
ascribed to betrayal by the leaders— there was literally no
room in the analysis for anything else.
Lenin, upon first reading Luxemburg's Accumulation,
thought that her graphic accounts of the brutal conditions
164
in the colonies were "noisy, colorful and meaningless."
Naturally, Lenin knew that the colonies were an intrinsic
and important aspect of the question of imperialism, and
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indeed the colonies were where the capital went when it was
exported and where the ’super-profits* cane from when they
were brought back. But he had failed to pose the theoretical
problem of the colonies in the sense that for hin they were
merely ’there’, being partitioned and re-partitioned. At
that time, the (re-)partitioning of the world was interest
ing for Lenin neither because of the implications for rela
tions between colonial masses and European workers, nor
because of what the 'non-capitalist areas’ spelled for the
existence of capitalism per se (Luxemburg’s problem). The
latter two topics were ruled out as areas of inquiry in the
course of posing the main question, v iz ., the significance
of the (re-)partitioning of the world for the contradictions
which it continually created between the ruling classes and
the proletariats of the imperialist nations. However well or
poorly, the question of the European revolution was being
posed as a theoretical as well as a concrete, practical
problem. The political conclusions which flowed from the
analysis included the well-known 'weakest link* hypothesis,
the strategy of defeatism,

etc.

Nonetheless, as evidenced by the passage on the coming
revolutionary "union," by 1920 Lenin was beginning to think
seriously about political relations between classes in the
developed capitalist countries and the 'periphery'. This
'third worldism* did not stem from any convergence of
Lenin's theoretical approach with that of Luxemburg, as
there is not a shred of evidence that late in his life Lenin
appreciated the underconsumption argument any more than he
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had earlier (recall the discussion on pp.

120-136 above).

Neither was Lenin's interest in the colonies merely the
expression of a political ploy "by Marxists, especially the
Bolsheviks, for allies against the powerful centres of capi165
talist state power."
That explanation might be plausible
if Lenin (and the Bolsheviks generally) had waited until
1922 or later, by which time it was fairly clear that the
moment for the European revolution had passed, before ex
pressing an interest in the revolutionary possibilities in
the colonies. But Lenin was speaking of the "union" with
colonial revolutionaries in July 1920, and in September of
that year the Comintern organized the Baku Conference of the
Peoples of the East, an effort to aid in the organization of
revolutionary movements in Asia. Both of these events came
long before there was any sign of a 'turn to the right' in
Third International politics. The point is that an apprecia
tion of revolutionary prospects in colonial areas was not
simply an ad hoc tactic which "Marxists, especially the
Bolsheviks," cast about for once the hopes for revolution in
Europe dissipated.
There is a sense, however, in which the treatment of
the colonial question was indeed ad hoc, and this has al
ready been hinted at above. The 'colonial areas* were pres
ent in Lenin's Imperialism, but they were never objects of
systematic theoretical scrutiny. At best, passing references
to higher rates of profit, without further explanation,
sufficed to establish the relevance of the colonles--they

248

were merely the destination of capital exports and the
sources of 'super profits'.

In many respects, this treatment

was adequate; more precisely, given Lenin's primary concerns
during the conjuncture of World War I, this poor theoretical
grounding was not so inadequate as to prevent serviceable
political deductions on matters of greatest urgency.
A failure to rigorously conceptualize the nature of the
links between social classes in developed and developing
regions did not prevent Imperialism from being a suitable
guide to action during World War I and the onset of the
revolutionary struggle. However, such an analytical gap
could not but make its presence felt when Lenin and the
others began to employ the framework of Imperialism to
understand the politics and economics of the 'periphery'. To
compound the difficulty, this theoretical gap was not per
ceived , and work proceeded as i

the gap was not there. Such

an oversight is not surprising, since the colonies did
appear throughout the discussion. But it is one thing to
'appear', or to be 'discussed', and quite another to be an
166
object of scientific investigation.
Pointing these things
out is not Intended to suggest that Lenin or anyone else was
a theoretical ignoramus, for they were not. Rather, the
object is to allow the benefits of hindsight to be of as
sistance in coming to grips with the very difficult task of
understanding the theoretical conditions of the "concrete
analysis of a concrete situation."
Among the effects of the failure to take note of the
theoretical void in Imperialism and to fully rectify matters
249

has been the continual reproduction of the weakest aspect of
the book--the empirical dimension of capital export and
167
finance.
Perhaps even more serious consequences followed
upon the effort (by Lenin to a certain extent, but especial
ly by his followers) to grasp at concepts in order to fill
this theoretical gap, either because the dearth was intui
tively felt or because it simply came to be filled by de
fault. In this regard, the ill-developed notion of a "mori
bund" capitalism performed a real disservice. Given the lack
of an adequate theoretical grounding of the social and
economic links between the imperialist nations and the colo
nies, the empty space came to be occupied by the pseudo
theory of an "overripe" capitalism, which seemed suitable
(and continues to seem so) precisely because it apparently
had something to say (e.g., capital export and its effects)
about both developed countries and the developing regions.
It is much easier to add two poorly developed concepts
together and arrive at a third, and to be deluded into
thinking that thereby progress has been made,

than it is to

force vague notions, little more than metaphors or unsorted
observations,

to ’fit' within a coherent, well-developed

theoretical system.
The political effect of grafting the idea of an "over
ripe" capitalism onto a fledgling theory of imperialism
became the tendency to overestimate the revolutionary poten
tialities of 'anti-imperialist* movements in the colonies,
specifically the movements of the national or colonial bour-
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geoisie. Although the overzealous pursuit of alliances with
’anti-imperialist* national bourgeoisies led to disastrous
results only after the mid-1920s,

the origins of these

efforts can be traced back at least in part

to Lenin's
168

initiatives at the second Comintern congress.
Lenin arrived at the congress with a set of "Prelimi
nary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" to
be submitted for discussion. The text called for "the
closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the national
and colonial liberation movements" with the aim of fighting
for a worldwide federation to be followed by "the complete
169
unity of the working people of different nations."
In
"the more backward states and nations," Lenin first of all
pressed the need to "assist the bourgeois-democratic libera
tion movement," and only secondarily to carry on a struggle
170
against religious and/or medieval elements.
Although
vague enough to be (subsequently) interpreted in a fairly
'nationalist* manner, these arguments were strongly quali
fied by Lenin. Specifically, he warned against giving a
"communist coloring to bourgeois-democratic liberation
trends," and argued that while it was necessary for the
Comintern to enter into "temporary alliance with bourgeois
democracy," communist forces "should not merge with it, and
should under all circumstances uphold the independence of
the proletarian movement even if it is in its most embryonic
171
form."
Even with the qualifications listed by Lenin,

the

theses as written raised objections from some Asian dele251

gates to the congress. Sultan Zadeh of Persia, and especial
ly the Indian delegate I.Ianabendra Nath Roy, warned against
the danger of allowing proletarian movements in the colo
nies, however tenuous they might be, to fall under the sway
of the national bourgeoisie through the expedient of a
’temporary' alliance. As a member, along with Lenin, of the
Comintern's Commission on the National and the Colonial
Questions, Roy countered with a set of "Supplementary
Theses." In general terms, Roy argued that rather than
socialism in the less developed areas being dependent on the
'aid1 which might be extended by revolutions in Europe, it
was closer to the truth that "English imperialism has suc
ceeded in keeping the British proletariat under the domina
tion of the bourgeoisie." Not revolution in Europe first and
then the liberation of the colonies, but these two develop
ments "together...will overthrow the capitalist system in
172
Europe."
Lenin was ambivalent: in the "revolutionary union"
quote, there is very much a sense of the complementarity yet
autonomy of the colonial and European revolutionary proces
ses, which puts Lenin close to Roy. In the meetings of the
Commission on the National and Colonial Questions, however,
Lenin still mentions the necessity of "aid" by the proletar
iat in the advanced countries if the socialist revolution is
173
to be accomplished in the developing regions.
In any
event, there was nothing entirely antithetical in Lenin's
and Roy's views on this matter, particularly as the latter
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buttresed his case with the familiar argument (also advanced
by Lenin) that colonial

'super-profits’ allowed the bribery

of a European labor aristocracy. The real difference with
Lenin came when Roy maintained that the bourgeois-democratic
movement and "the mass struggle of the poor and ignorant
workers and peasants...grow farther apart every day." Al
though he did not completely eschew temporary co-operation
with the national bourgeoisie, Roy emphatically argued that
rather than scrambling to secure ’alliances’ with national
ists,

"the foremost and immediate task is to form communist

parties" in the colonies, since in most cases the "revolu
tionary strength of the liberation movements [there] is no
longer confined to the bourgeois-democratic nationalists."
Not only must the colonial masses maintain their "independ
ence" and avoid "merging" with the nationalists (as Lenin
had put it), but they must furthermore not abdicate "the
leadership of the revolution...to the bourgeois
174
democrats.”
Roy's amendments failed to make a major impression, and
succeeded only in Lenin’s agreeing to a largely rhetorical
modification of his own theses by substituting
the term 'national-revolutionary* for the term 'bourgeoisdemocratic'. The significance of this change is that we,
as Communists, should and will support bourgeoisliberation movements in the colonies only when they are
genuinely revolutionary....[175]
Unfortunately for revolutionary socialism, history would
come to show that bourgeois 'anti-imperialists' were also
quite capable of making expedient alliances, and that indeed
they were often more adept at the practice than the parties
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of the Comintern.
It is not difficult to find evidence of the confusion
sown by the (often implicit) injection of the "decaying
capitalism" notion into the field of political debate.

If

imperialism was capitalism which had developed to the point
of being "overripe," then it could readily be concluded that
to oppose imperialism, to be 'anti-imperialist', was to be
'progressive'. Political action based on this interpreta
tion, however, ran the risk of supporting capitalism in the
colonies by urging workers' parties,

for 'practical* rea

sons, to co-operate with bourgeois nationalists in ways such
that the latter defined strategies and objectives. Natural
ly, it was this danger to which Roy so assiduously sought to
draw attention. On the other hand, by taking this risk 'too
far' and issuing concrete warnings about alliances with
colonial bourgeois nationalists, one ran the opposite risk
of appearing insufficiently commited to the overthrow of
colonial rule. That this confusion could arise is amply
demonstrated by the following exchange on the floor of the
second congress. Note how close an indignant Roy comes to
arguing against himself:
[M.N.] Roy: Serrati has referred to my theses and to
those of Comrade Lenin as being counterrevolutionary.
[G.M.] Serrati: Oh, no!
Roy: I am sure that no proletarian can regard the
assistance rendered to the oppressed peoples in their
struggle against foreign oppression as being reactionary.
Every national revolution in a backward country is a step
in advance. It is unscientific to distinguish the various
forms of revolution. Every revolution is one of the
varieties of the social revolution. The peoples of the
exploited countries, whose economic and political evolu
tion has been hampered, must pass through the stages
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which the European peoples have passed long ago. One who
regards it as reactionary to aid these people in their
national struggle is himself reactionary and the advocate
of imperialism.[176]
The second congress had, however, explicitly rejected
the notion that all societies must pass through necessary,
sequential stages of development, and affirmed the view that
177
the capitalist 'stage* could in fact be 'skipped*.
Never
theless, a tension (and therefore, at times, confusion)
developed between this stated position and the evolu
tionist/stages conception of history which the "moribund
capitalism" theory of imperialism certainly encouraged in a
tacit way. Interestingly, rejecting the "moribund capital
ism" view can still be compatible with thinking of history
in terms of necessary stages, although of course the politi178
cal conclusions in that case will be quite different.
It will be recalled that at the first Comintern cong
ress, Lenin expressed no objection to comrades (e.g.,
Trotsky and Bukharin) who spoke in terms of ’'collapse" and
"chaos." At the second congress, however, Lenin chided
(without naming) those revolutionaries who
sometimes try to prove that the [capitalist] crisis is
absolutely insoluble.
This is a mistake. There is no such thing as an abso
lutely hopeless situation.... [Njoboby can 'prove' that
it is absolutely impossible for [the bourgeoisie] to
pacify a minority of the exploited with some petty con
cessions, and suppress some movement or uprising of some
section of the oppressed and exploited. To try to ’prove'
in advance that there is 'absolutely' no way out of the
situation would be sheer pedantry, or playing with con
cepts and catchwords.[179]
Having made this point, Lenin immediately explained the
constrained determinacy of political intervention in the
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concrete situation:
All over the world, the bourgeois system is experi
encing a tremendous revolutionary crisis. The revolution
ary parties must noiv 'prove' in practice that they have
sufficient understanding and organization, contact with
the exploited masses, and determination and skill to
utilize this crisis for a successful, for a victorious
revolution.[180]
Richard Day takes note of Lenin's admonitions, throws
in some other scattered remarks made by Lenin at various
times in various places, and presents the lot as further
evidence of the supposed dramatic divergence between Lenin
181
and Day's favorite scapegoat, Bukharin.
Aside from the
fact that D a y ’s representations of Bukharin are generally
transparently jaundiced, there are good substantive reasons
for doubting Day's appraisal of these comments by Lenin.
Firstly, having thrown out his barb Lenin immediately
blunted it by declaring that "[i]t is mainly to prepare this
•proof

[_i. £., of the necessity of the demise of capital

ism— N.K.] that we have gathered at this Congress of the
182
Communist International."
Day creates the impression that
the 'left' which Lenin subjected to such "harsh... criticism"
represented some sort of 'left-in-general1 and therefore
included anyone, as for example Bukharin (or Trotsky), who
was employing 'left' sounding catchwords such as "chaos” or
"collapse." But the full context of Lenin's comments sug
gests something different, because immediately after the
critical observation just quoted, Lenin spends two and onehalf pages of manuscript belaboring not 'leftists', but
reformists; next, a passing comment that the defeat of
opportunism will be much more difficult in Europe and the
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United States than in Russia; and finally, the conclusion
that in comparison with the task of combatting reformism and
opportunism,

"the rectification of the errors of the 'Left'
183
will be an easy one."
And the characteristics of this
’left* deviation? Lenin specifically lists only dogmatic
anti-parliamentarianism, which makes it clear that just as
in his contemporaneous 'Left W i n g ’ Connunisn— An Infantile
184
Disorder,
Lenin was singling out for criticism the an
archist and syndicalist elements within the International,
not figures like Bukharin or Trotsky. Neither of the latter
two had ever rejected in principle the notion that revolu
tionaries should make use of the bourgeois parliament in
order to overthrow capitalism. Secondly, in order for his
argument to hold, Day would seemingly have to explain
Lenin's failure to take note of and criticize the terminolo
gy of 'collapse' at the first congress, over a year earlier,
when it was if anything even more pronounced. It is diffi
cult to believe that this was the result of simple oversight
on Lenin's part, since he was not one to overlook "shades of
meaning" which could congeal into principled differences at
critical moments.
The reason that Lenin had failed to raise the issue at
all during the first congress,

and only pursued it so mildly

at the second, is very simply that the theoretical terrain
on which the capital accumulation debates of the Second
International were conducted was now irrelevant— neither the
Bolsheviks nor, for that matter, any other significant ad-
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herents

of the Third International thought that capitalism

would 'collapse* in the sense that Luxemburg or Kautsky
believed, or the sense in which Bernstein thought Marxists
by and large believed. Talk of 'collapse' was conjunctural,
collapse was not (especially not its concrete forms) deduced
as a necessity from abstract premises and, as such, when
Lenin at this time made references to a capitalism which was
186
"doomed"
and to the victory of the socialist revolution as
187
"assured",
he was not saying anything so different from
what Bukharin or Trotsky said. At_ this time, the real issue
that Lenin regarded as the line of demarcation between
Bolshevism and the ultra-left was not around the terminology
(or, for that matter, the immediacy) of capitalist 'col
lapse'— the real difference lay in the choice of tactics to
spur the coming European revolution. The feeling in the
party and in the Comintern generally was that capitalism in
at least some of the leading European countries was finish
ed. While It is true enough that in a few years it would be
necessary for all (including Lenin) to speak of "illusions,"
it is a far different thing to claim that at this time a
significant voice in the party was deducing the necessity of
'collapse' from a study of the reproduction schemes in
Capital volume two. Had there been such persons, it would
have made little sense for them to have become Bolsheviks in
the first place.
Lenin's efforts to restrain the anarchist and 'ultraleft* inclinations, both before and during the second cong
ress, brought some results. The "Theses on Communist Parties
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and Parliament" adopted by the second congress, despite some
objections from the left, instructed Comintern affiliated
organizations not to forego as a matter of course partici
pation in bourgeois parliaments. The guidelines were quite
clearly spelled out:
The communist party does not enter this institution to
function there as an organic part of parliament, [but to
carry out] activity inside parliament which consists
chiefly in revolutionary agitation from the parliamentary
tribune, in exposing enemies, in the ideological mobili
zation of the masses....[188]
While it was of course never suggested that parliamentary
activity be anything but "wholly and completely subordinate
to the aims and tasks of the mass struggle outside parlia
ment," the directive stated that any "absolute and categori
cal rejection of participation in elections" was a "naive
189
and childish doctrine... beneath criticism."
Perhaps even more significantly, Comintern cadre were
ordered not to reject work within reformist trade unions.
The "Theses on the Trade Union Movement, Factory Councils,
and the Communist International" adopted at the second cong
ress instructed communist trade unionists to utilize the
♦economic* struggle to overcome the "indecision of the work
ing ma s s e s ...[and] their susceptibility to the specious
arguments of the opportunist leaders." The objective of
trade union work must be to convince the workers of the need
"to get rid of the opportunist union leaders," and for
"communists to get at the head of the trade union movement
190
ana make of it an organ of revolutionary struggle...."
Again, the theses on trade unions were not adopted
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without misgivings, voiced particularly by the U.S. and
British delegations. The Americans and British argued that
the existing reformist trade unions could never be won over
to communism, and that new revolutionary unions must be
formed. The theses, however, strongly inveighed against such
views, and condemned any
voluntary abstention from the unions, all artificial
attempts to create separate trade unions, unless compel
led thereto either by extraordinary acts of violence on
the part of the trade union bureaucracy, or by their
narrow policy of serving only the labor aristocracy which
makes it impossible for the less skilled workers to
j oi n. ...[191]
At the same time, however, communists
should not shrink from a split in the union organizations
if the refusal to split would be tantamount to abandoning
revolutionary work in the unions.... But even if such a
split should prove to be necessary, it should be effected
only if the communists succeed in convincing the broad
working m asses... that the split is to be made not for the
sake of distant revolutionary aims which they do not yet
understand, but for the sake of the most immediate prac
tical interests of the working class....[192]
Finally, for most histories of the Communist Interna
tional, all the happenings at the second congress pale in
comparison to the adoption of the infamous "21 Conditions
of Admission" to the organization. The essential provisions
of the "21 Conditions" required the immediate (and periodi
cally repeated) purging of centrist elements from adherent
parties; mandated the creation of parallel illegal organiza
tions which would enable revolutionary work to be carried on
in the event of the suspension of bourgeois 'democracy';
obligated the member organizations to conduct agitation
within the military,

in the countryside, and in reformist
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trade unions; required an open disavowal of socialpatriotisn and social-pacifism; ordered each "party which
wishes to join the Communist International... to give uncon
ditional support to any Soviet republic in its struggle
against counter-revolutionary forces"; stipulated that the
organizational form of the Communist International and its
member sections would be that of democratic centralism, with
supreme authority vested in the regular world congresses of
the Comintern (the power to issue binding decisions resided
193
with the ECCI in the interim periods between congresses).
In his discussion of the second congress, Fernando
Claudin makes mention of "the new catechism" and "a sectar
ian and dogmatic spirit." For a moment, he even finds it
opportune to make an unusually favorable (for him) appraisal
of the Russian Communist Party (b), so as to be able to
contrast its genuinely revolutionary heritage and flexibili
ty with the "verbalism" of the Comintern "[u]nder the in194
fluence of the T21 Conditions'."
Braunthal likewise notes
the "uneasiness" which the "21 Conditions" created among
Comintern moderates like Giacinto M. Serrati (who objected
to the demand for expulsion of rightists and centrists from
the communist parties) and Artur Crispien (who wished a
clearer distinction between the use of force, which he
claimed he did not oppose, and civil war and terrorism,
195
which he felt social democracy must reject).
In order to
highlight their odious nature, Braunthal points out that not
only the moderates raised objections to the "21 Conditions."
He describes the opposition of the 'left-wing' trade un
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ionists (already encountered above in the discussion of the
"Theses on the Trade Union Movenent") to working within
reformist trade unions, and their argument that since the
existing trade unions could not in any significant measure
be won over to the communist cause, new revolutionary trade
unions had to be formed. Braunthal quotes William Gallacher,
a Scottish trade union leader, who somewhat condescendingly
argued that "[w]e left-wingers have already been active in
the British trade unions for twenty-five years and we have
196
not succeeded in revolutionizing them from within."
This
was true, no doubt, but the point was that neither had the
"left-wingers" succeeded in building an independent, non
reformist alternative.

It is rarely mentioned, and Braunthal

is no exception, that in the actual vote the "21 Conditions"
197
were carried with only two ballots opposed.
Braunthal hence arrives at an impasse, some version of
which recurs throughout his work. Intimating that his so
cialist vision is a revolutionary one, he begins by insist
ing that the revolutionary outcome Is only compatible with
the support of the "great majority" of the masses (citing
198
Luxemburg, who Braunthal professes to admire).
From this,
Braunthal somewhat illogically concludes that the unity of
the working class must be maintained at all costs, even if
this means unity with unabashed reformists or outright anti199
socialists.
The Bolsheviks, in Braunthal's estimation,
erred by seeking to effect a Blanquist coup cl' etat, without
mass support. But insofar as the Bolsheviks particularly,

and the Comintern generally, pursued support for the revolu
tionary socialist project within the greater labor movement,
Braunthal objects that any such activity threatened the
sacrosanct unity of the proletariat. Leaving aside the fact
that any claim as to the

'unity’ of the working class in the

conjuncture of World War I Europe is an empty one, Braunthal
constructs a sophism from which there is no escape, and then
chides those who sought to break out of it.
*

*

*

The period following the second congress of the Comin
tern saw a series of defeats and setbacks for the revolu
tionary proletariat.
1. Following its early success in repelling the Polish
invasion of March 1920, the Red Army was flung back from
Warsaw in mid-August by the Polish counter-offensive under
(French) General Weygand. The Riga armistice, on terras fa
vorable to Pilsudski's regime, was finally signed in March
1921.
2. The political situation in Italy became increasingly
volatile over the summer and fall of 1920. Following the
breakdown of wage negotiations between northern Italian
workers and employers, a series of work slowdowns finally
led to a lockout in early September, and several hundred
factories in Milan, Genoa and Turin closed. The workers
responded by breaking in and seizing the factories, and
proceeded to operate them under workers' control. The move
ment spread, the police and military avoided confronting the
workers, but the process faltered when banks and raw mate263

rials suppliers refused to deal with occupied factories.
Representatives of the Italian Socialist Party and its trade
union federation rather narrowly voted to linit demands to
very modest, reformist objectives. The government of Premier
Giovanni Giolitti agreed to wage increases and recognition
of union participation in management— the workers' action
was quickly defused.
By autumn,

Italian fascism had become a mass movement,

funded by capitalists and landowners and supported by the
Vatican. Armed squads carried out attacks against tradeunion offices,

socialist publishing operations, municipal

offices in the socialist controlled towns, and peasant
organizations.
3. Having acquiesced in employers' efforts to provoke
200
workers in Prussian Saxony in March 1921,
the Social
Democratic government there sent in security forces to oc
cupy the area. The KPD responded by calling first for insur
rection and later, in view of the very uneven and often
tepid response to the signal for an uprising, a general
strike. Apart from miners in the area around Mansfeld,
Saxony generally, Hamburg and the Ruhr, working class sup
port for the infamous 'March action' was sparse, and indeed,
much of the fighting was between striking workers and those
who remained on the job. Many hundreds of people were
killed, and the KPD suffered not only a major tactical
defeat, but also a substantial decline In its membership
over the next several months.

4. The 'March Action' had been preceded by internal
struggles and a split within the KPD. With a selective lapse
of memory, Braunthal forgets his previous admonitions on the
paramount importance of "the sticking together of all
201
workers' tendencies,"
and warmly praises the moderate
leader "Paul Levi, an exceptionally capable and cultivated
intellectual who had been a close friend of Rosa Luxemburg,
[for having] expelled the 'putschists' and Anarchists from
202
his [sic] party."
The latter tendencies had formed the
Kommunistische Arbeiters Partei Deutschlands (KAPD), or
German Communist Workers' Party, and were admitted to the
Comintern as sympathizing members. Unfortunately for Levi,
he came into conflict with the Central Committee of the KPD
over his opposition to the "21 Conditions." Outvoted on the
CC, Levi resigned and the leadership of the party passed to
203
August Thalheimer and Heinrich Brandler.
After the failure
of the 'March Action', Levi wrote slanderous pamphlets at
tacking the leadership of both the KPD and the EC CI . Even
tually, he and his supporters went on to join the USPD.
The 'March Action' had taken place with this volatile
state of affairs inside the KPD for a backdrop. Historians
continue to debate the extent of Comintern involvement in
the decision to stage the uprising, and while there is no
doubt that there were Comintern representatives in Germany,
who "may have had [specific] instructions from Zinoviev,"
arguments that the KPD was simply manipulated from Moscow
for purely Russian ends do not appear to hold up in light of
204
documentable evidence.
It should not be overlooked that
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the sense of opportunities lost because of the KPD's inac
tion during the Kapp putsch a year earlier had led to sig
nificant support for a policy of action within the party.
Indeed, although the leadership which replaced Levi was not
from the left wing, it did subscribe to the notion that the
time was ripe for a transition from revolutionary propaganda
to revolutionary action,

the so-called "theory of the

offensive." This view had already begun to conflict with the
increasingly cautious Comintern policy.
5.

In Soviet Russia,

also during March 1921, the

sailors of the Kronstadt naval garrison mutinied following a
winter of rising discontent over the policies of war commun
ism. Even as the Kronstadt rebellion was unfolding,

the

tenth congress of the Russian Communist Party (b) was in
session, and acting to replace the mechanisms of war commun
ism with those of the New Economic Policy. It must be re
peated that while war communism, being a series of ad hoc
responses to conditions of civil war and foreign interven
tion, had certainly not been implemented as a consciously
conceived vehicle for an heroic 'leap' Into pure communism
by an act of will alone, "illusions" did emerge over the
course of the period. Lenin and other leaders later fre
quently made references to such "illusions"— consequently
(particularly in its early stages),

the N.E.P. was widely

regarded as a 'retreat1.
The beginning of 1921 is for all these reasons fre
quently seen as marking the apogee of revolutionary volunta
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rism within the Comintern until the 'turn to the left' of
the late 1920s. Some historians suggest that during the
years 1919-1920 the communist parties had come to conflate
their optimism regarding the prospects and imminence of the
European revolution with their own capacity to determine the
205
course and pace of events.
There is no doubt that the
Comintern regarded the situation in the post-war years as
revolutionary, and that the member sections expected and
worked toward the overthrow of capitalism in one or several
countries of Europe. But this is not so strange, as many
members of the bourgeoisie and its ideologues, not least
206
among these John Maynard Keynes,
demonstrated by both
rhetoric and action that they shared at least somewhat the
assessment of the situation (if not the goals) provided by
the Comintern.
While it is one thing to take note of the sense of
revolutionary optimism within Comintern circles prior to the
third congress,

it is quite another to leap from this to the

following 'analysis' by Braunthal:
The Third Congress of the Communist International,
which met in July 1921, no longer called upon the Com
munist Parties, as the Second Congress had done, to
'hasten' the revolution; its slogan was: ’Go out to the
m asses!’ The congress declared that Communist parties
should avoid revolutionary action which had no prospect
of succeeding [such action had of course never been
encouraged— N.K.], but should try to capture the majority
of the working class by pursuing a day-to-day struggle to
win immediate benefits for the workers.[207]
Braunthal misleadingly implies that a concern with mass
politics was absent until the 'To the Masses!’ slogan. But a
year earlier, the second congress had also instructed the
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member sections "to keep always in closest touch with the
208
broadest masses of the proletariat."
Jane Degras similar
ly writes that "although Levi had been expelled for attack
ing the policy of artificially creating revolutionary situa
tions,

it was his policy which was in fact adopted" at the
209
third congress.
But the "ECCI Statement on the Expulsion
of Paul Levi" which Degras herself supplies reads:
In the name of the small bureau and the entire ECCI,
comrade Zinoviev declared, 'It is an abominable lie that
the ECCI or its representatives provoked the March
rising. This fable was needed by the German counter
revolution, on whose side Levi stood....* Even if Paul
Levi were nine-tenths right in his views of the March
offensive, he would still be liable to expulsion from the
party because of his unprecedented violation of disci
pline and because, by his action, ini the given circum
stances , he dealt the party a blow in the back.L210J
One might also recall Lenin's comments on Levi, noted above,
which were once again cited by Degras herself without in any
apparent way affecting her conclusions regarding the Levi
211
affair.
Far from accurately reflecting either the state of mind
or the issued proclamations of the second congress, opinions
such as Braunthal*s or Degras' considerably and misleadingly
overstate the extent to which voluntarist delusions came to
be codified in Comintern instructions. Leaving aside the
fact that communist action during this period was only
intermittently and sporadically audacious, and that there
was no talk of "revolutionary war" after Brest-Litovsk, it
is necessary to point out again that the "Theses on the
Basic Tasks of the Communist International" (already refer
red to above) approved at the second congress was in fact a

rather pragmatic document. The idea that "to accelerate the
revolution" is an "immediate task" of the communist parties
appears embedded in the fifth thesis in the section on
preparatory work, and is not mentioned again in fourteen
21 2
pages of manuscript.
Note also that to call something an
"immediate task" does not necessarily imply that it is the
only or even most consequential one. When seen in the con
text of the document, "to accelerate the revolution" does
not leap out as a dominant

’slogan1 or theme, but rather as

one "task" (among many others) which is "immediate" in the
sense of proximate--the situation was a revolutionary or at
least potentially revolutionary one. That politically active
persons regarded the period as such should not seem so
strange,

except perhaps to those who have never been able

(then or since) to see anything but "a world that was either
213
indifferent or hostile to Communist revolution."
The di
rective "to accelerate the revolution" is immediately quali
fied by the warning that the communist parties must proceed
by "taking care not to provoke [the revolution] artificially
before adequate preparations have been made." The bulk of
the document, indeed, consists precisely of a chronicling of
the necessary tasks of preparation rather than acceleration:
[T]o attract not only the entire proletariat, or its
overwhelming majority, but also the entire mass of work
ing people.... [T]o rally the scattered communist forces,
to create a united communist party in each country....
[To secure the support of] the overwhelming majority of
the proletariat.... [To seek this support in] all organi
zations, unions and associations of the working and ex
ploited masses without exception.[214]
The third congress does mark a watershed in Comintern
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politics, but it represents not as dramatic a reversal as
Braunthal, Degras and others suggest.

In this regard at

least, the 'official' Comintern periodization of its own
history, which speaks only of a "high point" in "direct
revolutionary action" around the end of 1920 and the begin
ning of 1921, is nearer the mark than the assessment offered
215
by social-democratic writers.
There was recognition of an
"ebb in the revolutionary tide," but the sense of retreat
was certainly not so general as to precipitate a complete
and thorough break with extant tactics. The Communist Inter
national's 'turn to the right' was a protracted manuever, it
was not cleanly executed, it was not undertaken without
vacillation and ambivalence. Moreover, as will be seen
shortly, even before the 'turn to the right* was complete in
any real sense, it already became possible to detect ele
ments of the subsequent 'turn to the left'!
Third Congress of the Communist International
June-July 1921
At the congress, Lenin presented "Theses for a Report
on the Tactics of the RCP" which served as the bassis of his
spoken report. In both the document and the speech, Lenin
introduced the theme which he would develop in the coming
months, viz., that "the development of the international
revolution, which we predicted, is proceeding, but not along
216
as straight a line as we had expected."
The result was
"that a certain equilibrium has now undoubtedly set in
between the forces that have [until now been] waging an
217
open, armed struggle."
This did not mean a victory or
270

defeat for either side, or even a decisive shift in the tide
of battle. Rather, this "brief respite" did not rule out an
upsurge in revolutionary action,

even as it offered an

opportunity to "thoroughly prepare for revolution and make
a deep study of its concrete d e v e l o p m e n t a d a p t

our tac

tics to this zigzag line of history;...[and win] over the
218
majority of the proletariat."
The general "Theses on Tactics" (drafted by the Russian
and German delegations) adopted at the third congress sound
ed similar themes. "The world revolution... will require a
fairly long period of revolutionary struggle," although "in
the period of chronic capitalist decay, the continuous revo
lutionary sapping comes at times to a head in an acute
crisis." Moreover,
the world economic crisis which began in the middle of
1920 and spread over the whole world, increasing unem
ployment everywhere, proves to the international prole
tariat that the bourgeoisie are unable to rebuild the
world anew.... [T]he illusion that by renouncing the
conquest of political power in revolutionary struggle
[social-democracy] could gradually and peacefully achieve
economic power and self-government, is fading away....
The most important question before the Communist Inter
national is to win predominating influence over the ma
jority of the working class.... For despite the objec
tively revolutionary situation...the majority of the
workers are not yet under communist influence....[219]
Contrary to Braunthal*s implication, the emphasis newly
placed on partial demands in the Comintern "Theses" was not
the result of a fundamental strategic re-orientation. The
"Theses** state:
Communist parties can develop only in struggle....
The entire agitation and propaganda, all the work of the
communist parties, must be informed with the conscious
ness that no lasting improvement in the position of the
proletarian masses is possible on a capitalist basis....
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But this should not imply a renunciation of the struggle
for the practical, urgent needs of the proletariat until
it is ready to fight for the dictatorship....
The task of the communist parties is to extend, to
deepen, and to unify this struggle for concrete demands.
Every partial action undertaken by the working masses to
achieve a partial demand, every serious strike, mobilizes
the entire bourgeoisie, who...also bring into action
their entire State machine.... The workers who fight for
partial demands will be automatically forced into a
struggle against the entire bourgeoisie and their State
apparatus....
Any struggle may turn into a struggle for p o w e r ....[220]
Fundamentally, the Comintern continued to regard the period
as belonging to ,fthe epoch of world revolution," in which
the communist party must be "by its very nature an attacking
party,...obliged, whenever a defensive struggle grows in
depth and extent,
221
society."

to turn it into an attack on capitalist

G.D.H. Cole, like Braunthal, considers that "in 1921
and for the next two or three years, Comintern policy moved
222
sharply rightwards."
Insofar as Cole succeeds in making
good his case, he does so primarily by getting the dates all
wrong. Writes Cole, without citation:

"Thus was born,

in

June 1921 [ i^.£., at the third congress— N.K.] the notion of
223
the 'United Front'."
In fact, however, the "Directives on
the United Front of the Workers" were only issued at a
meeting of the ECCI In December 1921. They allowed for joint
action by Comintern affiliated workers on the one hand, and
sympathizers of the Second International and the Independ
ents on the other. This was permissible insofar as "the
influence of the mounting capitalist attack...has awakened
among the workes a spontaneous striving toward unity" which
could, through the use of united front tactics, win over
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workers to the revolutionary camp. It was stressed, of
course, that this 'unity* could under no circumstances be
allowed to lead to "tendencies which would in fact amount to
the dissolution of communist parties and groups into the
united but formless bloc." This meant among other things
that "communists must retain the unconditional right and
possibility of expressing their opinion... not only before
and after action has been taken but also, if necessary,
during its course." More significantly, several member sec
tions objected to the tactics of a united front as present
ed, with the result that they were not finally approved
until the June 1922 meeting of the ECCI, almost a year after
the third congress. Even so, there was sufficient continued
objection to the united front that the question was added to
the agenda of the fourth congress (November 1922). By that
time, a 'left* distinction was already being drawn between a
united front "from above" (collaboration of communist and
socialist leaders in organizing joint action) and a united
front "from below" (an "agitational and organizational ral
lying of the working masses"). Only the latter, it was said,
could ever signify the "true realization" of the united
224
front tactic.
Cole, however, Incorrectly (by about a year
too late) dates the united front "from above*' and "from
below" distinction only from late 1923, saying that with
225
this change "Comintern policy swung again leftwards."
Stranger still is Cole's claim (again without reference)
that "other slogans" such as "the cry for a ’Workers' Gov-
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226
eminent'" originated with the third congress.

In fact,

however, the tactic of communist participation in "Workers'
Governments" was officially approved only at the fourth
Comintern congress, a year and a half later than Cole
227
suggests.
Both the extent and decisiveness of the Communist In
ternational's 'turn to the right' are thus greatly exagger
ated by a writer like Braunthal, who overlooks all of the
considerable elements of continuity between the second and
third congresses, or Cole, who inaccurately ascribes all
aspects of the rightward drift to the third congress. Cole's
assessment therefore has a twofold effect: it makes the
rightward turn seem much more decisive than it actually was,
and it creates the false impression of a fairly well-defined
period of several years duration in which 'right-wing' poli
cies and tactics were in place.

In fact, however, a slightly

less cavalier attitude to the dating of events shows that
even over the course of the drift to the right, counter
tendencies of a leftward inclination were operative.
At one of the early sessions of the third congress,
Trotsky delivered a speech on the "World Economic Crisis and
the New Tasks of the Communist International," and together
with Varga he drafted the "Theses on the World Situation and
the Tasks of the Comintern," which were unanimously adopted
by the congress. In the speech, Trotsky noted that the
bourgeoisie had grown considerably in "self-assurance" be
tween 1919 and 1921, but that it was too early to see in
this the restoration of a capitalist "equilibrium." The
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general tenor of the speech certainly suggests neither that
Trotsky felt the revolutionary moment had passed by, nor
that he believed (any more than Lenin) that a full-scale
228
strategic re-orientation was in order.
Although Trotsky participated in drafting the "Theses,”
the document also clearly bore the stamp of Varga's think
ing. The "Theses" reiterated Trotsky's argument to the ef
fect that the brief post-war recovery was but a fleeting
"reaction to the fictitious prosperity of wartime. The "nor
mal sequence of boom and crisis,

[which] used to occur on a

rising curve of industrial development," had been replaced
by a long term downward trend in which cyclical upturns
would be brief and "largely speculative in character
[whereas] crises will be prolonged and severe. The present
229
crisis in Europe is a crisis of under-production...."
The European war, the "Theses" went on to declare, had
produced contradictory effects on the development of capi
talism in the United States. On the one hand, the annihila
tion of European industrial capacity together with the con
tinent's demand for materiel stimulated U.S. industrial
output (reversing the traditional composition of U.S. ex
ports from predominantly agricultural), and turned the
United States into the world's largest holder of gold. On
the other hand, the decline of Europe i-epresented the loss
of markets for the United States: "Europe needs American
products but has nothing to offer in return. Europe is
suffering from anemia; America from plethora." Moreover,
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the

depreciation or outright collapse of many European curren230
cies exacerbated the difficulties of resuming trade.
In a somewhat confused manner, the "Theses" maintained
that the process of "proletarianization...[has] made enor
mous progress...," despite the crisis of accumulation. The
"Theses" failed to clearly distinguish proletarianization
from "pauperization," and concluded only that impoverishment
would provide "the class struggle a tense, bitter, and
convulsive character." At the same time, it was argued that
the only means by which European capitalism could be re
stored would be an even more profound depression in working
class living standards. "This is what the capitalists are
asking and this is what the treacherous leaders of the
Yellow International are recommending.... But the European
proletariat is not ready to sacrifice itself." The conclu
sion was by no means quiescent: "[T]he curve of capitalist
development is downwards, with a few passing upward move
ments, while the curve of revolution is rising although it
231
shows a few falls."
Speaking several months after the third congress on the
(domestic) question of the transition to the New Economic
Policy, Lenin had recourse to a metaphor also applicable to
232
the (international) question of the European revolution.
During the Russo-Japanese war, Lenin recalled, the Russian
fortress at Port Arthur was captured by the Japanese General
Nogi in two distinct steps--a "first stage...of furious
assaults," which was unsuccessful and entailed heavy losses
for the Japanese, and a second step of protracted, "extreme
2 7 ')

ly difficult and slow...siege," which eventually led to the
surrender of Port Arthur. Lenin maintained that while unsuc
cessful,

the first step was necessary and in actuality

represented "the only possible tactics that could have been
adopted under the conditions then prevailing,

i_.£. , the

opening of hostilities," for two reasons. First, an attempt
at direct assault was worth the (not unanticipated) heavy
cost,

in that had it been quickly successful "it would have

released the Japanese army for operations in other theaters
of war...." Secondly,

"without testing the enemy's power of

resistance, there would have been no grounds for adopting"
the tactics of siege. The New Economic Policy on the domes
tic front, and by extension the shift in Comintern tactics
on the international front, did not (at least not yet)
represent a retreat— the period of direct revolutionary
action was not ov er , but a different approach was required
in the face of a renewed "general capitalist offensive"
233
against the revolutionary proletariat.
The Comintern had
never countenanced ultra-leftism or putschism, but at this
juncture it was all the more necessary to discourage think
ing along the lines of the "theory of the offensive" so
prevalent in, for example, the KPD.
*

1.

*

*

Throughout the spring of 1922, efforts aiming to

establish a basis for unity between the Second and Third
Internationals were undertaken by the wizened Vienna (or
Two-and-a-Half) International, but these came to naught. In
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June 1922 the Second International declared it would no
longer engage in dialogue with the Comintern and that, in
essence,

the Vienna International could do as it wished. By

May 1923 these ‘right* and 'center* tendencies in the inter
national labor movement cane to be amalgamated "under the
name 'Labor and Socialist International*. It laid down no
conditions for admission and formulated no policy pro
gramme." The statutes of the new International left the
internal policies of the member parties to be formulated
entirely at the national level although it was declared,
recalling the ignominy of August 1914,

that in the event of

war the affiliated parties would be required to recognize
the International as a higher authority. Even Braunthal
obliquely recognizes the ingenuousness of the scheme, con
ceding that this was the most that "could be done by
234
statutes.'*
2.

With the resumption of diplomatic relations between

Germany and Soviet Russia after the Rapallo agreement of
April 1922, the uneasy ambivalence of Soviet attitudes to
the European capitalist powers moved toward "a single coher
ent foreign policy In which rapprochement with Germany pre235
dominated over rapprochement with the western powers."
Under the terms of the agreement, the Russian republic would
(secretly, of course) aid Germany in avoiding the extraordi
nary Versailles prohibitions on armaments production, while
Soviet Russia would share in German technological expertise.
The treaty contained no secret clauses specifying political
or military obligations; the principal binding agreement was
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to consult one another prior to commencing on an economic
undertaking (with a third party) that could affect the
partner.
3. Following the fascist march on Rome, ?Iussolini was
installed as prime minister of Italy on 30. October 1922,
with his party holding fewer than ten percent of the seats
in parliament and only four of fourteen cabinet positions.
Mussolini’s ascent to power did not cause much of a stir in
bourgeois circles. Indeed, insofar as the European elites at
this time did not merely ignore Mussolini and fascism, they
were actually rather positively disposed toward the develop236
ments in Italy.
4. At the end of 1922, the Russian Socialist Federal
Soviet Republic became the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub
lics (U.S.S.R.), and a constitution formally establishing
the Union was drawn up in 1923 to replace the earlier treaty
which had linked the Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, and
Trans-Caucasian republics.
Fourth Congress of the Communist International
November-early December 1922
It was in his report to the congress on "Five Years of
the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revo
lution" that Lenin made his oft-quoted comments on the
importance of "the idea that we must prepare ourselves for
the possibility of retreat," and "not only from the view
point of a country whose economic system [is very back
ward]...but also from the viewpoint of the Communist Inter
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national and the advanced Vfest-European countries." Rather
than immediately drawing up a new program, Lenin suggested
that the "most important thing for all of us, Russian and
237

foreign comrades alike, is to sit down and study."

With

his familiar habit of utilizing the analysis of one problem
to Illustrate or highlight the central features of another,
Lenin employed a discussion of the New Economic Policy to
designate the nature of the retreat underway inside Soviet
Russia, seeking thereby to specify the characteristics of
the retreat on the international front whose "possibility"
had to be "prepared." Insofar as most commentators dwell on
Lenin's words regarding the preparation for "retreat" (more
precisely, its "possibility"),

they tend to overlook a par

allel theme in the speech, v i z ., the way in which the formu
lation of a "possible line of retreat" could actually repre
sent a "step forward." These two lines were undoubtedly
present in Lenin's thinking at that time, and their appear
ance was an indication of a strategic shift, albeit one of a
different sort than would be identified from an exclusive
238
focus on the issue of retreat.
Lenin had in fact regarded
the N.E.P. purely in terms of retreat for only a rather
brief period. At the time of the fourth Comintern congress,
only a year and a half after the implementation of the
N.E.P., Lenin already conceived of the strategy in the dual
sense outlined above. And significantly, by early 1923,
Lenin would write of the N.E.P. as the vehicle which, admit
tedly, "is still not the building of socialist society, but
239
it is all that is necessary and sufficient for it."
2R0

Whether this was a correct or realistic outlook (it was
neither) on the

prospects of the New Econonic Policy

is

entirely beside

the point here. Whatmatters is that

the

N.E.P. on the domestic front, and the strategic re
orientation on the international front, were not perceived
as unequivocal retreats any more than backing out of a blind
alley and proceeding along a different route would be per
ceived as failing to arrive at one's destination (or chang
ing the destination).
The united

front tactic already referred to was

not a

retreat per s e , it was not synonymous with an embrace

of

reformism, and finally, it was not "exactly what Levi had
240
fought for."
The similarity between Levi's conception of
the united front and the view of the Comintern extends
little further than beyond the shared name. In the interests
of a 'united front' Levi,

in 1921, had campaigned to allow

the Serrati faction of the Italian Socialist Party to remain
in the Comintern despite its clearly evident refusal to
apply in practice the "21 Conditions." As noted earlier, the
party split over this issue, with the Serrati faction de
parting from the Communist International.
true, as Ben Fowkes maintains,

It is simply not

that the situation after the

Comintern's adoption of united front tactics was somehow
substantially altered and that the attitude toward Serrati
would have been different. There is no indication that the
Third International moved to dispense with or even weaken
its organizational directives (indeed, a more thoroughgoing
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'bolshevization' was in the offing). More accurately, activ
ity under the rubric of the united front was a refinement of
the 'splitting' tactics encountered a few years previously,
and so often regarded as an index of the 'leftist' Comin
tern. "The reformists need a split," declared the "Theses on
Tactics" adopted at the fourth congress,

and the united

front was the vehicle by which this would be accomplish241
ed.
Significantly, both Karl Radek and Zinoviev (re
spectively, the ECCI spokespersons for the united front
'from above' and 'from below') very emphatically declared
that the united front was "but a first attempt to drive the
social-democrats to the wall" and that an interpretation of
the united front as a unification of communism and social242
democracy "would be the biggest crisis we could commit."
At a June 1923 meeting of the ECCI, Zinoviev stated that the
united front was a "strategic manuever [which] consists in
our appealing constantly to people who, we know in advance,
243
will not go along with us."
Similarly, the virtue of the struggle for a workers'
government was seen to reside in the possibilities it of
fered "for invigorating the revolutionary labor movement"
and for "concentrating the proletariat and unleashing revo
lutionary struggles." Communist support of social-democratic
(and "liberal") workers' governments was specifically pro
hibited ; "[o]n the contrary, [communists] must vigorously
expose to the masses the real character of these pseudo244
workers' governments."
In sum, the mood at the fourth congress was cautious,
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but not unequivocally so. Lenin's speech, with its enigmatic
appraisal of the "possibility of retreat," nonetheless held
245
to an outlook for "excellent" prospects.
Trotsky at this
time was particularly adamant that following the political
defeats recently suffered by the revolutionary proletariat,
"the industrial revival will not come as a blow hurling us
back but as an impulse propelling us forward" because the
workers will "begin to feel more secure...and begin to press
246
forward."
As always, Trotsky emphasized the subjective
and organizational factor:
If we cancel out the revolutionary nature of the work
ing class and its struggle and the work of the Communist
Party and of the trade unions, that is, if we cancel out
that for the sake of which we exist and act, and take
instead the objective mechanics of capitalism, then we
could say: '...capitalism will restore its own
equilibrium*.[247]
The attitude of the Comintern sections was by no means
quiescent, and substantial opposition to united front tac
tics (including the 'from below' version) was voiced by the
248
left.
Finally, the earlier Comintern prognosis of the
inevitability of capitalist collapse was not only left unal
tered, it was strongly reaffirmed. The "Theses on Tactics"
adopted by the congress, in the second heading titled "The
Period of Capitalist Decline," stated:
The general picture of the decay of capitalist economy
is not mitigated by those unavoidable fluctuations which
are characteristic of the capitalist system both in its
ascendancy and in its decline. The attempts of bourgeois
and social-democratic economists to explain the improve
ment which began in the second half of 1921...rest partly
on the desire to falsify the facts, partly on the lack of
insight of these lackeys of capital....
Capitalism will be subject to cyclical fluctuations
till the hour of its death....
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What capitalism is passing through today is nothing but
its death throes. The collapse of capitalism is inevitable.[249~]
*

1.

*

*

In January 1923, soon after the fourth congress,

French army occupied the Ruhr in response to Germany's
failure to meet certain war reparations deliveries specified
by the Versailles treaty. The Comintern, PCF and KPD quickly
organized protests and issued denunciations, while at the
same time opposing the German government’s advocacy of "pas
sive resistance" (work slowdowns,

e t c .) on the grounds that

the Ruhr conflict was a struggle between the French and
German bourgeoisies. The initial popular response to the
occupation was an upsurge of German nationalism and a wave
of 'patriotic' strikes. At the Leipzig congress of the KPD
(28. January - 2. February 1923) a vocal 'left' minority and
the 'right* majority both distanced themselves from this
nationalist tide, and KPD Reichstag deputies opposed the
passive resistance tactic in January, declaring against a
"national united front" and in favor of a "united front of
the proletariat." Thalhelmer (of the KPD right wing) quickly
softened his stand, however, and as early as February was
warning of the greater danger posed by the French bourgeoi
sie. But even Thalheimer did not go so far as withdrawing
the demand for a simultaneous struggle against the German
bourgeoisie. Although it did not endorse Thalheimer's views,
the ECCI (through Klara Zetkin) urged caution, by contrast
250
with the KPD left and its "occupy the factories" slogan.
Over the spring and summer of 1923, in the face of
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the

continuing military occupation and the famous German hyper
inflation,

the political and economic crisis led to a

strengthening of the KPD left and a radicalization of popu
lar sentiment generally.

In April the ECCI intervened to

prevent a split in the KPD, calling members of the factions
to Moscow for a conference. Four KPD leftists (including
Ruth Fischer and Ernst Thaelmann) were added to the central
committee, and the ECCI issued an opinion which tilted more
to the left than had been the case previously:

M [T]he strug

gle against left tendencies can be carried on successfully
only if the KPD Zentrale eliminates, primarily by a struggle
against the right-wing elements, the reasons for the revolu251
tionary mistrust of the left."
The ECCI also sided with
the left in rejecting the workers* government established in
Saxony as a clear example of the united front from above,
and as such a form of workers* government which the fourth
congress had prohibited the previous November.
These concessions to the growing influence of the KPD
left, however, belie the fact that the ECCI (along with the
KPD majority), failed to clearly perceive the developing
revolutionary situation in Germany. A series of strikes in
May, June and July was not interpreted as being of any great
significance, since they generally involved local, partial
252
demands.
The SPD, losing ground to the KPD as more mili
tant views found favor among social-democratic workers, came
to be increasingly polarized— some SPD parliamentary depu253
ties called for the overthrow of the Cuno government.
In
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the face of all this, however, the KPD majority was expect
ing the need to organize only "defensive battles" against
counter-revolution, and was therefore (along with the ECCI)
caught unawares at the outbreak of a spontaneous and grass
roots KPD led general strike of massive dimensions in midAugust. Only then did the KPD national leadership move to
support the action; the social-democrats did not until,
fearful of losing its remaining credibility,

the SPD with

drew parliamentary support of Cuno, thereby forcing him to
resign. Only by late August did the ECCI begin to proclaim
that "conditions in Germany are becoming more and more
254
acute...."
Once again a socialist government was a real possibili
ty in Germany, and once again the SPD drew back from the
verge of decisive action. A new government was formed by
Gustav Stresemann of the Volkspartel (German People’s Party,
actually a party of the large bourgeoisie), and was joined
by four SPD ministers, Hilferding among them. Dexterously
blending a policy of police repression against the strike
leaders and factory councils with wage increases to appease
the rank and file, the Stresemann regime rode out the crisis
as the strike movement subsided.
Throughout September, KPD representatives and ECCI
officials met in Moscow, and the decision was made to stage
an insurrection during October. Brandler, of the KPD right,
hesitated but was overruled. The actual uprising was not
only belated, but the preparatory work and logistical opera
tions were botched as well, with most of the participants
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lacking weapons. At the last moment, as the Stresemann
regime ordered the keichswehr into Saxony and Thueringia in
order to disband working class militias and remove the
united front governments,

the KPD central committee voted to

call off the insurrection. The decision to call off the
armed struggle was made on Brandler's recommendation,

the

justification being the SPD's reluctance to join the call
for an uprising in defense of the united front governments.
News of these developments did not reach the Hamburg KPD
district in time, and some 1300 communists confronted 6000
soldiers and police. The uprising was put down after three
days, leaving 21 workers and 17 government troops dead. The
defeat of the working class extended far beyond the suppres255
sion of the uprising.
By mid-December, the Stresemann
regime was replaced by an even more right-wing government
under Wilhelm Marx (Centre Party), the KPD and its press
were banned, and the workweek in industry was lengthened to
59 hours.
Among the political effects of the October events in
Germany was a further strengthening of the leftward drift
already apparent in the communist movement. The right wing
leadership of the KPD (Brandler, Thalheimer, and Zetkin)
were replaced by the leftists Fischer, Thaelmann, and Arkady
Maslow. It must be emphasized that while the ECCI ratified
and abetted the leadership change, the impetus for this
256
action originated within the KPD.
Indeed, the waning
influence of Brandler and the KPD right had begun in the
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spring of 1923, and reflected the growing strength of the
ascendent KPD left, as well as the increasing ECCI criticism
of the Brandler leadership's interpretation of the united
257
front tactic.
After the October defeat and the demise of
the KPD right, Zetkin complained that any criticism of the
KPD leadership (by implication, herself included) was inap
propriate, or at least must equally apply to the ECCI, since
the latter had supported and endorsed KPD policies. While it
is true enough that the ECCI had underestimated the extent
and depth of the crisis in Germany (the KPD leadership's
assessment was even wider of the mark),

it is likewise true

that the ECCI had been pushing the KPD to adopt a more
258
leftward orientation.
Part of the difficulty consisted in
the scope of the ECCI's criticisms not being fully transmit
ted to Berlin— the chief Comintern representative in Germany
was Radek, whose compulsive caution and close personal rela
tionship to the KPD right considerably dampened the effect
of ECCI communications. Even assuming the ECCI liaison to be
all-powerful (which was not the case, especially in Germa
ny), the fact that this liaison was Radek sufficed to temper
the influence that ECCI leftists such as Zinoviev exercised
over German affairs.
2.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain

continued to deteriorate in 1923. In May, the British For
eign Secretary dispatched a threatening note (the 'Curzon
ultimatum') complaining, among other things, of Comintern
agitation in India and the Middle East as a violation of the
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of March 1921.
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3. The Ruhr intervention had further complicated the
"equivocal relation between German communism and German
nationalism," and throughout the summer of 1923 the KPD and
the Comintern pursued a confusing policy with regard to
259
emergent fascist sentiments.
The third ECCI plenum (June
1923) issued a resolution which described fascism as "a
characteristic phenomenon of decay, a reflection of the
progressive dissolution of capitalist economy and of the
260
disintegration of the bourgeois state."
The resolution
suggested that the social strata drawn to fascism consisted
of petty bourgeois elements who had been radicalized by war
and economic crisis, and whose "vague expectations... of a
radical social Improvement, to be brought about by reformist
socialism, have also been disappointed." The bankruptcy of
the social-democratic leadership thus caused the radicalized
petty bourgeoisie "to despair of socialism itself." On the
basis of this analysis,

the Comintern for a brief time

adopted an ambivalent attitude to the radical German nation
alists. Although the Comintern line called for a ruthless
and relentless struggle against fascism, in his famous
"Schlageter speech" Radek (who sided with the KPD right)
implied a coincidence of interests between socialism and
radical German nationalism against Entente capital (French
in particular), and went so far as to martyr a German fas
cist executed by the French occupation forces. On several
occasions throughout the summer, fascist and communist
speakers shared public platforms, but this practice was
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terminated (on fascist initiative) long before the October
events. Although there was no significant objection to the
261
"Schlageter policy" from within the KPD,
the notion of a
"defense of the revolutionary fatherland by anticipation"
not unexpectedly created acute discomfort in the French and
central European parties.
4.

The Bulgarian Communist Party, a powerful organiza

tion with solid membership (40,000) and electoral support
(about 20 percent of the total vote in April 1923, making it
the second largest party), suffered a disastrous setback as
a consequence of tactical errors. The ruling Peasant Union
of Alexander Stambuliski was overthrown, and Stambuliski
killed, in a June 1923 coup d ’ etat organized by military
officers and elements of the large bourgeoisie. In accord
ance with an earlier Internal resolution,

the Bulgarian CP

remained neutral on the grounds that coalition with or
support of the Stambuliski regime was outside the scope
262
permitted by united front tactics.
At the time of the
coup, the third plenum of the ECCI was meeting in Moscow and
issued orders for the BCP to resist the overthrow of
Stambuliski. The latter was likened to Mikhail Kerensky,
whose Provisional Government in Russia the Bolsheviks fought
to support during General Kornilov’s coup attempt in July
1917, even though the Kerensky regime was not sympathetic to
the working class. "The putschists are now the enemy, and
must be defeated. Unite for the fight against the white
revolt not only with the broad masses of the peasantry, but
with the leaders of the peasant party who are still
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263
alive."

Even the cautious Radek found himself urging: on

the Bulgarian Communists.
The central committee of the Bulgarian party met in
July and rejected the ECCI directive, but by August a new
leadership emerged (evidently on Bulgarian initiative) which
favored an alliance with the remnants of the Peasant Union
against the white dictatorship. An abortive uprising took
place in September, was quickly defeated, and the Bulgarian
CP was utterly decimated in the ensuing white terror.
Thirteenth Congress of the RCP(b)
May 1924
The October uprising in Germany and the associated
controversy inside the KPD not surprisingly would loom large
at the upcoming fifth Comintern congress in June 1924. Just
prior to this the same issues were discussed at the thir
teenth congress of the Russian party.
Bukharin delivered the report on the international
political situation and developments in the Comintern. In
his estimation, England's increasingly tenuous hold on her
colonies (esp. India),

the fiscal crisis of the French

government, the lengthening of the workday throughout
Europe, and the cooling of Anglo-French relations in the
wake of the Ruhr occupation all pointed to a westward shift
(i_.e. , away from Germany) of political opportunities for the
communist movement. While the bourgeoisie was no longer
facing a critical situation, it was in need of a "breathing
spell." This would find expression in efforts by the bour-

291

geoisie to seek its own united front, a tactic which not by
accident would assume the form of fascism in the defeated
countries, and "pacifism" (the "liberal bourgeoisie plus
liberal workers' politics," _e.g., the MacDonald regime in
England and the 'Left Bloc'
264
ones.

in France) in the victorious

Recall that while this was the occasion on which Bukha
rin first spoke of "a certain stabilization" of capitalism,
he used the opportunity to speak primarily of instances of
heightened class antagonisms,

including those cases where

the communist parties had suffered defeats (Germany, Bul
garia, e t c .). The political "crisis" which gripped the par
ties of the International stemmed, in Bukharin's view, from
the application of united front tactics (described as the
tactics of splitting off "those layers of the working class
infected by petty bourgeois ideology" from the social demo
cratic movement) by communist parties which had not yet
proven themselves capable of shaking off the vestiges of
265
opportunist, petty bourgeois political habits.
The danger
which this entailed was a "right danger," and one which
perhaps the International had been somewhat slow to
recognize:
The extreme left in the KPD...had for a long time
signalled of a right danger. And with the full authority
of the Communist International we supported, for a con
siderable period, the right groupings in the party. But
after remnants of social democratic ideology revealed
themselves among the right over these two major questions
[_i.e^ , the coalition government in Saxony and the inter
pretation of united front tactics as "bloc politics"
rather than an "agitational manuever"— N.K.]..., when it
became absolutely apparent that a great deal of the
unfavorable consequences of the October events were bound
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up with the right orientation, after this the question
arose, in a preliminary way, that perhaps we should alter
our party orientation.[266]
Indeed, Bukharin somewhat defensively continued,

"we had

continuously been saying, in opposition to a number of
comrades,

that much of what the left was saying was cor

rect." A decisive "turn of the wheel to the left" was also
267
necessary in the British party.
Trotsky had begun to oppose the policies of the Russian
party during 1923, and In October sent a letter to the
central committee outlining the economic and political spe268
cifics of his disagreements with the Politburo.
Only a
week later, the so-called platform of the 46 was distributed
within the party, and echoed many of Trotsky's complaints.
Although "no definite evidence exists of collusion between
Trotsky and the authors of the program," the fact that many
of the 46 were associates and political allies of Trotsky’s
easily suggested that a formal opposition bloc was in the
269
process of coalescing.
In his report at the thirteenth
congress, Bukharin took note of these developments in his
observation that the right wing in member sections of the
Comintern was almost invariably supported by the right in
the Russian party (these tendencies being personified re270
spectively by Radek-Brandler and Trotsky).
Fifth Congress of the Communist International
Mid June-early July 1924
Zinoviev's opening speech, which as usual was a report
on the work of the ECCI since the previous congress, echoed
Bukharin’s address to the Russian party on the imperative of
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maintaining an implacable hostility to social democracy. By
way of a criticism of Radek and Brandler, Zinoviev declared
that the need for an attack on the reformists was particu
larly acute now that social democracy was in power (England
and France), so as to expose the true nature of the
"democratic-pacifist" phase and of social democracy as "the
271
third bourgeois party."
The SPD now had to be regarded as
"a wing of fascism," rather than (as in the Radek-Brandler
perspective) a party defeated by fascism.
cy had intended to combat fascism,

If social democra

argued Zinoviev, the

social democrats would have moved closer to the communists.
The fact that this did not happen proved the SPD had become
272
a wing of fascism.
One of the most widespread misconceptions is that this
identification of social democracy and fascism ("social
fascism") dates only from the supposedly ’Stalinist third
period*

(ca, 1928). It should therefore be noted that the

notion of social fascism emerged earlier, its source was not
Stalin, but the Zinoviev leadership of the Comintern. E.H.
Carr documents the fusion of social democracy and fascism by
Zinoviev from as early as 1922, and convincingly demon
strates that the principal support for the notion of social
fascism stemmed from the KPD, especially after the October
1923 debacle and the advent of the left, rather than from
273
Stalin.
Bukharin was also at this time conspicuous in the
Comintern leadership (a leading member of the presidium of
the ECCI), and although his attacks on social democracy were
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as vituperative as Zinoviev's, Bukharin did not use the term
social fascism. For Bukharin, social democracy and fascism
were not exactly one and the same thing, although they were
both "tactics" reflective of the "same objective require
ment of the bourgeoisie," viz, to capture a measure of mass
274
support.
In his 1928 "Draft Programme of the Communist
International" Bukharin said that "Social-Democracy not
275
infrequently plays an openly fascist role."
Perhaps the most shocking episode in the documentation
of the social fascism saga is recounted by Theodore Draper,
and is worth quoting at length:
Until now, it has been widely believed that Bukharin
was wholly opposed to the concept of social-fascism and
that Stalin had forced it on him.... This belief was
based on a passage in Professor Daniels* book: ’Behind
the scenes, Bukharin expressed opinions which belied his
official view of the right danger. To the Swiss Comintern
Secretary, Humbert-Droz,...Bukharin wrote to express
sympathy with the idea that the communists* best in
terests lay in alliances with the Social Democrats
against fascism. He apologized for not being able to
support this position in public because of the critical
situation which he faced within the Communist Party of
Russia*. As his authority for this startling revelation,
Professor Daniels gave 'Bukharin to J. Humbert-Droz,
September 1928 (Humbert-Droz Archive)'....
I went through the Humbert-Droz Archive twice without
being able to find such a letter. In puzzlement, I wrote
to Professor Daniels, and he has informed me that it was
all a 'mistake', based on hearsay.[276]
Draper, like E.H. Carr, correctly and assiduously
traces the origins of the concept of social fascism, and he
moreover chronicles the influential historians of the Com
munist International and the years from which they mistaken
ly date social fascism: Franz Borkenau (one of his books has
it 1929-1930, the other 1929), Barrington Moore, Jr. (July
1928), Hugh Seton-Watson (after July 1928), Isaac Deutscher
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(1929), and R. Paine Dutt (May 1929). Draper's list omits
Braunthal, who also perpetuates the myth that Zinoviev
"merely echoed Stalin, who d e c l a r e d S o c i a l

Democracy is,
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objectively, the moderate wing of fascism’."
not 'echoing' anyone;

Zinoviev was

in fact, precisely the reverse is true

because the passage attributed to Stalin appeared only in
September 1924, several months after Zinoviev's speech, in
one of Stalin's earliest discourses on international af278
fairs.
Braunthal did not quote Stalin directly, choosing
instead to rely on Deutscher. The latter does refer to the
original text, but steadfastly maintains, without explana
tion, that the doctrine of social fascism stems from
279
Stalin.
Fernando Claudin also remarks on "Stalin’s thesis
of 'social Fascism'," and the "conceptions (such as that of
'social F a s c i s m ' . w h i c h had been laid down by Stalin," but
280
without any references at all.
Bukharin's biographer
Stephen Cohen considers social fascism to be one of Stalin's
"Comintern initiatives," cites Stalin's 1924 remark, but
does not mention Zinoviev's earlier identification of social
281
democracy and fascism.
Hone of this is to suggest that Stalin did not sub
sequently participate in the application of a distended
concept of social fascism by his party (and Comintern)
constituency over the unfolding of the 'third period'. But
to say this carries very different implications than to
claim that the 'third period' and its political conceptions
were merely the international analog, conveyed by "automatic
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282
transmission" (Deutscher),

of a Stalinist left turn in

Soviet domestic policy, or that these policies were "laid
down" (Claudin) by Stalin, or engineered "upon Stalin's
283
personal orders" (Borkenau).
In the discussion following Zinoviev's report, Radek
and Brandler defended their actions before and during the
October events,

the former pointing out that (at the time)

"Comrade Zinoviev did not hold our entry into the [Saxon
coalition] government to have been a mistake," and the
latter arguing that he (and the recently replaced KPD lead
ership generally) had throughout 1923 merely been applying
the directives and slogans of the third and fourth cong284
resses of the Comintern.
Klara Zetkin supported Radek and
Brandler, arguing that if the ousted KPD leadership was
being accused of opportunism, the ECCI must be equally
blamed for not having earlier identified the nature and
285
sources of this opportunism.
Many historians, E.H. Carr among them, claim that these
286
arguments left Zinoviev 'embarrased',
but it is not the
case that Zinoviev developed his criticisms of the right
only ex post (as Zetkin maintained). Radek and Zinoviev had
been at odds over the interpretation of the "workers' gov
ernment" slogan since its inception— as the ECCI representa
tive in Germany, Radek was in a position to ensure that
practice corresponded more closely to his views. And while
the "'workers' government'

[had been] defined In Imprudent

detail as including left coalitions of all kinds" (Carr),
it must be recalled (as Carr does not) that communists were
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specifically prohibited from participating in reformist
coalitions. That is, the "definition" of a "workers' govern
ment" had been written as a list, "including left coalitions
of all kinds," but participation in these was specifically
287
ruled out by the original 1922 tactical thesis no. 11.
Also in the discussion of Zinoviev's report, Radek
adamantly claimed to be "in absolute agreement with comrade
Zinoviev that one cannot have an united front from above
unless one has it from below." And the united front from
below "we had not organized; our factory councils were
divided, they were nothing but separate atoms." After this
assessment, Radek was about to continue, and opened with:
"If the Saxon government had relied upon the congress of
factory councils...." when Ruth Fischer (of the KPD left)
exclaimed from her seat "Why was it not called together?"
Radek professed this to be "just the mistake which I admit,"
288
to which Fischer replied "We asked for It six times!"
The point is that ambiguity and dispute did not sudden
ly materialize only as a consequence of some 'rewriting' of
history on the part of Zinoviev (however self-serving his
remarks). There had been imprecision and contentiousness all
along, on both sides. Zinoviev perhaps could be criticized
for not being far-sighted enough in the spring of 1923 to
recognize the developing revolutionary situation (this crit
icism would apply even more strongly to the right, however);
he should perhaps have acted sooner in a more decisive
fashion, but his ambivalent maneuvering must be seen in
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light of the very real danger of a split in the KPD through
out 1923. Radek had on numerous occasions clashed with the
ECCI, as Zinoviev successfully pointed out, and in several
cases prior to the October action the ECCI had sought to
promote the aspirations of the KPD left, as the "Resolution
of the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Report of the ECCI”
289
pointed out.
It is likely true that the right's tactics precluded
the possibility of a revolutionary outcome and that the left
(especially in the Comintern) should have been more percep
tive and militant in combatting the right's reluctance to
pursue mass mobilization for revolutionary ends. Far too
many commentators, however, seem to accept the illogical
conclusion advanced by the KPD right and its supporters that
the failure of the October uprising somehow provided a
vindication of the right's thinking and tactics. While the
castigation of the right at the fifth congress was therefore
in many respects on the mark, there nonetheless was a fail
ure to reconize that only symptoms were being addressed.
'Bolshevization' was hardly as thorough as many Western
commentators imagine, and helped serve the far too optimis
tic opinion that a "Resolution" of the fifth congress was
quite sufficient to effect a "determined solution" (an as
sessment provided by the "Resolution" itself) to the prob290
lems of the KPD.
The "Resolution" did take a distinctly leftward tilt,
noting that "the danger of right deviations... turned out to
be far greater In the execution of the united front tactics
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than could have been foreseen," that the united front could
never be "more than a revolutionary method of agitation and
of mobilizing the masses," and that any effort to use the
workers’ government slogan "not for agitation for the prole
tarian dictatorship, but as a means of coalition with bour
geois democracy" must be rejected. The notion that social
democracy was the right wing of the working class had also
been proven false, and it was necessary to emphasize "the
true character of social democracy as the left wing of the
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bourgeoisie."
Varga delivered the economic report to the congress,
and his views were embodied in the "Theses on the World
Economic Situation." The recent upturn in some of the capi
talist economies was temporary; the overall situation was
still one of crisis amidst a general downward trend. The
"Theses" foresaw rising class conflict as a result of deep
ening differentiation (caused by the "process of concentra
tion and cartellization") and regarded as "inevitable" only
the emergence of "mass movements of the proletariat... in the
immediate future." Whether these movements would succeed in
the revolutionary project would depend on "the ability of
the communist parties to exploit, organizationally and po
litically, the objectively revolutionary situations which
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will develop."
In a separate and fairly standard docximent
(drafted by Trotsky) on the tenth anniversary of the out
break of the war, an incidental comment predicted the demise
of the economic upturn following the saturation of the
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American market.
The "Theses on Tactics" adopted at the congress were
contained in a long document of fifteen sections. Among
these was an elaboration of Bukharin’s views on the emer
gence of a "democratic-pacifist phase" in some of the lead
ing capitalist powers where liberal and social democratic
governments had ascended to power. The significance of this
development did not lie in "the beginning of the stabiliza
tion of the capitalist ’order' on the basis of 'democracy'
and peace, but merely the concealment of its rule while
294
bourgeois world reaction is intensified...."
As a corol
lary, social democracy moved
from being the right wing of the labor movement [to]
becoming one wing of the bourgeoisie, in places even a
wing of fascism. That is why it is historically incorrect
to talk of 'a victory of fascism over social-democracy'.
So far as their leading strata are concerned, fascism and
social-democracy are the right and left hands of modern
capitalism.[295]
The fifth congress reaffirmed the directives issued at
the two previous congresses concerning the need for commu
nist parties to become mass organizations. This was one of
the very few areas where a criticism of the 'ultra-left' was
apparent: a warning was issued against excessively volun
tarist attitudes and against the view "that communist par
ties may be parties of a 'terrorist minority'." Even so,
this was somewhat tempered (at the beginning of the section
on organizational tactics) by an emphasis on the importance
of the "subjective factor" as the "cardinal question of the
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entire epoch."
As regards the tempo of the revolutionary process, the
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congress perceived "the rise of a new revolutionary wave"
based on the events in Germany and Bulgaria, and waves of
strikes in several of the industrial countries. The major
emphasis was on combatting "right-opportunist tendencies,"
and as such the tactics of the united front were clarified.
The united front from above together with from below were
approved, while the united front from above alone was cate297
gorically rejected.
Among the more widely known aspects of the fifth cong
ress was the tactical injunction to "bolshevize" the member
sections, _i.e., to make the organizational structure of the
Russian party the mold for the others. "Bolshevization of
the parties means that our sections must take over for
themselves everything in Russian bolshevism that has inter
national significance." The five "basic features of a gen
uine bolshevik party" were listed: (i) a mass party capable
of operating under both legal and illegal conditions,

(ii)

the party must be flexible enough (i_.e. , to allow tactical
maneuver,

(iii) the party must be revolutionary and Marxist

in orientation,

(iv) the party must be centralized with no

factions, e t c ., (v) the party must carry on political activ298
ity in the armed forces.
There was no alteration of or
addendum to the original organizational directives of the
"21 Conditions," it was more the case that
[t]he fifth congress could hardly fail to reflect the
widening gap between the one party which had a victorious
revolution to its credit and the parties which had
failed, or had not even made the attempt. What had hap
pened inevitably strengthened still further Russian pres
tige and predominance in Comintern, and popularized the
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view that other parties, in order to qualify themselves
for the same success, must above all follow the Russian
model and submit to Russian guidance.[299]
*

1.

*

*

Soviet relations with the capitalist countries,

apparently in an ambivalent equilibrium during most of 1924
such that "each blow seemed to be tempered by some fresh
gain" (Carr), soured considerably thereafter. The German
tilt to the west (Dawes Plan), the fall of the Labour gov
ernment in Britain,

the election of Coolidge in the United

States and especially the revolt in Soviet Georgia to which
the western powers lent support all contributed to unease
and the reappearance of fears that an immediate threat of
military intervention against the U.S.S.R. existed.
A conference to discuss a proposed security pact was
organized for October 1925 in Locarno, and excluded the
U.S.S.R. The resulting agreements included an acceptance by
France, Germany and Belgium of their mutual borders, and the
de-militarlzation of the Rhineland. These aspects of the
pact were to be guaranteed and enforced by Britain and
Italy. There were no agreements on Germany's eastern borders
(with Poland and Czechoslovakia) other than a pledge to
resolve all disputes peacefully. France and Poland signed a
treaty promising each other military support in the event of
an attack.
In the Comintern,

these developments were widely re

garded as threatening to the Soviet Union and/or to peace
generally. It was certainly the case that Locarno was a
major victory for British foreign policy on several fronts,
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not least that of dividing the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Al
though several Soviet-German agreements (on trade, and prom
ises of neutrality) followed in the months after Locarno,
"the old sense of a common destiny as outcasts from the
European community1' (Carr) was gone, and the increasing
international isolation of the Soviet Union was unmistak
able .
2.

In 1925 for the first time the phrase "stabilization

of capitalism" began to appear regularly in Comintern pro
nouncements. Recall that Bukharin had made (one) reference
to "a certain stabilization" at the thirteenth congress of
the RCP(b) in May 1924, but the expression gained currency
only around the time of the fifth enlarged plenum of the
ECCI (March 1925), when separate preparatory articles by
Zinoviev and Stalin each remarked on "stabilization" and
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Varga used the term in his presentation.
Although both
Zinoviev and Stalin at this time spoke of "two stabiliza
tions" (i.-e,-> of capitalism and the Soviet Union), Zinoviev
was already drifting over to the opposition and Trotsky's
hostility to the notion of 'socialism in one country'.
Indeed, by June 1925 Zinoviev appears to have changed his
mind on stabilization, and published an article entitled
301
"The Epoch of Wars and Revolutions."
Cautious as ever about the prospects of promoting a
European revolution, Stalin in early 1925 enumerated the
four "allies of the Soviet power,” listing these as the
proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries,
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the masses

in the colonies, the "struggle, conflicts and wars" amongst
the imperialist powers, and the peasantry. Stalin essential
ly dismissed the first two "allies" as being of no palpable
importance in the near future, conceded that while the
peasantry was participating in economic relations with so
cialist industry it was nevertheless not "reliable," which
left inter-imperialist contradictions as the principal ally
302
of the Soviet Union.
Coupled with a theoretical concep
tion in which the central categories are the "two stabiliza
tions," or the "two camps," and in which "the international
situation will to an increasing degree be determined by the
303
relation of forces between these two camps,"
the quite
logical implicit political conclusion is that Soviet (and
presumably, international socialist) interests would be best
promoted through exploiting inter-imperialist rivalries.
So even at this early juncture, the different under
lying conceptions of stabilization and its contradictions
discussed in the previous section came to be reflected in
divergent programmatic emphases. Stalin gravitated toward
the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel)
and its view
that communist parties could profitably collaborate with
other Left parties opposed to their bourgeois govern
ments, especially those of a Fascist complexion, even
with parties which did not accept the revolutionary pro
gramme of communism.[304]
Bukharin, on the other hand, despite his support of
Stalin against Trotsky in the central committee at this
time, pushed for a "class against class" strategy in Europe.
Together with Jules Humbert-Droz, and against Stalin, Bukha
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rin was successful in advocating that the French Communist
Party abandon its support of the ’Left Bloc' and that the
Communist Party of Great 3ritain cease collaboration with
305
Labour.
Although arguably Stalin's approach of collabora
tion 'from above' might have yielded more favorable results
than the strategy actually adopted--there were no communist
deputies chosen in the subsequent French (1928) or British
(1929) general elections— the point is that the turn to the
left originated with Bukharin and was linked to his theoret
ical understanding of the contradictions of stabilization.
The "class against class" slogan was coined (in this tacti
cal conjuncture) by Bukharin's associate Humbert-Droz in
March 1927, it "was not launched at the Sixth World Congress
[1928].. ..[it] was certainly not introduced in connection
with Stalin's rise to power, and he surely did not bear
306
'major responsibility* for it."
3.

In May 1926, a protest by British mineworkers over

wages developed into a massive general strike supported by
the British Trade Union Congress (TUC), which jointly with
the All-Russian Central Committee of Trade Unions had estab
lished the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee in April
1925. This action seemed to confirm the Third Interna
tional's stated view that the center of gravity of revolu
tion had shifted westward and that a turn to the left among
European workers had become discernible. Although the strike
and the international working class support It touched off
provided glorious evidence of internationalist solidarity,
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the British government's strategy was effective:
With unerring precision, the Government and its sup
porters concentrated from the start on the one issue
which was, above all others, certain to unnerve the
Labour leaders: the issue of revolution and unconstitu
tionality. Concentration on that issue had another im
mense advantage--it made it unnecessary to discuss the
miners' case at all....
Try though they night to persuade themselves and others
that they were engaged in a purely industrial dispute,
almost a routine strike, [the leadership of the Labour
Party] knew that it was more than that, and it was this
which made them feel guilty, uneasy, insecure. In fact,
they half shared, indeed more than half shared, the
Government's view that the General Strike was a politi
cally and morally reprehensible venture, undemocratic,
anti-parliamentary, subversive.[307]
These same events were described in the following way by an
ECCI analysis of the strike: "If the labor leaders acted as
though they failed to understand the political character of
the strike,

the Government and the bourgeoisie understood it
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very well, and acted accordingly...."
The Baldwin govern
ment so thoroughly disquieted the Labour leadership that on
12. May the general strike was ended and all demands uncon
ditionally withdrawn. The miners doggedly hung on for an
other six months, but eventually resumed work under condi
tions worse than before.
From an historical perspective,

the significance of

this defeat for the miners consisted in
the transformation of the workers' movement into a tame,
disciplined trade union and electoral interest.
This Is not only to say that never again would the
trade unions and the Labour Party seek to exercise po
litical influence against the Government of the day by
the use of the industrial weapon. It also means that the
trade unions would shun militancy over industrial
issues.[309]
Within the Comintern, however, the Immediate effect of the
defeat of the general strike was to further the acrimony
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between the majority and the Trotskyist opposition. Trotsky
tentatively advocated disbanding the Anglo-Russian Trade
Union Committee, but agreed "to waive his demand" in order
to entice Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev into joining the opposi310
tion,
Stalin at this time, in a series of speeches,
agreed that the British TUC had "doomed the strike to inevi
table failure," and accused the TUC of "treachery" and "a
whole chain of betrayals," although he did not advocate
311
forsaking the Anglo-Russian Committee.
Against Trotsky,
Stalin depicted abandonment of the joint committee as an
ultra-left "theatrical gesture" since,
for all their reactionary character, the trade unions of
the west are the most elementary organizations of prole
tariat, those best understood by the most backward work
ers, and therefore the most comprehensive organizations
of the proletariat.[312]
In Bukharin's estimation, the turn to the left was
nowhere more apparent than in Britain, but he agreed with
Stalin (and the majority of the ECCI) that leaving the
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Anglo-Russian Committee at that juncture was undesirable.
This seemingly perverse attitude (i,.£. , why remain in ca
hoots with reformists at a time when revolutionary senti
ments were on the rise?) reflected the success of the Na
tional Left Wing Movement, organized by the Communist Party
of Great Britain,

in chipping local Labour constituencies

away from the national party in order to form an organized
left-wing faction within Labour.
The Comintern "Theses on the Lessons of the General
Strike" interpreted the strike as confirmation of "the g e n 
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eral move to the left of the workers...." The Anglo-Russian
Trade Union Committee was a product of the united front
tactics, designed to expose the reactionary British trade
union leaders and win over the masses to the side of the
revolution.

In the official Comintern view, the betrayal of

the strike by the Labour leadership partly accomplished this
goal. As such, it would be folly to leave the Anglo-Russian
Committee, declared the "Theses," because if the reformist
leaders moved even further to the right--which was "highly
probable"--they would be utterly exposed to the remaining
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workers as traitors to the proletariat.
As it happened,
the British TUC voted to disband the joint venture with the
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Russian trade union federation in 1927.
In a further
setback, the British government severed diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1927.
4. As early as the spring of 1925 a revolutionary
316
situation had begun to develop in China.
A strike in the
Shanghai textile factories spread into a series of strikes
which increasingly assumed an anti-imperialist and revolu
tionary character throughout the major cities of China. The
leading role played by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in
these events very rapidly transformed the party from a small
group of intellectuals and university professors into a mass
organization. Since January 1923 the CCP, by direction of
the ECCI, had instructed its members to join Sun Yat-sen’s
Kuomintang (KMT) on an individual basis while the CCP would
317
separately maintain its own organization.
The KMT under
Sun Yat-sen was, in the terminology of the Comintern, a
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"national-revolutionary" organization rooted in the liberaldemocratic bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, intellegentsia
and proletariat.
Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, before the strike
movement began, and leadership of the KMT passed to Chiang
Kai-shek. So long as the May strike movement was centered in
Japanese-owned textile factories,

the KMT acquiesced; but as

the actions spread to include Chinese-owned enterprises as
well, relations between the CCP and KMT became tense. The
ECCI urged the CCP not to press matters to the point of
insurrection, deeming an uprising premature. Even as the May
movement ebbed during the summer of 1925, however, troops
under the comprador Chang Tso~lin suppressed striking work
ers and students. Then, when some of Chang's supporters
began to rebel against his leadership, a fresh impetus
appeared for joint CCP-KMT anti-imperialist struggle, and a
breach was averted.
The second congress of the KMT in January 1926 seemed
to evidence a growing influence of the CCP (almost onefourth of the newly elected KMT central committee were
communists), but in May 1926 Chiang suddenly ordered the
arrest of key leaders of the CCP, the removal of communist
political commissars attached to the army (of whom there
were many), and the confinement of Soviet military advisors.
Chiang had evidently decided that his forces were adequately
prepared "to launch the long-awaited 'northern expedition'"
against the comprador warlords. Carr astutely describes the
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two principal reasons for the rift between the KMT and the
Comintern. First, Chiang's Soviet military advisors, and the
Comintern generally, considered the move reckless. The Com
intern, having already been disappointed in the widely an
ticipated European revolution, could not bring itself to
believe in the imminence of an Asian revolution which had
always seemed more remote than a European one, despite the
admonitions of Lenin in his final years. Second, once revo
lution had suddenly appeared on the agenda,

"the hollowness

of the verbal compromise" between the bourgeois-nationalist
and social revolutions became evident, and Chiang merely
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forced the issue.
In the Comintern, Chiang*s coup led Zinoviev to suggest
withdrawal of the CCP from the KMT. Trotsky,

in a set of

extensive personal clarificatory notes on China penned five
days before the coup made no mention of a need for independ319
ence of the CCP.
Carr documents several different stories
subsequently provided by Trotsky: an unpublished analysis
(September 1926) written after the coup argued that "partic
ipation of the CCP in the Kuomintang was perfectly correct
in the period when the CCP was a propaganda society which
was only preparing itself for future independent political
activity...," but that the time had come for the CCP "to
fight for direct independent leadership of the awakened
working class...."; by 1930, after Chiang's massacre of
communists in Shanghai (April 1927), Trotsky was claiming
that "I personally was from the very beginning,

that is,

from 1923, resolutely opposed to the Communist Party joining
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the Kuomintang...."
After some hesitation, the majority of the ECCI re
frained from a break with Chiang at this time insofar as a
split would leave the communists unable to influence the
Impending northern campaign whatsoever. Nonetheless,

the

central committee of the Russian party in March 1927 con
sidered it "necessary to adopt the course of arming the
workers and peasants" and expose "the treacherous and reac321
tionary policy of the Kuoraintang Rights."
As it happened
(or "on the face of it," according to the Deutscher ver322
sion),
this assessment was on the mark insofar as during
the campaign communist troops were successful in organizing
workers and peasants, and expropriated landlords in Hunan.
Chiang*s betrayal of the CCP came in April 1927, when fol
lowing a successful communist uprising in Shanghai (once
more directed against Chang Tso-lin) ICuomintang troops en
tered the city demanding that their erstwhile communist
allies surrender all weapons. Compliance with this order led
to a bloody massacre of communists by Chiang’s forces on 12.
April. The ECCI majority assessment at this point became
that the national bourgeoisie had deserted the revolution,
and that the trajectory of development had shifted from that
of a revolutionary national united front (including the
national bourgeoisie) to a working class and agrarian social
323
revolution.
It should be noted that Bukharin’s and Stalin's views
on the question of the Chinese revolution closely coincided,
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and that at this stage there was no indication of Stalin
forcing Bukharin to say things which were more ’radical*
than Bukharin believed. On the contrary: although Bukharin
and Stalin walked in tandem when it came to the Chinese
question, on every other significant issue of international
politics Bukharin had for quite some time, as seen above,
occupied a position to the left of Stalin. China, moreover,
was not merely the exception that proved the rule (of Bukharinisra as origin of the turn to the left)— China's semi
colonial status meant that theories of capitalist stabiliza
tion (or capitalist anything else) did not apply. Neither
Bukharin's nor Stalin's analysis of the Chinese situation
was particularly good, but their views on China could be
similar precisely because their quite different theoretical
outlooks on the 'contradictions of capitalist stabilization*
were irrelevant in the Chinese case.
At the time of the fifteenth congress of the VKP(b) in
December 1927, which also marked the official expulsion of
the opposition from the party, Bukharin continued to be more
emphatic and concrete about the turn to the left than
Stalin, although the latter had finally begun to speak for
the first time of Europe on the "eve" of a "neriod” charac324*
terized by "a new revolutionary upsurge."
Concretely,
however, the immediate tasks of the communist parties seemed
quite modest in Stalin's view: "to develop the Communist
Parties....; to strengthen the revolutionary trade unions
and the workers' united front....;

to maintain peaceful
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relations with the capitalist countries...."
Bukharin, by
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contrast, argued not only that the united front should be
strengthened, but that it had "become necessary to effect
[a] change of emphasis... in the direction of a more inten326
sive fight against the Social Democratic leaders."
While
Bukharin thus explicitly advocated "changing...the united
front tactics" in a leftward direction, Stalin spoke only of
"strengthening" the united front per se, and made no refer
ence to a new orientation.
A practical outcome of the party congress was a
strengthening of Stalin's position in the nine-member Polit
buro, with the replacement of Zinoviev and Trotsky by Ya.
Rudzutak and V. Kuibyshev. The falling out between Stalin
and Bukharin became evident only in the spring of 1928, and
then only in discussions within the Politburo; the disagree
ment centered on Bukharin's growing unease over the extraor
dinary measures for grain procurement, measures he had up
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until then supported.
Within a very short period, even
while the sixth congress of the Comintern was convening in
July 1928, Bukharin's considerable (indeed, decisive) in
fluence on the editorial boards of the crucially important
Pravda (newspaper) and Bol'shevik (theoretical journal) was
severely curtailed by additions and shake-ups.
Sixth Congress of the Communist International
July-August 1928
This account of the origins of the third period in
Comintern history will end at the sixth congress, exactly
where most other explanations of the left turn begin. Rather
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than a starting point,

the sixth congress was the formal

confirmation of tactical changes which had already been
prepared under the guidance of the Bukharin leadership.
Indeed, many of these changes had been ratified even prior
to the congress at the ninth enlarged plenum of the ECCI
(February 1928). Over the objections of the majority of the
central committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain,
the ECCI had instructed the CPGB to adopt "clearer and
sharper tactics of opposition to the Labour Party" due to
the growing "integration of [the] capitalist bourgeoisie and
reformism...." The Labour Party now had to be considered one
328
of two "enemy camps."
The French Communist Party had
already, in November 1927, adopted the "class against class"
tactics following instructions from the ECCI appearing over
329
Bukharin's signature.
The ninth plenum was careful to
characterize the Chinese revolution as still In its
bourgeois-democratic phase. The KMT had now been completely
exposed as reactionary, and the CCP had to "prepare itself
330
for a violent surge forward of new revolutionary waves."
E.H. Carr suggests that after the ninth plenum a "tem
porizing view of the prospects of capitalism" (by the Bukha
rin leadership) prevailed, but that by the time of the sixth
congress four months later this "could no longer be toler
ated" (presumably by Stalin). The "temporizing view" was, in
Carr's opinion, presented in a B o l *shevik article (March
1928) which argued that it would be '"crudely mistaken
theoretically'

to suppose that western capitalism was on the

verge of a breakdown." The evidence presented by Carr to
315

demonstrate that this view "could no longer be tolerated"
consists only of (i) a speech by Stalin in July that sug
gested "contradictions... have ripened...within the capital
ist camp" since 1924, specifically the Anglo-American con
tradiction ("the principal one"),

the contradiction between

imperialism and the colonies, and the contradiction between
the capitalist world and the Soviet Union;

(ii) an article

in Koramunisticheskil Internatsional which "used the wave of
strikes, as well as recent election figures, to demonstrate
the growing power of communist parties in Europe"; and (iii)
an article in Pravda noting "'a sharpening of the struggle
331
against social-democracy’."
But there is a non sequitur
here In that none of the items cited by Carr suggest the
imminence of breakdown, and in fact only repeat the asses
sments which the Bukharin leadership had been providing for
quite some time.
Carr, as many other analysts, notes that Bukharin's
draft theses on the international situation (to be presented
at the sixth congress) were amended after being discussed in
the Russian delegation. Neither Bukharin’s original nor the
altered draft were ever made public (only the final version
passed by the congress was published), and the only extended
description of what transpired in the dicusslon was provided
by Stalin in April 1929, almost a year later, when the
campaign against Bukharin was in full swing. Carr appears to
accept at face value Stalin's claim that in Bukharin's view
capitalist stabilization was "becoming more secure," to
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which (said Stalin) the Russian delegation countered that
"capitalist stabilization is not and cannot be secure,

that

it is being shaken and will continue to be shaken by the
march of events, owing to the crisis of world capital332
ism."
Although it is not known specifically what Bukharin
said about capitalist stabilization in his draft theses,
enough is known (and has been reviewed above) about his
assessments of stabilization between 1926 and 1928 to ques
tion uncritical acceptance of Stalin's remarks. At the
least, Stalin’s statements of April 1929 are more reasonably
regarded as polemical tactics in a highly charged factional
struggle rather than as a faithful account of events at the
congress or an accurate rendition of Bukharin's views on
stabilization. The three other major amendments to Bukha
rin's theses noted by Stalin in 1929 were (i) that Bukharin
confined himself to stressing the need to sharpen the strug
gle against social-democracy generally, and not the struggle
against left social-democracy particularly,

(ii) that Bukha

rin confined himself to merely the fight against the right
deviation in the Comintern, and not the fight against con
ciliatory attitudes toward the right deviation, and (iii)
that Bukharin did not sufficiently stress the need to main333
tain iron discipline in the communist parties.
Richard Day's version of the events is even less pla u
sible. He regards the "real import of the amendment [to be
the] inclusion of Stalin's insistence on the inevitability
334
of war."
Since, however, Day is in a position to know
neither the content of the original draft nor the amendment,
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and since Stalin's own account of the amendment procedure
makes no mention of the inevitability of war question, Day's
revelation of what Stalin 'forced' Bukharin to say is pure
conjecture. Day claims that Bukharin had been growing "des
perate" to save the N.E.P. in Russia, and that this had led
him (as early as the fifteenth congress of the Russian party
in December 1927) to "retract... his forecast of hostili
ties," but Day provides no citations or references to sup
port this. In fact, at the fifteenth congress Bukharin
stated that the "danger of war was never so great as it is
335
now. "
A much more convincing explanation of Stalin's insist
ence on the amendments is indicated (but not pursued) by
Carr himself. Bukharin had for the first time openly opposed
the extraordinary grain procurement measures in the Soviet
Union at the central committee meeting of the Russian party
just prior to the sixth Comintern congress. Stalin's insist
ence on modifying Bukharin's draft theses a few weeks later,
no matter how trivial the content of the amendments, could
still embarass Bukharin and show that he "had forfeited the
336
confidence of the party majority."
Carr seeks to present
the dispute on Comintern affairs in larger (substantive)
terms by implicitly claiming to know (which he cannot) that
Bukharin's draft theses were in fact decisively altered. No
real evidence for this claim exists, and any attempt to
conjecture such evidence requires the implicit assumption
that Bukharin had suddenly and without any prior indications
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altered his conception of capitalist stabilization. Bukha
r i n ’s own assessment of the changes, which admittedly should
not be given any more credence than Stalin's, was that the
337
alterations had only made his draft "more precise."
It is not necessary here to do more than note that the
campaign against Bukharinism, begun In the spring of 1928,
was successful. Moreover, while the campaign may have re
sembled ’m e r e ’ factional strife, real issues (collectiviza
tion, industrialization) were at stake in the sense that
Stalin, in the wake of the defeat of the Trotskyist opposi
tion, was not simply taking over their agrarian program.
Stalin's solution to the grain impasse of the late 1920s was
rooted in a novel theoretical approach, one that owed noth
ing to either the right or the left oppositions which in
fact both proceeded from substantially similar theoretical
fundamentals that belied their different programmatic con338
elusions.
On the international front, however,

the defeat of the

Bukharinist opposition and the consequent consignment to
oblivion of its "variegated" analysis of capitalist stabili
zation meant that a theoretical vacuum inevitably appeared.
The Varga perspective, which had been uneasily coexisting
alongside the Bukharinist, stepped into the breach and be
came virtually by default the prevailing Comintern theory of
capitalism. Whereas the Bukharin approach had initiated the
turn to the left, it fell to the underconsumptionist theory
to complete the shift. This was accomplished by substituting
for the Bukharinist conception of stabilization as self319

limiting growth the only conception possible in a radical
underconsumption milieu (moreover, one which emphasized the
’rottenness’ of the imperialist phase): univocal collapse.
It was as much the logic of the underconsumptionist
view as Stalin’s supposedly implacable radicalism that form
ed the essentials of the Comintern's hard left line between
the time of the sixth congress and the consolidation of
fascist power in Germany during the mid 1930s. Although he
had tilted toward the underconsumption theory and its con
clusions earlier, Stalin came around to wholeheartedly ac
cept it only at the time of the sixteenth congress of the
Russian party in June 1930; even at this juncture, however,
Draper notes that Stalin was saying only that ’’the stabili
zation of capitalism is coming to an end," i..e^ , presumably
339
it had not yet ended,
Stalin inherited the turn to the left, he did not
initiate it in order to defeat Bukharin. Rather than stem
ming from Stalin's personal traits— which I do not for a
moment claim were inconsequential or irrelevant to sub
sequent events— the political forms assumed by the third
period owe at least as much to the Varga-underconsumption
thinking on capitalism, to conditions in the member parties
340
(especially the German),
and to the timely arrival of the
economic crisis which seemingly vindicated Varga and the
theory of decay once and for all.
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126.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The foregoing has sought to provide some inductive
support for the writing of theoretical economic history by
demonstrating, via analytical case study, the vital yet
complex role played by economic theory in the formation of
political strategy and tactics. The specific example consid
ered was the mainstream Marxist labor movement in the years
1860-1930. The necessity of analysis rather than description
stems from the fact that although the role of economic
theory is often decisively important, it is equally often
true that a ready and direct identification of the specific
effects of theory is difficult to provide, i^.e^., its effects
are not immediately and palpably revealed in the 'choices'
that political actors make. This Is not because most politi
cal practitioners (particularly Marxists) fail to explicitly
acknowledge the importance of theory, but rather because the
practical repercussions of conflated levels of theoretical
abstraction, teleological constructs, ill-defined or absent
concepts, etc., frequently only make their appearance ob
liquely, or in a domain once, twice, or even further removed
from that in which the theoretical construct had originally
been erected.
One aspect of the exercise has been a writing of the
theoretical history itself, viz., criticism of the varied
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economic theories of capitalism advanced by socialist poli
ticians (and/or prevalent in socialist political parties)
has been linked to the political practice advocated or
pursued by the politicians and/or parties. The second aspect
of the study then logically entailed the demonstration that
these theoretical conceptions of capitalist economy provide
a good explanation (as good as or better than rival explana
tions) of the political conclusions reached by their propo
nents. Note that the approach taken herein has never implied
the claim that the entirety of an individual's (or party's)
political makeup derives directly from their

'preferred*

1

theory of capitalism.

Lenin's politics, for example, proba

bly owe something to the fact of his brother’s execution at
the hands of the tsarist regime. But for an analyst (a
Marxist one at that) to claim to somehow know that Lenin's
considerations on party organization sprang full-blown from
2
the sad episode of Alexander's death is arguably fanciful.
The theory-dependence of politics is more complex, but no
less crucial merely because of this complexity, than expla
nations which dwell on the 'personal' or 'psychological*.
Indeed,

it is precisely the attenuated nature of the link

between economic theory and politics which makes it both
possible and necessary to speak of the sense in which the
logic of an economic theory imposes itself on practice,
since it most frequently takes place 'behind the backs* of
the practitioners.
A clear case of economic theory's perceptible effects
on practice was discussed in Chapter I, which traced the
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development of Marx's theoretical work and his conduct of
political matters.

It was shown that prior to his working

out of a complete economic theory of capitalism, Marx's
understanding of capitalist society derived from a concep
tion of history rooted in philosophy. Economic notions
(wages, capital, etc.) were present, but they were not yet
concepts. These non-concepts, once instantiated in Marx's
philosophy of history, nonetheless became metamorphosed into
vessels (in the sense of containers), with a shape and a
palpability which belied the fact that they were--empty. The
relations between these contentless notions could not,
therefore, be governed by the structure of the notions
themselves (as is the case with genuine theoretical con
cepts), but came to be dictated by the highly general phi
losophy of history in which they were embedded. The con
sequence was the outline of capitalism in which the homo
genizing and levelling tendencies of the accumulation proc
ess appeared to stand alone, seemingly driving real history
to the pure final result in which "The working men have no
country."
Conclusions of this sort were gradually discarded by
Marx in step with his elaboration of the economic theory of
capitalism. Commodity, value, money, capital, etc., were
systematically worked over into concepts as opposed to only
designating the names of things; serious attention was de
voted to distinguishing levels of theoretical abstraction
3
and the legitimate applications of these abstractions.
The
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implication, as evidenced by Marx's political approach after
the early 1850s (and especially with the International Work
ing Men's Association,

the First International), was an

increasingly 'complex’ and non-deterministic politics (Chap
ter I, subheading C ) . Once the economic analysis of capital
allowed the prospects for revolutionary politics to be eval
uated from the standpoint of a theoretically informed con
crete analysis (rather than the mere, even if 'artistic',
hypostatization of generalities),

the conception of an ac

tually or even eventually existing homogeneous proletariat
vanished. Concerted international working class political
action, while not ruled out as an impossibility, came to be
regarded by Marx as a political program to be forged and
continuously re-forged. The process of accumulation not only
produced, it also continually reproduced, the economic con
ditions which simultaneously fostered and equivocated prole
tarian political unity.
Marx had determined that the 'pure' theory of capital
ism (as ultimately embodied in Capital) could not be regard
ed as the "historical tendency" and "logical conclusion" (as
Luxemburg later maintained) of the real development of capi
talism, any more than the Newtonians' first approximation of
a 'frlctlonless' environment could be regarded as the "logi
cal conclusion" of actual motion in the physical world. The
relationship between theory and the reality it sought to
explain was now treated in a much more contingent manner
than before— Marx had adopted a materialist perspective in
more than form, and had begun to operate from an epistemo347

logical perspective resembling modern scientific realism.

It

was this sense of the contingency mediating the theoryreality relation which for a time escaped Marx's followers.
Within the Second International, Bernstein's politics
not surprisingly reflected his criticism of Marxism from
essentially bourgeois theoretical positions (Chapter II,
subheading C). From the standpoint of this study, however,
more interesting and important considerations emerge from an
analysis of the differences among those who sought to defend
Marxism from Bernstein's revisionism, and the manner in
which economic-theoretical discord produced or was reflected
in varying political judgements. For the 'orthodox* tendency
in the International, determinism in economic theory
(Kautsky) plus a pacifist social orientation combined to
produce a political position which affirmed the 'necessity'
of a peaceful capitalism (ultra-imperialism). The determin
istic vein in Plekhanov’s work stemmed not so much from his
own economic analyses (of which there were few) nor his
philosophical efforts, which, contrary to much of the con
temporary wisdom, are not crudely deterministic. Rather,
Plekhanov's deterministic-teleological constructions derive
from his over-reliance on the economic themes of Marx's
Manifesto which, as already argued above, were drawn from
the philosophical theory of history ultimately abandoned by
Marx himself.
Luxemburg, despite the militant orientation and inde
fatigable spirit which render her so appealing, was unable

348

to resolve the revisionisn-orthodoxy quandary. This must be
recognized and affirmed, without casting unwarranted asper
sions, particularly in view of those increasingly ingenious
efforts to recover Luxemburg. As argued in Chapter II,
subsection E, it Is simply impossible to disengage the
tension between activism and fatalism in Luxemburg’s work—
indeed, Luxemburg’s theoretical schema necessarily produces
a continual oscillation between determinism and voluntarism
in politics.
Although Lenin's approach surmounted in practice the
impasse erected by the revisionism controversy, it did so in
a not entirely theoretically satisfactory manner, with
shortcomings which were not long in returning home to roost.
L e ni n’s "concrete analysis of a concrete situation" was no
doubt a major methodological step toward recapturing the
complexity of Marx's mature approach, but the fortuitous
aspects of the success of the Leninist project were not
always recognized as such. It was precisely the spectacular
practical success of Leninism which led to its virtually
uncritical incorporation into the revolutionary working
class movement. Not unreasonably, organizational considera
tions were perceived as the hallmark of the Leninist
approach, and the optimism of the immediately post
revolutionary period suggested that surmounting theoreticalpolitical problems was possible by simply drawing the appro
priate organizational lines of demarcation.
But while the effects exercised by economic theory on
politics may be silent and indirect, they are also inexora
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ble. Even the seemingly ironclad "21 Conditions” of admis
sion to the Comintern could not prevent economic theory from
leaving its specific imprint on the communist politics of
the 1920s. In this case, Le nin’s theoretical legacy did not
make a positive contribution. The poorly worked out aspects
of his economic theory--especially the inconsistency inher
ent in his treatment of the corapetition-monopoly question
and the pseudo-concept of "moribund” capitalism— forced
their way into the theoretical orientation of the Comintern.
While Lenin's notion of "moribund" or "decaying" capi
talism produced very consequential effects, it was not whol
ly or partly responsible for the origins of the third period
in Comintern politics, as some Marxists (Claudin,
Poulantzas) maintain. The turn to the left wing politics of
the third period originated with the disproportionality
approach of Bukharin and his analysis of the growing contra
dictions of capitalist stabilization. Bukharin by and large
succeeded in presenting an analysis which treated the inten
sification of contradictions as an integral aspect of the
resumption of accumulation, by contrast to the underconsump
tion approach which forced observable phenomena into precon
ceived images of "decay." Disproportionality explicitly
avoided the notion of "decay," and was able to explain the
upturn,

the aggravation of contradictions as accumulation

proceeded, and the eventual downturn; but disproportionality
was less suited to pinpointing why a particular downturn
would or might be the final "structural" crisis of capital

350

ism, Varga's underconsumption view, on the other hand, was
in relative abeyance through the mid-1920s as Varga's ef
forts to deny any evidence of a resumption of economic
activity began to sound increasingly ad h o c . The persistence
of generally high levels of unemployment in Europe was the
toehold needed by the underconsumption theory to retain a
semblance of offering a viable explanation of economic con
ditions in the capitalist world.
After the campaign against the right deviation and
Bukharin began to make an impression, however,

the undercon

sumption approach began its move to center stage by default,
and soon displaced disproportionality as the prevailing
theory of capitalism's contradictions once Bukharin's views
on socialist development were rejected in the Russian party
and his political influence collapsed. The triumph of under
consumption might have been shortlived, due to its under
lying inability to reasonably explain any recovery in the
process of accumulation, were it not for the economic col
lapse in the capitalist world after 1929. Suddenly the
imagery of "decay” came into its own, and was actually more
compelling than disproportionality in its description of
empirical events, as the 'rationalization' and

'stabiliza

tion' of capitalism in the previous few years were
forgotten.
The increasingly implacable character of the left turn
after 1929 was sustainable largely as a result of the suc
cess enjoyed by underconsumption in 'predicting' the Great
Depression— it was the theory of underconsumption and its
351

descriptive baggage (the collapse of an ’overripe’ capital
ism) rather than Stalin as such which made the distended
version of the third period possible.
It is particularly the case for the Comintern's politi
cal history that economic theory must comprise a significant
component of any effort at understanding. Without the in
sights gained by assigning a major explanatory role to
economic theory, the alternative is an account rooted in
Stalin's personality and/or his tactics in factional strug
gle. While these latter factors are certainly not irrele
vant, their utilization as the principal explanation of
events is sustainable only by a careless approach to the
dating of events (Chapter III, subheadings C and D ) .
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No t e s

to C h a pte r IV

1. The ironical quotes reflect my realist view that the
'preferred’ theory of capitalism does not acquire its status
as the result of 'choices' made by practitioners. "The
scientific practice will exist in a particular society as an
autonomous practice provided it plays an appropriate role or
function in that society. This will not be a matter of the
decisions of individuals." Chalmers, What Is This Thing
Called Science?, 139.
2. P.N. Pospelov et a l ., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965),24.

A Biography

3. The subject matter of Capital was "...not Britain, but
the capitalist socio-economic formation." Colletti, From
Rousseau to Lenin, 9.
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